22 August 2024, NIICE Commentary 9440
Ankur Dixit
Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in Kyiv, Ukraine on the 23rd of August. This will be his first visit to the war-torn nation since it broke away from Russia, and it will come roughly a month after he met with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Modi also met with Volodymyr Zelenskiy, the president of Ukraine, last month during the Group of Seven(G7) conference in Italy. Before leaving, Modi stated, “As a friend and partner, we hope for an early return of peace and stability in the region. “India has consistently encouraged Russia and Ukraine to settle their problems via communication and diplomacy. During his two-day visit to Russia last month, Modi witnessed a deadly attack on a children’s hospital in Kyiv. He informed Putin that the loss of innocent lives was heartbreaking and terrible and demanded an end to the violence.
The visit is seen as a balancing act of Indian foreign policy. Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine(so-called Special Military Operation), India so far trod a tightrope walk of neither endorsing Russia’s attack on Ukraine in principle nor openly criticising their act. India abstained from successive UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it effectively furthered the Kremlin cause. A sustained US-led Western campaign to isolate Russia globally is not in India’s interest. Their effort to present the Russia-Ukraine war in the Manichean narrative of a fight between Good and Evil does not resonate well with India. From the Indian perspective, it is neither party to nor any role in the ongoing war. It is a geostrategic war between Russia and the US-led West, where Ukraine is merely a pawn on the geo-political chessboard of Europe. Similarly, India’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war is dictated by its national interests and geo-strategic calculus.
India purchases more than 40% of its armaments from Russia, so it makes sense that it would be reluctant to offend the Kremlin. Indeed, this percentage has been declining as India diversifies its defence purchases from the US, France, Israel, and other Western nations. However, the past still significantly influences the present: 86% of India’s military hardware is Russian-made and dependent on Russia for spare parts. Taking advantage of Western sanctions on Russia, India has become one of the largest importers of cheap Russian energy. According to a report from ICRA, a rating agency, there is an uptick of 20 times in India’s purchase of Russian oil compared to 2021, exceeding two million barrels per day. Since the Western sanction on the Kremlin, India could save approximately 13 billion by importing cheaper crude oil from Russia. In sum, India is still dependent on Russia for military hardware despite India’s attempts to reorient its military hardware equipment. Besides being a vital defence supplier, India considers Russia a capable and willing partner to balance China. Amid facing heat on the northern border with China, India can ill afford to isolate Russia, which in turn could fall into a complete Chinese embrace.
Strategically, India and Russia are on the same page; both seek a multipolar world and multipolar Asia. Despite persistent US pressure to take a side in the Ukraine war, the fragile situation in the South Asian neighbourhood, Russia’s deteriorating military and economic might, and its potential irrevocable entanglement in China’s strategic embrace have made maintaining solid relations with Moscow necessary. However, India and the USA have come closer strategically over the last decades due to Chinese belligerence in the Asia-Pacific region. There is greater military-to-military cooperation, and the USA has signed three important agreements, the General Security of Military Information Agreement(GSOMIA), the Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement(LEMOA), and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement(COMCASA), to enhance military interoperability. India is also part of the QUAD grouping, which many believe is directed against China. Despite all these, India and the US have a history of mistrust, particularly in Washington’s role in South Asia, which has not been augur for India. The perceived US role in the overthrow of the friendly Sheikh Hasina regime in Bangladesh reinforces unease between the two countries. There is also a fundamental difference in the ‘notion of alliance’ between India and the US, as strategic autonomy is the cornerstone of India’s foreign policy and is a critical US hegemonic role in world politics.
Rationale Behind the Visit
Against this background, PM Modi’s Kyiv visit can be seen as an assertion of India’s strategic autonomy. India is ideally placed to play a mediator role in today’s polarised world as it has a working relationship with both the US and Russia. It is common sense that the road to peace in Ukraine goes through Washington. Any peace negotiation attempt on the part of the USA, bereft of the Kremlin and not on the table, is wishful thinking. India also does not want to be considered part of the much-maligned ‘Axis of Evil’. In the wake of the peace settlement, Russia does not mind India being one of the countries on the negotiating table. India would also like to raise the voice of the global South as they are the ultimate sufferers of ongoing war.
For the countries of Africa, the issue of food security is particularly acute. Africa, which still imports a net amount of food due to its over 65% uncultivated land, has been badly hit by the increase in global food prices brought on by the conflict. The IMF reports that the price of staple foods “surged by an average 23.9 percent in 2020-22—the greatest since the global financial crisis of 2008” across Africa. The adverse impact of rising food and fuel prices can also be felt in South Asia; Bangladesh is a telling example. With an ambition to be a leader of the global South, India should raise the plight of global South countries that are not adequately heard in the cacophony of strategic narratives of both camps. If this visit is an exercise of optics, India should project itself as standing for countries of the global South at the war’s end, not the victory of one side, which is the need of the hour. Any high hope from this visit flies in the face of the ground reality, as India does not have much leverage. To what extent this visit will placate the disappointment of its Western partner despite continuing its close partnership with Russia is uncertain. How long will India be able to convince its Western partner of its much-touted strategic autonomy will be the test of India’s foreign policy acumen. With the election year in the USA, if there is a desire for at least a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war, India is an ideal candidate to be on the table with like-minded countries.
Ankur Dixit is a Research Scholar at the Centre for Russian and Centre Asian Studies, JNU.
