17 October 2024, NIICE Commentary 9665
Anant Mishra & Prof. Dr. Christian Kaunert 

Since the Israeli airstrike that killed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of ‘once feared’ Hezbollah, the group appears to have experienced one of the worst succession crises in its history, echoing the challenges of succession emanating from Tehran. Tracing sequentially, after the death of the late President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, the loss of Hassan Nasrallah was felt deeply in the power corridors of Iranian political space, accelerating the talk of the ageing Supreme leader’s transition while putting the spotlight on Mojtaba Khamenei, the second-eldest son of the Ayatollah and a key office bearer within the Office of the Supreme Leader, potentially raising his stalks in the race for the Third Ayatollah.

Tehran’s decision to strike against Israel for the second time this year, with a barrage of over 200 mixed rocket systems, cannot be simply put as retaliation against the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah or Ismail Haniyeh, according to one Beirut-based scholar, but also reflects instability in the Tehranian political space. The scholar further opines that such a delay in retaliation has put a significant risk to the Islamic Republic’s survival and prestige, which appears to decline among regional allies and its Axis’. In Iranian political space, voices of leaders from the conservative camp continue to question Tehran’s capability to deter Israeli offensives, with those in the military leadership arguing over Tehran’s reluctance to counter Israeli assassinations of its Axis’ leaders, pointing out severe challenges to operations, management and recruitment of its Axis’. With Hamas significantly weakened and Tehran’s tip of the spear Hezbollah experiencing operational challenges amidst serious contention emanating from its lower and middle echelon commanders (also echoed by the Shi’a community in Lebanon) on Tehran’s inability to protect Shi’a Lebanese, it will not be incorrect to state that, Tehran is facing one of the most severe threats to its existence, since the revolution.

Going through news articles, interviews and opinion pieces published inside Tehran (Tasnim, Fars News Agency or Mashregh news, for example) or even during the interaction with the local Iranians, the authors sensed Ayatollah’s growing concern for Iranian national security. This also emanated from two interactions between Ayatollah Khamenei and Hassan Nasrallah, weeks before his death, where he advised the slain Secretary-General to seek shelter in Iran, fearing possible intervention from Israeli intelligence inside Hezbollah. Taking note of the alleged Israeli assassination of Ismail Haniyeh inside Tehran, one security expert opined the Islamic Republic had gradually lost its reputation as a ‘safe-haven’ for potential Axis groups/affiliates and Shi’a militias alike. As a consequence, Hezbollah continues to receive severe criticism even from its staunch hardliner political leaders in Iran, especially over the delay in succession, resulting in decision-making paralysis within the group. According to one Tehran-based scholar, Nasrallah’s importance cannot be weighed in words but in the emotions of various commentators who once opined the late Hezbollah’s Secretary-General as a potential successor of Khamenei himself, echoing his vitality in Tehran’s grand strategy. His death has created a vacuum in Iranian political space, which is reflected by Tehran’s continued woes against Israel, giving a unique opportunity to Mojtaba to emerge from the shadows.

Profiling Mojtaba Khamenei

One Tehran-based scholar called Mojtaba as shy and ‘one who prefers to remain behind the curtain’. That said, Mojtaba’s first formal public appearance can be attributed to his video appearance, just last month. For decades, one former Tasnim news agency journalist opines, Mojtaba was primarily photographed only on select occasions, such as parades on the Quds Corps Day or during the anniversary of the Iranian revolution. Accompanying his father, the Ayatollah, one could spot him during funerals of key political figures or on certain memorial days accompanied by the Iranian political elites. It all changed last month when social media circles within Tehran began circulating videos of him suspending his eagerly awaited and widely respected seminary lectures while announcing his decision to be ‘simply non-political/devoid of political interference’.

That said, in the aftermath of Hassan Nasrallah’s death, Iranian media captured Mojtaba Khamenei in a meeting with the influential Abdullah Safieddine, Hezbollah’s chief of operations in Iran and the brother of Hashem Safieddine, Nasrallah’s potential successor as Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, reported to have been killed in an Israeli airstrike on October 8. Iranian media also photographed Mojtaba during his visit to a hospital, where he was reported to meet Hezbollah operatives injured during the explosion of pagers and telecom sets by Israel, a visit, one journalist opines, made on behalf of his father. This was the first time Mojtaba had undertaken a task such as representing his father while meeting the Axis’. He was rarely visible in public, and those who personally knew him termed his preference to engage/interact behind the curtain. His slow yet patterned transition from the shadows echoes a similar pattern Ayatollah had groomed the late President Raisi, who, before Mojtaba, was a preferred candidate to succeed Khamenei before becoming the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 8th President. While reviewing the photographs of Mojtaba’s visit to Hezbollah’s injured soldiers in Tehran, one former Tasnim news agency journalist opined his appearance mirrored that of the late President Raisi’s interaction with Hezbollah commanders during his visit to Lebanon in 2018, on enquiring about the pattern or the similarity (of Mojtaba’s visit) with any other political elite, the former journalist further opined of similar publicity received by the late Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, erstwhile chief justice of Iran who was also groomed by the supreme leader before his demise in 2018, pointing out his widely covered visit to Iraq in 2017. This solid public attention appears to work in favour of Mojtaba, making him more visible in crucial Islamic Republic constituencies while slowly raising his profile within the political space.

Mojtaba Khamenei as the supreme leader

The Ayatollah’s fear for Iran’s national security emanates from the loss of critical politico-military leaders of its Axis experiencing Nasrallah’s fate. Still, he appears to have accepted Mojtaba’s prospect of succeeding him as the next Ayatollah after he passes away. This explains the increase in the frequency of Mojtaba’s public appearances. However, according to an Iranian political leader, Mojtaba could appear as an unlikely choice as the third supreme leader purely because of nepotism. The doctrine of regime change directly contradicts hereditary succession, which is one of the very reasons that resulted in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

That said, in light of President Raisi’s untimely death and the escalated conflict between Israel and Iran (with the potency of evolving into a regional war), the Ayatollah and his followers (within the Council of Experts) regime’s stability and continuation/timely succession of leadership with particular ideologue holds supreme importance than the public’s perception towards nepotism. Taking note of the recent election for the Council of Experts, handpicked candidates by Khamenei appear to dominate decision-making within the council, somewhat assuredly increasing the chance of Mojtaba being elected as the Third Ayatollah.

According to one Iranian political elite, Mojtaba has the necessary credentials to become the Third Ayatollah:

  1. One expert defined him as a radical cleric, mirroring the ideologue of his father. He has an exhaustive political experience with limited to no public exposure. Some experts however contradicts his political experience, terming it as simply flourishing purely in the shadows of his father.
  2. He is experienced in managing shadow Iranian entities, certain institutions whose organisational hierarchy is nominated directly by the Ayatollah and tasked with functioning with the bureaucratic institutions within the Office of the Supreme Leader.
  3. In addition, Mojtaba is a member of critical, high-powered decision-making committees that oversee the state’s political elite’s transition, promotion, and delegation of duties within key politico-military institutions.
  4. Many political leaders within the Islamic elite, including Amin Hossein Rahimi, erstwhile Minister of Justice under the late President Raisi, and Abdol Hossein Khosrow Panah, a Shia cleric and Professor of Philosophy at the Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought, are close confidantes of Mojtaba. According to one estimate, Mojtaba has developed his circle of confidantes, mirroring his father’s.

That said, a great patronage or lineage also creates an unending list of enemies or rivals, which, in the case of Mojtaba, appears to be fewer but more potent. There is serious concern among reformists and hardline camps alike about Mojtaba succeeding his father. Some experts argue that after coming to power, he could create an endless saga of sustained influence and meddling in state affairs, limiting the significance of the Iranian presidency. That said, some in Tehran further opine on his religious credentials, terming it as ‘unattractive’ even within the hardline camps.

A Reformist Ayatollah?

During the authors’ interview with some experts of the Iranian political space, more than half of them portrayed Mojtaba as walking the line of a modernist or reformist ideologue, contradicting his father by not interfering in the state of affairs, somewhat painting a picture of a pure idealist/reformist Ayatollah. That said, taking note of his childhood, systematic isolation in his pre-adolescence, strong affiliation with extremist factions, and cracking down on protesters with harsh measures, all of which paint a contrary picture of him, one that reflects a continuation of harsh measures against entities threatening the state’s internal security and carrying forward his father’s policies. This could have probably made him more suitable among his three brothers, rendering him a fitting candidate in the eyes of the Ayatollah, a strong radical Islamist integrated into the state’s politico-military decision-making apparatus.

It will not be incorrect to state that Hassan Nasrallah’s death has not only crippled Hezbollah’s organisational and operational capability but has also mirrored serious concerns over the continuity of leadership and succession in Tehran. The fear within the political leadership in Tehran rests mainly on the probability of Israeli manoeuvres inside Iran, such as the assassination of critical Iranian leaders with the intent of destabilising the Iranian political system. After the loss of late President Raisi and Hasan Nasrallah, Mojtaba is at a crucial juncture where his newfound taste for public appearances suits him and the public. With Mojtaba as the third Ayatollah, his father’s wishes to maintain the regime’s stability and continuity of ideology are not only achieved but also aligned with Iran’s future, its regional ambitions, and its broader grand strategy.

Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales and Prof. Dr. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is also Professor of Policing and Security and Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales