25 September 2024,NIICE Commentary 9615

Pritam Sarbabidya

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Ukraine on August 23, 2024, came a month after his visit to Russia. This trip coincided with his visit to Poland on 21st August which signifies PM’s attempt to plot a route towards India’s longstanding ties with Moscow alongside pursuing closer ties with the countries in Europe. This would also go down in history as the first by an Indian prime minister to Ukraine since diplomatic relations were established over 30 years ago. 

The genesis of India-Ukraine relations date back to the 1990s, with India recognizing Ukraine as a sovereign state following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and establishment of the diplomatic relations in January 1992. During the years of Cold War, when the world was divided into camps one led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union, India maintained a non-alignment policy while establishing a significant tie with the USSR. With the independence of Ukraine, India formally laid the foundation of the diplomatic channel in January 1992 with Kyiv. 

This visit of PM Modi came at a very critical juncture, as the Russia-Ukraine war once again intensified over the last few weeks, differently this time with Ukraine’s offensive actions inside Russia from blowing up of bridges, targeting Russian strategic assets, and capturing war prisoners. 

The day started with the PM visiting Mahatma Gandhi’s statue, later on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accompanied him at the multimedia Martyrologist exposition on children at the National Museum of History of Ukraine in Kyiv, which was in the memory of children who lost their lives in the conflict.

During PM’s meeting with President Zelenskyy, PM recapitulated his position, he specified that “India is ready to play an active in any efforts towards peace.” On the other side Ukrainian President wanted “India to attend next peace summit”. Another important event of the visit was the signing of four important pacts for cooperation in fields of humanitarian assistance, medicine, agriculture, and culture. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the ease of doing business for mutual economic activities and investments, apart from removing any impediments for greater trade. The two countries also decided to encourage greater engagement at official and business levels to explore joint projects, collaborations, and ventures, also to explore the probability of opening and investing more in fields of higher education. 

Act of Balancing?

Many experts, and critical thinkers argue that this visit can be seen as a ‘damage control’ to that of PM Modi’s last month visit to Russia and doubted the timing of this visit. Before coming to such a conclusion, it is crucial to see from diverse perspective. India is known for its ‘Policy of De-Hyphenation’, which implies that “dealing with two countries, having an adversarial relationship between them, independently”. For instance, India maintains its relationship with both Israel and Palestine, in which India’s relationship with Israel stand on its own merit, independent and separate from India’s relationship with of Palestine. Similarly, India’s relationship with Russia is not in conflict in pursuing its ties with Ukraine. 

However, pursuing a relationship with the two adversaries who are at war brings about several challenges with it. Firstly, from the very first day west led by the United States and Ukraine in particular have criticised India for buying oil from Russia at a discounted price. In the month of July, India has overtaken China as the biggest importer of Russian oil, with an import of 2.07 million barrels per day (bpd) compared to that of 1.76 million bpd by China. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has mentioned the same, he said India can stop both Putin and the war, by stop buying oil from Russia, and halting the Russian economy. To which India didn’t take much time to make its point clear, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar while responding to a question retorted that “It’s not like there is a political strategy to buy oil… there is an oil strategy to buy oil … there is a market strategy”. This pursuit of ‘self-interest” is a characteristic of New Delhi’s foreign policy. 

Similarly, India has been accused time after time for not condemning Russia for its aggression towards the sovereign state of Ukraine. India’s relationship with Russia underlines India’s long-lasting strategic visions with keeping in check India’s interest of not letting Moscow to go much closer to its biggest contender in the region China, knowing the relationship Russia enjoys. There was another apprehensive comment made by President Zelenskyy, that came after PM left Kyiv for New Delhi, “the issue of the Russian Army recruiting citizens of India as members of its support staff and sending them to the battlegrounds in Ukraine”, the same has not been well taken by the India side. 

While PM Modi was in Ukraine, Chinese Premier Li Qiang met Russian President Putin at the Kremlin, which clearly stipulates it’s not just limited to Russia-Ukraine, others have started playing their game and trying to make their way in the situations in Europe. India aspires to be “Vishwa Bandhu”, a global friend, cannot leave opportunities, that was also evident in PM Modi’s remarks as well when he mentioned, “We were not neutral from day one, we have taken a side, we stand firmly with peace”. 

To conclude, PM Modi’s visit to Ukraine reinforces India’s stature global where it can engage with opposite camps at the same time assuring its own national interest. For decades, India has been a spectator to European affairs, with the visits to Ukraine along with that of Poland, Austria proves India’s endurance to play a significant role in the continent with the changing dynamics of the international system. This August trip also exhibits India’s potentiality to sail through the waves of geopolitics, maintaining relationships with countries across Europe, stretching itself on the world stage simultaneously preserving its strategic autonomy. 

About the Author:

Pritam Sarbabidya is pursuing MA in Politics and International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Studies, Pondicherry University. His Area of interest includes India’s Foreign Policy, Defence and Security Studies, Intelligence and Strategic Warfare