26 November 2020, NIICE Commentary 6493
Saanjana Goldsmith
The dawn of the twenty first century has unfolded a series of unforeseen catastrophes that has left a scar in our minds and fear in our hearts. The horrific 9/11 attacks on the American soil proved Huntington’s thesis of Clash of Civilization while at the same time reminding the world that no nation is invincible. The world was only coming to terms with reality of the large scale terror attack on America that the November of 2008 proved disastrous and callous for India. The appalling incident of 26/11 which killed about 166 people still remains etched in every India’s heart. This incident opened up the discourses on maritime terrorism and the significance of coastal security in a country which has about 7516 km long coastline to protect. This article explores the nuances of maritime terrorism and the status of coastal security in India after the 26/11 attack.
Maritime Terrorism
All terrorist attacks are planned meticulously with advanced strategies and often comes with an element of surprise. The medium or the route adopted by the terrorists to reach their target location has been largely varied. In the recent years, the sea line has been under the terrorist radar for engaging in scornful activities. In fact, the 26/11 attack was channelled through the sea line where a group of ten terrorists crossed the Arabian Sea through multiple small boats.
Maritime terrorism can be defined as terrorist activities which are undertaken within a maritime environment, using vessels, boats or ships; either at a fixed platform at the sea or the surrounding coastal region. The attack might either take place at the sea or the sea might serve as a route to reach the targeted spot on the coastal land.
The geostrategic location of India makes its vulnerable to maritime terrorism because India is surrounded by water on three sides which is connected to the mainland. Moreover, the coastal regions act as centres for trade and business. As there is massive influx of goods at the port cities it becomes an easy route for terrorists to infiltrate into the mainland. The fact that there are incessant numbers of activities taking place in the ports, entering the territory in disguise becomes easier.
The use of the term Maritime Terrorism is not restricted to attack on humans at the sea. It includes a vast range of issues like attack on boats, vessels or ships; it does not necessarily mean an attack on humans. It can also be an attack on merchant ships or naval ships which might be used to thwart a larger attack planned elsewhere. The risk mostly lies in hijacking small boats which was the exact method adopted by the terrorists to execute the 26/11 attack.
Maritime Terrorism: Threats for India
The Indian port cities like any other port cities are major centre of trade and commerce with vehement engagement of people and goods. These port cities serve as a source of optimism for terror activities because of the non-stop engagement and inflow of goods and people. This makes the ports more susceptible to terror acts. There have been cases of piracy, drug trafficking, illegal goods trafficking etc. conducted through these ports. Therefore, adopting a guise and entering the country is not very difficult for terrorist groups to fulfil their missions. Interestingly, most of the world’s trade take place through ships and hence a maritime terrorist act is not invincible for us. Moreover, as stated above, maritime terrorism is not restricted to attack on humans alone but it can be an attack on ships carrying goods in the sea which might be a threat to both the maritime environment as well as the trade and economy of a country. The Mumbai attack raised number of questions such as how did a group of terrorists fully armed crossed the Arabian Sea and entered Mumbai unnoticed? What is India’s Coastal Security Policy? Has there been any change in the document post the 26/11 Attack?
Since India’s independence, national security has been relegated to protecting the land against external threats. But, after the 1993 Mumbai blasts, a restructuring of the 1977 Coasts Guard was adopted with Indian Navy, Coast Guard and joint patrol of state police and personnel’s from the former two units. The Indian Government went on to institutionalise a Coastal Security Scheme in 2005 to set up check post at the coastal regions with coastal police stations equipped with boats, jeeps and bikes and handled by trained coast guards. Sadly, this mechanism was not enough to deter the 26/11 Mumbai attack.
There has been a drastic shift in the maritime security apparatus post the Mumbai terror attack. There has been a renewed emphasis on coastal surveillance, intelligence and information gathering among various organisations. Moreover, in 2009, few months after the terror attack the Indian Coast Guards were additionally designated as the authority responsible for coastal security. A comprehensive surveillance system called Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN) with cameras, sensors, radars and automatic identification has been instituted in coastline areas and in the islands. There have been varied levels of SOP’s adopted for coordination and engagement along with regular exercises and awareness building mechanism among the fishermen at sea. In fact, the process of identification and validation has been more stringent at the ports for further protection. Moreover, interaction programmes with the fishing community are conducted regularly to sensitise them with the issue and serve as the “eyes and ears” for the coastal guards. A decade after the deadly attack, the ICG has been looking after a host of issues starting from coastal security to anti-piracy issues.
However, the bigger question for today is are we secured from a maritime terrorist act even after all these mechanisms. Are there any other challenge and those should be resolved? A plan can never be full proof if the strength of the adversary is not known. A terror attack can be executed through means which has never been imagined. So in spite of a coastal security mechanism, there might be challenges through other means. The maritime infrastructure and the associated industries are easy targets. They are either the target objects or means to enter into the mainland. Secondly, there might be moles within the fisherman community or others in the network that might thwart or misguide a bigger catastrophe. Thirdly, the reconnaissance of a region or a port might be disrupted through cyber-attacks. Fourthly, Terrorism-piracy nexus has been on the rise and the risk associated with this nexus is very deadly.
What is needed at this point is a cohesive coastal security mechanism with advanced infrastructure, to practically execute the policy. There is a need for a set of well trained personnel through simulations, joint exercises and with a logical mind to be able to crack codes whenever required. Moreover, both the Central and the State governments should initiate discussions on how to protect the nation on its three fronts covered by water. With NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid) about to be operationalise by the end of this year, a more comprehensive outlook to surveillance and reconnaissance can be undertaken. However, the responsibility does not lie on the shoulder of the policy makers or the military alone, but the academic circle and the civil society too have a significant role to play in researching, reporting and raising awareness about maritime terrorism in order to prevent another 26/11 attack.
