7 February 2019, NIICE Commentary 2065
Dr. Hoimonti Barua

Bangladesh held its much anticipated 11th General Elections on 30th December 2018 in its forty-seven years of being an independent nation-state. Sheikh Hasina, a veteran leader and the flag-bearer of the Awami League (AL) came out victorious sweeping out clean the Opposition parties and got reinstated as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh for the third time in a row. Scholars, researchers, political experts who analyse the socio-economic and political affairs of Bangladesh remained unbaffled by the outcome. Awami Leagues triumph was indubitable, nonetheless the fact that the party received 288 votes out of the 300 seats contested, making it more than  ninety per cent of popular votes did raise some eyebrows on the authenticity of the nature of free and fair elections claimed to have been exercised. Immediately after the results were announced, news of unrest and killings carried out allegedly by AL supporters were reported; hence analysts from domestic, regional and international community pointed out that this election was anything but free and fair. Despite all the allegations, the hat-trick victory confirms Sheikh Hasina another five years terms making her the longest serving Prime Minister (PM) in the history of Bangladesh.

Post Election Challenges for Hasina

The elections are over and PM Hasina should resume the task of balancing the strategic interests of her two neighbouring giants – India and China. The challenges that lie ahead for Hasina to deal with are to synthesize Bangladesh’s domestic concerns besides balancing its regional interconnections – that is – its relationship with India on one hand and China on the other. In the previous two terms, Awami League’s win was embraced by not only India but China and the rest of the Global powers as an expedient alternative to any possible instabilities in the South Asian region. The nature of Bangladesh’s association with India and China is disparately structured, although both are its developmental partners. While India played a major role in the emancipation of Bangladesh as a free nation and bonded by shared civilizational commonalities, China emerged as the major developmental partners for the same. So far, Hasina efficiently continued an immanent empathy with India, concurrently establishing a robust alliance with China. It will be interesting to observe how these relationships will shape up in the next five years. Will Bangladesh sway towards China or India? Indian support in the last four decades has been a constant factor with the additional ups and downs that occurred due to regime shift in Bangladesh which seemingly improved in the last decade. The China factor is on the other hand, an unavoidable reality.

The India-China Tug-of-War

It seems that Bangladesh is important for both India and China. Bangladesh and India have had an uninterrupted decade-long solidity since 2008. New Delhi has even invested a great deal in establishing strong ties with Dhaka. Especially, during the last four years of PM Narendra Modi’s government, the stakes were elevated substantially. Sheikh Hasina’s win indicates potential as well as constructive improvements to India’s favour, which remained a trusted ally during her previous primeministerships. Hence, the return of a reliable friend is favourable for New Delhi to fulfill its politico-economic ambitions.

At present, China is Bangladesh’s major trading partner and leading military provider. According to 2014 the Swedish based think-tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China was the biggest arms provider to Bangladesh between 2009 to 2013. China and Bangladesh did not only signed defence deals like “Defence Cooperation Agreement” in 2002 but the defence forces of Bangladesh are equipped with arms supplied by China such as anti-ship missile launchers, fighter aircrafts tanks, sub marines and several other defence systems, which makes India anxious.

The geo-strategic location of Bangladesh is an attractive factor for China. President Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) dream is notably one of the reasons. As a matter of fact, Beijing has recognised Bangladesh as crucial for the OBOR ambition and committed to an investment worth USD 24 billion. On the other hand, Bangladesh is salient for India’s ‘Act East’ ambition, North-East agenda, for its developmental goals and security purpose. Besides the USD 1 billion offered in 2010, the Modi government extended close to USD 9 billion as credit and aid for the Rampal project. Not only financial aid, New Delhi promptly sorted out one of the longest pending issues by ratifying the forty-one years old border dispute by signing Land Boundary Agreement, including the issues of enclaves and maritime boundaries, increased the number of Indian visas to Bangladeshi nationals to a three-fold from nearly 500 thousand in 2015 to 1.4 million in 2017 and increased the intake of Bangladeshi students through scholarships and various educational cooperation. Several foreign policy experts have attributed this speedy diplomatic pursuit by India to ‘China Factor’.

It is quite paradoxical how China was the last country to acknowledge an independent Bangladesh, and yet this Asian superpower has constantly and increasingly been interested in Bangladesh since the mid-seventies in terms of both civil and military cooperation. The Bangladesh-China association has undergone remarkable changes from an erstwhile antagonistic relationship to a substantial strategic partnership. This escalating closeness certainly perturbs India. China’s growing interest in Bangladesh and their escalating closeness certainly perturbs India.

What to Expect?

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s triple win imparts that the premier is insightful and astute in her domestic as well as foreign policy practice. Bangladesh’s borders are surrounded by India on three sides; therefore, she will not make any move to exasperate India. At the same time, China’s keenness towards enormous financial pledges, a possible debt-trap in disguise does generate curiosities for Sheikh Hasina. Nonetheless, if played strategically, she could strike the best deal for Bangladesh using the China factor against India.

In this tug-of-war between India and China, Bangladesh needs both these Asian giants to improve its country’s socio-economic status. Therefore, Hasina’s challenge is to not step into a situation of binary choice of ‘either-or’ with either these Asian powers. For Bangladesh, the most advantageous long term strategy would be to handle both its allies methodically, alleviating India’s China anxiety, at the same time chalk out a regional framework linking China-Bangladesh-India as a reality. And how Sheikh Hasina plans to accomplish these is what the regional as well international community is probably anticipating.

Dr. Hoimonti Barua is a Research Associate at NIICE.