Guardians of the Himalayas: Mountain Communities and India–Nepal Climate Diplomacy
06 June 2026, NIICE Commentary 12529 Pahi Bhuyan The Himalayas are often described as the “Third Pole” because they contain the largest reserve of ice and snow outside the Arctic and Antarctic. Stretching across multiple countries and supporting the livelihoods of nearly two billion people, the Himalayan region serves as a vital source of freshwater, biodiversity, energy resources, and climate regulation. Yet while discussions surrounding the Himalayas frequently focus on glaciers, rivers, and geopolitics, far less attention is paid to the communities that inhabit these fragile landscapes and act as their long-standing custodians. Today, climate change is transforming the Himalayan region at an unprecedented pace. Scientific assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) indicate that the Hindu Kush Himalayan (HKH) region is warming faster than the global average. Glacier retreat, changing precipitation patterns, biodiversity loss, landslides, floods, and water insecurity are increasingly threatening mountain livelihoods across Nepal and India. These challenges are not confined within national borders. Environmental risks originating in one part of the Himalayas often affect communities, economies, and ecosystems across the region. Consequently, mountain communities such as the Thakali, Sherpa, Gurung, Tamang, Bhotiya, Lepcha, Monpa, and several other Himalayan groups are emerging not only as victims of climate change but also as crucial stakeholders in regional governance, climate adaptation, and environmental diplomacy. This article argues that the future of Himalayan resilience depends on recognizing mountain communities as strategic actors rather than passive beneficiaries of development policies. Drawing upon examples from Nepal and India, it further contends that India–Nepal cooperation offers a valuable framework for protecting vulnerable mountain populations while advancing a broader agenda of Himalayan diplomacy. Climate Change and the Changing Reality of Mountain Communities Scientific evidence suggests that climate change is already reshaping the ecological foundations of mountain life across the Himalayas. According to the IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report and ICIMOD’s Hindu Kush Himalayan Assessment, glaciers across the region are retreating rapidly, while snowfall patterns are becoming increasingly erratic. These changes are directly affecting water availability, agriculture, biodiversity, and local livelihoods. A frequently cited example is Upper Mustang in north-western Nepal, home largely to the Thakali and Loba communities, where changing snowfall patterns and prolonged water scarcity have altered traditional agricultural systems. Communities that once relied on predictable snowmelt for irrigation are increasingly facing water shortages. Local farmers report declining productivity in barley cultivation and changing grazing patterns for livestock. As a result, seasonal and permanent migration among younger populations has increased, with many seeking employment in urban centres such as Pokhara and Kathmandu or abroad. Recent climate adaptation studies conducted by ICIMOD indicate that declining snowfall and increasing water stress are significantly affecting agricultural livelihoods in Upper Mustang. Similarly, Sherpa communities in the Khumbu region of Nepal have reported increasing concerns regarding glacial retreat, changing trekking seasons, and heightened risks from Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs). Since tourism remains a major source of income, climate-related disruptions directly affect local livelihoods and economic security. Changes in snow cover and weather conditions have also affected mountaineering activities, creating uncertainty for households dependent on tourism revenues. The consequences of climate change extend beyond gradual environmental change. The Melamchi flood of 2021 demonstrated how extreme weather events can rapidly devastate mountain communities. Triggered by intense rainfall and debris flow, the disaster destroyed roads, bridges, hydropower infrastructure, and water supply facilities that served hundreds of thousands of residents in Kathmandu Valley. The event highlighted the growing vulnerability of Himalayan communities to climate-induced disasters and the cascading effects such events can have on national development. Similar trends are visible across India's Himalayan states. In Uttarakhand, increasing landslide risks, changing rainfall patterns, and water scarcity have intensified existing socio-economic pressures. These environmental changes are making traditional livelihoods increasingly difficult and forcing communities to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. Migration, Livelihoods, and the Human Dimension of Climate Change Migration has emerged as one of the most visible manifestations of environmental stress in mountain regions. While migration has historically been influenced by economic and social factors, climate change is increasingly acting as a multiplier of existing vulnerabilities. In Nepal, communities including the Thakali of Mustang, the Dolpo-pa of Dolpa, and Tibetan-origin communities in Humla and Mugu have witnessed significant youth outmigration over the past two decades. Declining agricultural productivity, changing climatic conditions, and limited livelihood opportunities have encouraged younger generations to seek employment in Kathmandu, Pokhara, and overseas labour markets. While remittances contribute significantly to local economies, the loss of working-age populations can weaken community resilience and reduce the transmission of traditional ecological knowledge. India faces similar challenges among several Himalayan communities. In Uttarakhand, Bhotiya communities inhabiting border villages such as Mana, Niti, and Nelang have experienced increasing outmigration due to declining economic opportunities, changing environmental conditions, and recurring natural hazards. Many younger residents have relocated to Dehradun, Haldwani, and other urban centres in search of employment. The phenomenon of “ghost villages” has become a powerful symbol of mountain depopulation. According to reports from the Uttarakhand Rural Development and Migration Commission, more than 1,000 villages have experienced severe depopulation or complete abandonment due to a combination of livelihood insecurity, inadequate infrastructure, environmental degradation, and increasing disaster vulnerability. The challenge is therefore not merely demographic. As younger generations leave, communities risk losing centuries of accumulated knowledge related to forest conservation, water management, biodiversity protection, and climate adaptation. This makes migration both a social and environmental issue that requires coordinated policy responses. Why Mountain Communities Matter for Regional Security The significance of mountain communities extends far beyond local development concerns. The Himalayas support major river systems such as the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Indus, making them essential to food security, energy production, and water availability across South Asia. The importance of Himalayan ecosystems for regional water security has also been emphasized by the UN World Water Development Report 2024. Consequently, environmental instability in mountain regions can create far-reaching impacts for downstream populations. In the Eastern Himalayas, indigenous communities such as the Lepchas of Sikkim, the Bhutias of Sikkim and Darjeeling, and the Monpas of Arunachal Pradesh maintain livelihoods closely linked to forests, water systems, and mountain ecosystems. Environmental degradation therefore affects not only local economies but also cultural heritage, traditional knowledge systems, and regional ecological resilience. The 2023 Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF), documented by India's National Disaster Management Authority, illustrates this reality. Originating from South Lhonak Lake in Sikkim, the disaster affected several Lepcha settlements and downstream communities along the Teesta basin. It caused widespread destruction, damaging roads, bridges, hydropower facilities, and settlements while displacing thousands of residents. Beyond infrastructure damage, the event disrupted local livelihoods dependent on agriculture, tourism, and river-based economic activities. Similarly, the Chamoli disaster of February 2021 in Uttarakhand demonstrated how mountain hazards can rapidly evolve into national security and development challenges. A massive rock-and-ice avalanche triggered devastating floods in the Rishiganga and Dhauliganga river systems, destroying hydropower infrastructure and causing more than 200 fatalities. The disaster raised important questions regarding sustainable development, environmental governance, and infrastructure planning in ecologically fragile regions. These examples underscore a crucial point: mountain communities are not simply local stakeholders. Their resilience directly influences broader regional resilience. Environmental risks originating in mountain regions increasingly affect multiple countries, making mountain governance a matter of regional security. From Nepal's Role to India–Nepal Mountain Diplomacy Much of the recent discourse on Himalayan governance has focused on Nepal's growing role in climate diplomacy. Through institutions such as ICIMOD and its active engagement in global climate forums, Nepal has emerged as an important advocate for mountain ecosystems and vulnerable communities. However, the future of Himalayan governance cannot depend solely on Nepal's efforts. Environmental systems do not recognize political boundaries. Rivers, glaciers, biodiversity corridors, and climate risks connect communities across Nepal and India. Consequently, effective responses require stronger bilateral cooperation grounded in shared environmental interests. Such cooperation is particularly important because many Himalayan communities share historical, cultural, and economic connections across borders. Communities such as the Sherpas, Tamangs, Bhutias, Monpas, and several Tibetan-origin groups possess transboundary cultural networks that can support collaborative approaches to climate adaptation and sustainable development. India and Nepal already possess several advantages that can facilitate such cooperation. The two countries share an open border, common river systems, deep cultural ties, and similar environmental challenges. These shared realities create opportunities for what may be described as “mountain diplomacy” - a form of regional cooperation centred on ecological interdependence, climate resilience, and human security. An India–Nepal framework for mountain diplomacy could focus on several priorities. Joint glacier monitoring programmes could improve scientific understanding of environmental changes across the Himalayas. Cross-border early warning systems for floods, landslides, and Glacial Lake Outburst Floods could strengthen disaster preparedness. Collaborative livelihood programmes could help reduce distress migration while promoting sustainable economic opportunities. Furthermore, both countries could work together to document and integrate Indigenous and community-based knowledge into climate adaptation strategies. International organizations such as the Mountain Partnership have increasingly emphasized the value of Indigenous and community-based knowledge in climate adaptation strategies. Such initiatives would move beyond traditional diplomatic concerns and place mountain communities at the centre of regional cooperation. Policy Recommendations To strengthen the resilience of Himalayan communities, several policy measures deserve immediate attention. First, India and Nepal should establish a Himalayan Resilience Platform bringing together scientists, policymakers, local governments, and community representatives to facilitate knowledge sharing and coordinated responses to emerging environmental challenges. Second, investments in climate-resilient livelihoods such as sustainable agriculture, eco-tourism, mountain entrepreneurship, and renewable energy should be expanded to reduce economic vulnerability and discourage distress migration. Such approaches are consistent with the World Bank's Green, Resilient and Inclusive Development (GRID) framework. Third, governments should strengthen community-based adaptation programmes that combine scientific research with traditional ecological knowledge. Special emphasis should be placed on involving Thakali, Sherpa, Gurung, Tamang, Bhotiya, Lepcha, Monpa, Bhutia, and Dolpo-pa communities in policy design because these groups possess generations of knowledge regarding water conservation, biodiversity management, sustainable agriculture, and disaster preparedness. Fourth, both countries should expand transboundary disaster management cooperation through real-time data sharing, joint emergency response mechanisms, and integrated early warning systems, drawing lessons from initiatives such as the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI). Finally, mountain communities should be provided greater representation within national and international climate governance processes to ensure that policies reflect local realities and priorities. Conclusion The Himalayas are undergoing profound environmental transformations that are reshaping livelihoods, migration patterns, and development trajectories across Nepal and India. Mountain communities are among the first to experience these changes, yet they also possess valuable knowledge and adaptive capacities that can contribute to sustainable solutions. The experiences of the Thakali and Loba communities in Mustang, the Sherpas of Khumbu, the Dolpo-pa communities of Dolpa, the Bhotiya villages of Uttarakhand, the Lepcha settlements of Sikkim, and the Monpas of Arunachal Pradesh demonstrate that climate change is no longer a distant environmental concern. It is a present-day challenge affecting livelihoods, infrastructure, migration, and regional security. At the same time, these examples reveal the resilience and ingenuity of mountain populations that continue to adapt despite growing uncertainty. Recognizing mountain communities as strategic stakeholders rather than passive victims is essential for the future of Himalayan governance. While Nepal has emerged as an important voice in climate diplomacy, meaningful progress will require stronger India–Nepal cooperation that places mountain communities at the centre of policy design and implementation. Ultimately, the true guardians of the Himalayas are not governments or institutions alone. They are the Thakali farmers of Mustang, the Sherpa communities of Khumbu, the Dolpo-pa of western Nepal, the Bhotiya villages of Uttarakhand, the Lepcha settlements of Sikkim, the Monpas of Arunachal Pradesh, and countless other Himalayan communities whose knowledge, resilience, and stewardship have sustained these landscapes for generations. Protecting their future is not only a matter of social justice but also a prerequisite for ensuring the environmental stability, human security, and geopolitical resilience of the Himalayan region itself. Pahi Bhuyan is a Research Intern at NIICE & a student at the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat, India. ...
Balikatan 2026 and Fortified Multilateral Force in Indo-Pacific Region
10 June 2026, NIICE Commentary 12534 Kim Wilhelm Perez & Amadeus Quiaoit Critical Standpoint of the Regional Status Quo With Taiwan's main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT) made a rare visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 10 April 2026, with a so-called party-to-party diplomacy between Beijing and Taipei, it reached new developments over talks that could bring peace negotiations in the cross-strait. With an aim of the One China principle became the center of the summit to de-escalate the tensions between Beijing and Taipei. Tensions in the cross-strait became a ticking time bomb due to possible military confrontation between the US and China, which applied coercive diplomacy to deter the US from increasing support of Taiwan to take steps toward independence through military assistance. Taipei’s view of Beijing is an existential threat to its independence, and potentially, the year 2027 became a concern that could lead to the total invasion of Taiwan. This comes after US officials claimed that by 2027, Beijing will have successfully built up its military capability and doubled its inventory of ballistic and missile stockpiles in 2020. Meanwhile, in the recently published US National Defense Strategy (NDS), President Trump does not mention Taiwan as part of the US grand strategy but focusing more on the side of Western Hemisphere and on defending the US homeland. Even the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which serves as a multilateral force between allied states, is not mentioned in the US National Defense Strategy (NDS). This US policy became unclear to its allies like Japan, South Korea, and India which forced them to provide for their own defense or reconsider their reliability with the US partnership. On the other side of the world, the US conflict against Iran had a tremendous effect globally, which strategically challenges China’s expanding ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, the US missile defense system from South Korea and thousands of marines stationed in Japan have relocated to the area of the Persian Gulf, which left both countries defenseless against possible conflict in the region. Some experts say that the military's overstretched by military operations in Latin America and the Middle East could signal a willingness to step back from its support for Taiwan, which could limit arms sales for military support. With the exhausted military footprints of the US in the Indo-Pacific region, the possibilities of a changing power dynamics could result in new opportunities that could shape the region’s status quo. Western Allies and Expanded Multilateral Defense Initiative Revival of the Philippines’ external defense capabilities after decades of neglect due to post–Cold War demilitarization, internal security priorities, and limited defense spending has begun to rebalance what was once criticized as an “unequal arrangement” under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States. The Philippines' previous lack of military capacity not only fostered dependence on the US but also raised concerns in Washington that the Philippines might leverage the treaty to assert its South China Sea claims in ways that could trigger unwanted conflict with China. The ongoing modernization of the Philippine forces, coupled with increased international recognition of its maritime claims and shifting U.S. strategic focus toward China, signals a stronger commitment to self-defense and reduces reliance on treaty ambiguity, thereby creating conditions to clarify obligations and restore the treaty’s credibility as a deterrent mechanism. The closing reiteration of Balikatan 2026 centered on the idea of a “dangerous security environment”. Referred to as the new focus that could cause an impact on cross-strait conflict near Taiwan, the Luzon Strait shall be an area of concern, which could activate the Multi-Domain Task Force employing precision capabilities for maritime key terrain seizure operations as part of sea denial and territorial defense. Adding to the events of Balikatan 2026, the US was able to do a test fire of a Tomahawk missile as part of its Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system. This mobile system could launch Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 interceptors from land-based platforms, which is categorically designed to extend long-range strike capabilities. This activity is part of the scenario under the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC), which formed part with the involvement of maritime strike groups from the US, Philippines, Japan, and Canadian forces. With the participation of Japan in Balikatan 2026, this evolves into a bilateral alliance to a broader strategic alignment of US partners aimed at counteracting China. This comes after Japan’s aim to secure the First Island Chain and counter Chinese maritime expansion in the South China Sea. Japan was able to deploy 1,400 personnel, the first time it sent combat troops to the Philippines soil since World War II. Tokyo’s strategy of growing alliances in Southeast Asia will focus more on relaxed arms exports, security pacts, and joint exercises. According to the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC), Japan’s inclusion in the Balikatan 2026 demonstrated improved territorial defense operations with the US forces and its allies in enabling seamless integration of air, land, and sea capabilities with an aim to have interoperability of participating forces through execution of complex amphibious operations. The Philippines, Strategic Theater for Future Coercive Conflict The Philippines is a fulcrum of the U.S.-Chinese strategic competition in Asia. Based on its geography alone, the Philippines is arguably Southeast Asia’s most important country. Its southernmost island sits in a tri-border region with Indonesia and Malaysia, while its northernmost island is a mere 90 miles from Taiwan. The northern islands of Luzon are part of the First Island Chain, with the Second Island Chain marking the maritime boundary of the Philippine Sea’s eastern reaches. For 200 nautical miles off its west coast stretches the West Philippine Sea and, beyond that, the broader South China Sea. As then President Trump has said of the Philippines: “It is a strategic location, the most strategic location. The most prime piece of real estate from a military standpoint.” Yet, the story of the Philippines is one of unmet potential. Historically, the country has been dogged by political instability, economic mismanagement, and internal security threats. For too long, the Philippines has been a nation swept up by the geostrategic currents of its neighborhood rather than a shaper of them. That has started to change. The geographic advantage of the Philippines is set to be seen as a primary concern because of the geopolitical framework encompassing islands and archipelagos from Japan through Taiwan, including the Philippines, and down to Borneo. The Philippines shapes the dynamic of the East and South China Seas due to its strategic position between these two seas. Both the US and Japan, through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and the Reciprocal Access Agreement, complement each other's ability to have a framework in flexibility and coordination for the Philippines’ allies who have a vital interest in the First Island Chain. The Philippines' archipelagic nature gives the US and its allies leverage in determining strategic chokepoints through the Luzon Strait, waters surrounding Palawan, and areas of proximity to key maritime routes and contested waters located in the South China Sea. Consequently, the Philippines can be transformed into a natural barrier against potential Chinese movements into the Pacific, making it a critical asset in any US-China military confrontation. Strategic Assessment and Relevance The Philippines’ shift from a traditionally bilateral defense posture through the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States toward a more collective framework reflects a rational strategic approach to the evolving power asymmetries in the South China Sea. This transition enhances external balancing against China’s growing maritime capabilities while simultaneously strengthening deterrence credibility through multilateral signaling and shared strategic commitments. Embedding a new security approach within a broader network of like-minded states, the Philippines stands firm in adhering to a rules-based international order, consistent with the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and aligns with Southeast Asia’s broader practice of strategic hedging by engaging multiple actors to constrain unilateral dominance without provoking outright confrontation. Ultimately, collective defense provides Manila with greater strategic resilience, bargaining leverage, and operational capacity, positioning it more effectively within an increasingly contested maritime domain. Japan’s defense posture toward a collective security framework is significantly reinforced due to its strategic role in Southeast Asia. As a proactive contributor to peace, Japan enhances external balancing against China by adding advanced military capabilities and supporting coalition-building dynamics. Japan’s involvement also reflects Southeast Asia’s strategy of hedging and networked security, where middle powers diversify partnerships to avoid overdependence on a single ally while constraining coercive behavior. Japan functions as a critical “force multiplier” in the Philippines’ transition from bilateral defense to a layered, collective security architecture, enhancing both strategic resilience and regional stability in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the ASEAN–NATO–style collective defense pact in Southeast Asia remains strategically appealing but ultimately constrained by the region’s political realities. Amitav Acharya’s argument over ASEAN’s foundational principles, particularly non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and strategic neutrality, poses structural barriers to a NATO-like alliance. Unlike Europe during the Cold War, Southeast Asia lacks a unified threat perception; member states maintain varying degrees of economic and political alignment with China, making binding mutual defense commitments difficult to institutionalize. As Amitav Acharya argues, ASEAN’s strength lies in its flexibility and inclusivity, not in rigid military alliances. Thus, the networked security architecture, which is composed of overlapping bilateral and minilateral arrangements involving actors such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and selected ASEAN states, forms a collective defense that is less formal but still strategically meaningful, enabling deterrence without provoking full-scale bloc confrontation, aligning with Southeast Asia’s long-standing hedging strategy. Kim Wilhelm Perez is a Research Associate of IDSC and a graduate of AB International Studies at Far Eastern University - Manila, Philippines. Amadeus Quiaoit is a Resident Fellow of IDSC and a graduate of BA International Studies at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Philippines. ...