27 May 2022, NIICE Commentary 8013
Amadeus O. Quiaoit
The Philippine Navy can better strategize in the future force development suitable in its geostrategic environment through automation and augmentation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Autonomous Systems. Recently the Department of National Defense (DND) secured the deal for next generation Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) for the Philippine Navy. This deal was awarded to South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) after the Asian Defense & Security (ADAS) 2022 convention held in Manila. The award was originally intended for Australia’s Austal shipbuilding company but was scraped due to budget constraints.
These next generation naval patrol vessels, together with PCG’s Gabriella Silang-Class patrol ships and Teresa Magbanua-class frigates, will join to form an integral role for DND’s Horizon 2 AFP modernization program for Philippine naval forces. New acquired ships are expected to perform in possible high-tech multi-domain warfare in near future as heightened regional security concerns in South China Sea coalesce with China’s rise to great power. These new OPVs are expected to replace the obsolete Malvar– class corvettes hand overs from the USN. Horizon 2 represents an array of emerging trends in defense technologies to better equip the military for future wars. The materiel procurements of Horizon 2 suggest a return to traditional military domains rather than a shift to internal security operations in the Philippines.
This return to major power competition reckons the recently launched Autonomous Multi-Role Vessels (MRV) of the Japanese Maritime Self- Defense Forces (JMSDF). The Mugami-class frigate is set to counter increasing PLAN activities in the disputed first island chain, particularly the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Having a complete Unmanned Autonomous Multi-Role Vessel (UAMRV) system allows the Mugami cutting-edge littoral and surface combat performance as well as enhanced cyberwarfare capabilities for plausible high-tech wars against China. Japan’s pioneering autonomous MRV was a missed opportunity for the Philippine Navy’s emulation for development of autonomous materiel capabilities.
The bang for buck ratio for DND’s “strategic” purchase may seem unaddressed to the changing and emerging multi-domain battlespace. The Armed Forces of the Philippines should augment cybersecurity capabilities in their naval systems. Achieving strategic effect through force multiplication is highly desirable due to the expandability of light-weight littoral ships in naval forces. It is cheaper than bigger, more capable to address symmetrical military threats, and also more politically acceptable for potential losses due to being unmanned. Maximizing HDP-1500 NEO’s reduced radar cross section (RCS) provides enough maneuverability to emulate covert navigation and conceal Combat, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (CSTAR) for stealth tactics. Automation of systems also hardens armed forces cybersecurity measures against possible operational risks of system-wide hackings, information sabotage, and hardware and software vulnerabilities. Securing and hardening cybersecurity is akin to hitting two birds in one stone.
Operational risks and benefits, however, are not mutually exclusive. It is important to review safeguards for cybersecurity infrastructures by having robust defensive electronic warfare strategies. Coordination of multi-domain assets, such as deterrent integration of BrahMos missile systems, can seamlessly provide tactical protection to the Navy, as well as cover limited deterrence at the strategic level. A reliable cybersecurity system can shield offensive – kinetic weapons from open, potential hardware and software exploitations. Naval AI systems can re-calibrate existing command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to overcome these operational and combat risks by constructing integrated naval fires. Technical vulnerabilities also include lack of bureaucratic firewall against embedding penetration of Chinese telecommunication in AFP military establishments.
The Philippine Navy should also recognize the value of joint warfighting along the electromagnetic spectrum. Competition in multi-domain naval warfare requires interception of signals and who gets faster and better information requires complementary augmentation in traditional military strategies.
Amadeus O. Quiaoit is a student of International Affairs at Polytechnic University of the Philippines.
