16 January 2023, NIICE Commentary 8497
Amadeus Quiaoit

The Philippines faces a strategic security challenge against the People’s Republic of China under the highly militarized and contested waters of South China Sea. China is already on track to become a world-class Navy to compete against the United States by 2030.  Current force structure organization of the modern Philippine Navy (PN) indicates continued posture to that of a brown water navy, although recent developments in the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) Modernization program suggests a possible way towards a Blue Water navy.

This geostrategic reality constraints pose actual strategic consequences to the Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP). Main underpinning due to local complacency of domestic politics, which extends from bilateral dependency on Chinese-Filipino foreign direct investments, to political affluence in informal economies , as well as national security concerns  penetrated within military establishments. A well established thought on Filipino strategic culture can be studied further by the concept of “Philippinedization” which is simply defined as “process whereby a weaker state, backed by a powerful country, goes to great lengths in temporarily refraining from opposing a neighboring great power by resorting to economic and diplomatic rapprochements at the strategic level but strengthening its national security infrastructure on the operational level with an eye for potential conflict in the foreseeable future”. The need for a new naval strategy requires abandoning the old force structure and development issues in order to formulate a new strategy.

Current Defense Policy

According to author’s previous article, The Philippine Navy faces tactical and strategic vulnerability for their lack of systemic development in blue water naval warfare. A weak Philippine Navy signals weakness for potential adversaries, primarily the People’s Liberation Army Navy. However, despite having incompetent materiel and maritime capability the Republic of the Philippines designates a legal mandate for the Navy (formally known as Executive Order No. 389) that states a reorganization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to create and organize a Navy as one of the major services of the AFP with primary concerns in operations at sea responsible for the protection of territorial and coastal sovereignty. The Philippine Navy is stuck under an offshore/ littoral naval structure.

The Available Capabilities and Old Operational Problems

To illustrate my point, the chart below represents the current force structure and employment of the Philippine Fleet (note: the units under each command are aggregated for total statistics). At the technical level, the Philippine Fleet is bolstered entirely by littoral vessels under its command. Out of the three listed categories no naval ship is capable of delivering any long range, not to mention any ship equipped with 100mm canons, to deliver offensive strikes or suppressive firepower required to combat in a high-tech naval warfare. These vessels cannot withstand any Type-45 destroyers or any modern Chinese frigate. At the operational level, the force structure offshore and littoral combat forces were built lightweight for rapid maneuvers and fast combat operations.

What does this all mean at the strategic level? The Philippines simply does not have a grand strategy for its maritime/coastal defense. This is partly due to the strategic culture of the Armed Forces of the Philippines prioritizing “Internal Security Operations” or ISO, hence, this security paradigm favors land power over sea. This traditional paradigm translates auxiliary functions and complementary support to land-based operations of the Philippine Army; it is nowhere near delivering actual sea power projection for maritime defense.

A Possible Naval Grand Strategy; A case for Multilateralism

The past several years has seen big shift in force development of the Philippine Navy. The recent acquisition of six next generation Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) from South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries contract. This new littoral OVPs will be adjoining together with Gabriella Silang-Class patrol ships and Teresa Magbanua-class frigates, will jointly form an integral role for modernization program for Philippine naval forces. The ongoing procurement process of French scorpene class submarines indicates a probable shift from a littoral, brown water navy to that of a blue water navy, albeit in the distant future. The fleet is gearing towards a multi-domain  battlespace as the political administration of Marcos Jr. resented a complex “balancing act” policy between the US-China competition. A new naval strategy has two-fold. First, the multi-domain aspects need to have firm reliance on allied interoperability, especially that of American naval counterparts. This could complicate Marcos Jr. calculus on bilateral relations with China because multilateral naval exercises are necessary for allied interoperability.

Naval interoperability was pivotal to the success of US military dominance and regional influence in the Indo-Pacific. The value of a coalition force is more efficient in navies as the open waters are more expansive and opaquer than ground terrains of land warfare. Interoperability also enhances allied strategy for a seamless integration of networks and channels for combined fleet formation. This cooperative strategy will favor the burgeoning Philippine Fleet as it slowly transforms into a Blue Water navy.

Second, while the Philippine Fleet is indeed littoral in character, the sum of its parts is bigger than the whole. Proper assignment of each vessel can be strategically placed for coastal defense. A possible scenario could be a classical “line of ship” formation outside Manila Bay, a semi-ring of frigates in an event of Chinese naval offensive. For surface combats, the Philippine Fleet can perform combined arms strategy. A typical scenario could require advanced OPVs serving as peripheral frontlines to cover the flanks of the Fleet, while the Gabriela Silang and Teresa Magbanua frigates and diesel submarines forces both primarily deliver main firepower and offensive blows to enemy fleet. Additional elements from the Philippine Marines and Air Forces can replicate similar offensive and strike capabilities for force protection.

Lastly, trenching through open systems can expand defense market, government-to- government contracts, and private partnerships beyond available options for material procurement.

Conclusions

For the meantime, the Philippine Navy has no choice but to ride itself with multilateral defense. Pragmatic foreign policy and defense cooperation can offset the lack of materiel capability. There is much needed development for restructuring and reemployment of navy ships and units, though easier once the materials and equipments are ready. While the road may seem a long way to go, prospects for a real blue water strategy is within reach.

Amadeus Quiaoit is a Research Intern at NIICE.