23 September 2024, NIICE Commentary 9606
Syed Ali Abbas & Maryyum Masood
A stable Afghanistan is crucial for the stability of the entire region. For over four decades, Afghanistan has been mired in turmoil, with various Taliban factions and warlords locked in a relentless power struggle, while simultaneously serving as a battleground for major global powers. Throughout this period, Afghanistan has remained a difficult neighbor for Pakistan. The return of the Taliban to power in 2021 has significantly worsened the situation. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has become a safe haven for Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch insurgents, while also serving as a breeding ground for extremist groups. These groups are sponsored by adversaries to target Chinese nationals and infrastructure projects within Pakistan. These developments have placed Pakistan in a precarious position, as it must ensure its internal security while maintaining its critical relationship with China. Experts argue that the attacks on Chinese nationals on Pakistani soil could strain China-Pakistan relations. However, there is a contrasting view that, despite these challenges, both states are working together to mitigate the risks and strengthen their partnership.
The Afghan Taliban and TTP Nexus
The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has created a conducive environment for various militant groups to operate with impunity. The Taliban’s ideological alignment with extremist factions like the TTP has emboldened these groups, allowing them to regroup and plan attacks across the border into Pakistan. A recent United Nations report says that TTP has emerged as the largest terrorist group in Afghanistan, with an estimated strength of 6,000-6,500 fighters. The report details how the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan have increased their support to anti-Pakistan TTP, enabling it to conduct cross-border attacks into Pakistan.
According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), there was a 56 percent increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year following the Taliban’s return to power, with most of these attacks being traced back to sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The UN report corroborates this, noting that TTP operatives, along with local fighters, are being trained in Al-Qaida camps in Afghan provinces such as Nangarhar, Kandahar, Kunar, and Nuristan. The report also mentions that the Taliban’s intelligence agency, the General Directorate of Intelligence, has facilitated guest houses in Kabul for TTP leaders, providing them with immunity from arrest and weapons permits.
The implications of this policy are dire for Pakistan. The TTP has intensified its attacks against Pakistan, from 573 in 2021 to 1,203 in 2023, with the trend continuing into 2024. This dramatic surge in violence has strained relations between Islamabad and the de facto Taliban government in Kabul, which denies the presence of any terrorist groups or the use of Afghan soil to threaten neighboring countries. However, the UN report explicitly states that the Taliban’s bonds with TTP are close, and the debt owed to TTP is significant, making it unlikely that the Taliban will take any substantial action against the group.
The Baloch Insurgency: An Additional Challenge
Meanwhile, the situation in Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and most resource-rich province, has also worsened due to Afghanistan’s tacit support for Baloch insurgents. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other insurgent groups have found safe havens in Afghanistan, from where they orchestrate attacks on Pakistani soil. The insurgency, which has been ongoing for decades, has intensified, with the number of attacks increasing by 25 percent over the last three years, according to government data.
These attacks have not only targeted Pakistani security forces but have also been aimed at Chinese nationals and projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Gwadar port, a cornerstone of CPEC, has been a frequent target of Baloch insurgents.
Instability in Afghanistan and Impact on China-Pakistan Relations
China’s investment in Pakistan, particularly through CPEC, is critical to the country’s economic future. While some experts speculate that the increasing insecurity in Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan has made Chinese companies wary of continuing their operations, and that the frequent attacks on Chinese nationals could lead to the suspension of CPEC, the reality is different.
The attacks on Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects, while deeply concerning, have paradoxically presented an opportunity for China and Pakistan to strengthen their bilateral relationship. These incidents highlight a shared threat from extremist elements, particularly those operating from Afghanistan, and have spurred both countries to deepen their cooperation on security and counterterrorism measures. Rather than driving a wedge between the two countries, these attacks have accentuated the necessity for closer coordination to protect their mutual economic and strategic interests. It is evident from the Joint Statement between Pakistan and China after the terrorist attack on the Chinese convoy of the Dasu Hydropower Project in May 2024. The statement said:
“The two sides strongly condemned the terrorist attack on the Chinese convoy of the Dasu Hydropower Project in Pakistan on March 26, 2024, and emphasized that no attempt to undermine Pakistan-China friendship and cooperation will ever succeed. The Chinese side appreciated the Pakistani side’s active pursuit and conduct of the investigation and its findings, and hoped that the Pakistani side would continue to make every effort to hunt down any perpetrators and make sure they receive deserved severe punishment. The Pakistani side was committed to enhancing security forces deployment and taking more effective security measures, and making all-out efforts to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel, projects and institutions in Pakistan.
The two sides reiterated their commitment to combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations with a “zero tolerance” attitude, and agreed to further strengthen cooperation in counter-terrorism and security through a comprehensive approach. Calling on the international community to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation, the two sides expressed their firm opposition to double standards on counter-terrorism, and opposed the politicization and instrumentalization of counter-terrorism. The two sides stood ready to work with the international community to strengthen multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations.”
The attacks have created a pressing need for enhanced security collaboration between the two neighbours. By working together to address the threat of terrorism, China and Pakistan have strengthened their intelligence-sharing mechanisms, improving their ability to preempt attacks on Chinese personnel and infrastructure. This cooperation extends to joint security initiatives, with both countries collaborating on specialized forces such as Pakistan’s Special Security Division (SSD), which is dedicated to protecting CPEC projects and Chinese nationals. China’s role in supporting the SSD through training and equipment has been pivotal in ensuring CPEC’s security.
In addition, the attacks have provided an opportunity for diplomatic solidarity. The frequent targeting of Chinese nationals has underscored the critical importance of CPEC to both countries, reinforcing their strategic alignment. Through joint statements and high-level engagements, such as those following the major terrorist attacks on the Chinese nationals working in Baluchistan, China and Pakistan have demonstrated their firm commitment to CPEC. These moments of crisis have allowed both states to reaffirm their shared objectives and long-term vision for the corridor, positioning CPEC not just as an economic initiative but as a symbol of their enduring partnership.
Moreover, these challenges have reinforced China’s long-term stake in Pakistan’s stability and security, leading to greater Chinese investment in Pakistan’s internal security capabilities. By supporting Pakistan in countering extremist groups that target CPEC, China is helping to stabilize not just its investments, but also the broader region. This aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which requires a stable and secure Pakistan as a key partner.
In sum, the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in 2021 has profoundly impacted the region, particularly influencing the dynamics of China-Pakistan relations. Three years into Taliban rule, Afghanistan’s internal instability, the presence of extremist groups, and the evolving geopolitical landscape have posed both challenges and opportunities for Beijing and Islamabad. The Taliban’s governance, or lack thereof, has exacerbated cross-border militancy, making Afghanistan a focal point in the strategic calculations of both China and Pakistan.
Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad and Maryyum Masood is a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad.
