12 July 2025, NIICE Commentary 11467
Samyuktha P R
The West’s push for isolating Russia following the Ukraine crisis since 2014 is seemingly a failed objective as Russia has increased its foothold in various regions such as North Korea, Latin America, the Gulf, and Africa. Africa, in particular is seen as an advantageous arena to expand Russia's influence with greater benefits, as Africa currently is desperate for political stability and development. The relations between Africa and Russia go way back to the Cold War era. The Soviet Union had invested economically and assisted the independence movements of the African countries from their European colonisers, making Africa another proxy war arena for the Cold War rivalries. However, the relations deteriorated post-disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s due to economic constraints and debt that were rising exorbitantly in Russia.
As for the other foreign intervention in the near past, though African countries have gained independence, there have been successful operations carried out by the French through Operation Serval in 2013 and Operation Barkhane in 2014, and the US’s counterterrorism policy in some regions of the African continent. Additionally, the phenomenon of a paternalistic culture, such as ‘Françafrique’ by the French predominantly during the period from 1960 to 2019, continues to have lingering effects in Francophone Africa to date. Evidently, the West and European colonisers used the ‘rules-based order’ to justify interventions, policies, or aid programs that served only their own interests, rather than addressing the real needs or priorities required for the development of the African nations. This instrumentalization of the foreign powers has further bolstered African countries' feelings of not being treated equally in the international arena.
However, a strategic vacuum was left by the French and the US by the withdrawal of troops in Mali(2022), Burkina Faso(2023), Niger(France-2023, US-2024), Chad(2025), and Senegal(2025), which gave space for the Russian Federation to benefit and influence the region. It is widely debated that given the advantage of not following a contingency for cooperation by Russia, such as the need to follow democratic values, freedom of press, and human rights like the West demands, makes the arrangement easier.
The re-engagement by Russia in Africa nearly two decades after was heavily fuelled with the help of a Private Military Company, Wagner Group, with its deployment in 2017. The PMC Wagner group, now restructured and rebranded as African Corps, is directly controlled by the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation. The PMC, though not explicitly accepted as a wing of Russia, extended in Africa, worked in the interests of Russia, giving the privilege of deniability for the mishaps of the Wagner Group, such as allegations made for human rights violations in Africa.
The Wagner Group is one of the primary hands that made Russia expand its influence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. They imported security, trained military personnel, gave anti-insurgency training and consultancy services, sold arms, crushed rebellion from Salafi-jihadists, and contained the coups, gaining an important role in protecting the representatives of the government. The countries in the Sahel region, particularly Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, have junta-led governments seeking security imports and aid from Russia. Russia utilised the political instability to sift through the internal politics of these countries to benefit from it.
In North Africa, the Russian influence is taking a further deeper step with the shift of bases from Syria to Libya. The recent ambiguous shift of military bases away from Syria and to Libya confirms the possibility of relocating its naval and air-borne pathways, re-routing to Libya in the Mediterranean. Given the fragile situation in Libya, it has the possibility of becoming a conflict zone for the following reasons. One, Libya is currently struggling with a civil war, losing its control over the area again due to internal conflict will block Russia from building the logistics through Libya. Two, Russia backed Algeria, now, along with Libya, poses a greater challenge to Morocco, regarding the Autonomy plan for the Moroccan Sahara, where the Sahrawais are backed by the West. It makes the region more vulnerable to conflict. Three, the Russian presence in the Mediterranean through Libya is more disruptive than through Syria, given the geographical proximity to Italy. Thus, the alert spans out to part of Europe as well, which makes them unfavourable to the engagement of Russia in Libya.
In the eastern and Southern part of the African continent, Russia has gone through preliminary agreement in 2020, for the establishment of a naval base in Port Sudan to have a presence in the Red Sea, and the Wagner Group’s political presence were present in Zimbabwe, Madagascar and South Africa, with both military and political presence in Mozambique. Russia has also been extending its foothold in the Horn of Africa region by supporting Ethiopia.
There is a widespread presence of Russia in Africa in recent times, which is complementary to each other’s needs. The African continent lags behind in infrastructure and technology by which its resources, such as gold, diamonds, uranium mines, oil, land, natural gas, become unexploitable. Thus, Africa’s policy of “Resource Nationalism” (which is making nationalist policies that aim to engage in agreements and cooperation to utilise the resources with foreign countries and cautiously stay independent of them), is one big gateway to Russia. Russia, being involved in the Ukraine crisis, is looking for economic strategies to exert influence, including taking control of certain African resources. Russia, in turn, looks for regions to keep its military presence through aiding in the internal politics, agreements to build air bases, naval bases, talks for civil nuclear projects, and many more. As Africa aims to be non-aligned, Russia also does not demand an ideological match, unlike the West. In addition to this, the Labour shortages in Russia and an abundance of working population in Africa need to be converted into a boon, which could prove to be a great way to engage at a deeper level through revised educational programmes, student exchanges, and job opportunities. This makes Russian engagement a need for Africa at the moment and vice versa.
Conclusion
The road to self-sufficiency for Africa is not envisioned at the moment, given the Scramble for Africa, which has a lingering effect among the African population to date, accounting for poverty and underdevelopment, along with the policy of resource nationalism that limits the utilisation of the natural resources by the countries themselves through dependence on technology and machinery. Additionally, a corrupt and incompetent leadership without a strong set of values and confusing alignment policies and ideologies also amounts to instability in Africa. When resource nationalism may seem like a policy allowing to make economic relations with major powers such as China and Russia, it may better be said as a short-term goal as foreign intervention leaves no scope for self-sufficiency, even in a limited number of sectors. Amidst this chaos, the intervention of a foreign country such as Russia will only exacerbate the situation and will lead to instability in the long run, given the deep involvement of Russia.
Samyuktha P R is a Research Intern at NIICE, and she is currently pursuing her Master's in International Relations at the University of Madras, India.
