19 December 2024, NIICE Commentary 9789
Anant Mishra & Prof. Christian Kaunert

Notably, at the recently held BRICS summit, members of the academia appeared perplexed on not finding Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman among the BRICS leaders’ summit, raising speculation over Riyadh’s joining this emerging politico-economic force. Almost a year post-receiving the invitation to join the group, the missing Saudi crown prince reflected Riyadh’s continued indecision towards joining the group, resulting in the invitation remaining unanswered, explaining the logic behind his absence from the summit, this year. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, attended the summit on behalf of King Salman only on the final day. To some, the late arrival of Saudi FM reflected the kingdom’s reluctance to join the group, with one estimate pointing towards Saudi trade experts still contemplating accepting the group’s membership, interpreting their reluctance as ‘ambiguous’.

Not long ago, Riyadh appeared more open to joining the BRICS. On that note, Riyadh in 2022 had openly expressed interest in joining the group. It could have been advantageous for the BRICS to have the kingdom’s membership (a major oil exporter in the gulf) enabling the group to relatively exercise more significant influence in the middle east. To that end, during the BRICS summit in South Africa last year, the group sent formal invitations to six nations. Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and the UAE quickly agreed. Although Argentina declined, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remained sceptical. Their reluctance quickly became a point of contention among members of the academia, with some scholars alleging Washington’s ‘discontent’ contributed to Riyadh’s indecision. That said, BRICS invited members until 1 January 2024 to formally respond with their decision. On the deadline day, President Putin announced Russia was taking the rotating presidency over the BRICS group for 2024 while proudly welcoming the new members, formally mentioning Saudi Arabia. That said, every new member state made a formal announcement in their host media, including the Saudi state television channel. But almost two weeks later, the Saudi state removed any mention of the kingdom formally joining the BRICS group and any of its references, from its state media.

In the second week of January 2024 Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Economy and Planning, Faisal Alibrahim confirmed Riyadh to be ‘still in decision’. This was also reflected in the bold remarks by the South African foreign minister over Saudi Arabia formally (confirming via Saudi delegation) joining the group, which Riyadh immediately rebuffed in the media, reiterating it is to still ‘contemplate over its decision’. As the BRICS Summit in Kazan approached, Russian FM formally (more like publicly) invited the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman to attend, which was welcomed with absolute silence from Riyadh. The reflection from tight-lipped Riyadh was quickly interpreted as its indecision, which was largely confirmed by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal’s remarks during the summit, echoing the kingdom’s commitment to strengthen partnership with members of the BRICS group—devoid of any mention of it formally accepting membership. To that end, members of the academia appeared divided over Saudi Arabia’s ambiguity, one Qatari expert reflected on Riyadh’s ambiguity as ‘pressured or under duress’, reflecting Riyadh’s altering policy towards the BRICS group. Although the authors lack the necessary data to present a credible case over Riyadh’s ambiguity, it does raise key challenges for the BRICS group, that need to be highlighted:

  1. Riyadh’s ambiguous approach (some scholars call it strategic reluctance) towards the group has undoubtedly set a negative precedent for pro-Washington allies. Riyadh’s indecision has not only created confusion within the BRICS group but somewhat echoed desperation reflecting from the group who called it a full member on multiple occasions only to be refuted by Riyadh. This ‘ambiguity’ may have a serious impact on the effectiveness of the ‘plus’ format, diminishing its capability (to other similar blocs) in resolving future challenges (even existing) on the occurrence of a deadlock or accepting new proposals by member states on geopolitical issues. Taking note of Riyadh’s ambiguity and rejection by Argentina a negative precedent appears to have been set on the status of a ‘BRICS partner’ and the expectations that come with it. To the authors, the ‘BRICS partner states’ appears less as a concept but more of a resolution mechanism to prevent a deadlock between those states echoing to expand the group via membership and those aiming to keep the group limited to a ‘select states’.
  2. However, Saudi Arabia’s ‘ambiguity’ reflects a broader challenge, to begin, with a notion that comes with every group a state intends to join – joining BRICS has a cost, an idea not just this group but every other bloc or regional mechanism appear to have rigged with. However, to that thought, one Johannesburg-based economist echoed positive sentiments, stating ‘BRICS being neutral and against no state’ evident from over forty countries expressing willingness to join the group as stated by the then Chair, South Africa, in its 2023 Summit. By joining the group member states can seriously maximise their economic potential through diverse engagements/partnerships and, to begin with, seek access to global markets such as India and China—but with a particular ‘risk’. This is reflected in interviews (conducted by authors) with experts in Riyadh who confirmed the capitol’s reluctance over the BRICS invitation to Iran, along with Moscow’s apparent intent to reduce the reliance on US Dollars, which brings it in crosshairs with Washington. These moves, according to a Brussels-based economist, make it certainly ‘anti-West’ with the potency to stain Saudi’s long-standing partnership with Washington permanently. Although Tehran and Riyadh appear to have a steady (somewhat progressive) relationship, bringing UAE into the fold could have insecure Riyadh at a time when the Middle East is engulfed in severe instability.
  3. The sheer delay or tight-lipped Riyadh reflects its ability to perhaps strike a balance between partnerships at a time when regional instability is at its peak, and the global order appears to be steadily multipolar, limiting the influence of the West (to a certain extent) while seriously encouraging multipolarity. Riyadh is more inclined towards signing two bilateral defense agreements with Washington, which experts opine holds greater strategic value than BRICS membership. Accepting the BRICS invitation could be potentially interpreted as inching closer to either Moscow or Beijing, at least in Washington. That said, it is without a doubt experts advising Riyadh to opine for greater engagement with regional/global powers such as China or India, however, that sentiment appears to fade Moscow’s influence in the group. Although Riyadh is a principal supplier of crude oil to Beijing and the latter is Riyadh’s leading trading partner in the world, their ties have exponentially grown since the Chinese investment of over USD 10 billion for the Neom project, a futuristic city built under Riyadh’s Vision 2030 plan. Beijing, too, took the longer road and successfully negotiated the 2023 rapprochement deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In comparison, Moscow’s influence over Riyadh can safely be termed as ‘limited’. Although Moscow and Riyadh appear to greatly engage on the OPEC platform, it will weigh its options carefully before alienating both China or Russia. Still, it will preserve its relationship with Washington even if it means maintaining ‘ambiguity’ over joining an ‘anti-West’ group. That said, experts argue that, given the extent of ambiguity, Riyadh might change its stance post-Trump’s inauguration at the White House. It is doubtful that Riyadh’s ‘strategic reluctance’ has gone unnoticed, especially among Trump’s future administration members. Still, it may have silently inspired members of the Global South to replicate such a strategy.

Anant Mishra is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales in the United Kingdom and Prof. Christian Kaunert is a Professor of International Security at Dublin City University in Ireland and of Policing and Security at the University of South Wales in the UK.