21 October 2021, NIICE Commentary 7474
Gurjot Singh
The “peaceful rise” of China as a recognized world power bewilders many vis-a-vis India. The list of aspects in which the Chinese state has leapt forward is never-ending, however, one significant area of international cooperation or coordination in which China, against all odds, has outperformed India is at employing “Paradiplomacy” as an important principle of its external policy and developmental vision.
Paradiplomacy, a combination of ‘parallel’ and ‘diplomacy’, refers to the autonomous capacity of the subnational entities to engage with the external actors at social, economic and cultural levels. This concept was first introduced by Canadian Scholar, Panayotis Soldatos. Earlier, Paradiplomacy used to be considered as a phenomenon viable only in states with a resilient federal structure such as Canada, the United States and Australia. The subnational governments in these countries, nevertheless with certain boundaries, maintain the right to engage in activities that suit their own best interests. Recently, even the states with a strong unitary system like China, Japan and Malaysia have set new benchmarks in the pragmatic application of this innovative practice of international relations.
While India, which promises the spirit of democracy and federalism in its constitution has been yet unable to yield substantial gains, the post-1978 reforms Communist China has done fairly well in this regard. Apart from the coastline regions such as Macao, Guangdong and Fujian the provincial governments of landlocked regions as Xinjiang, Yunnan and Guangxi have played a key role, by leveraging their peculiar position and geographical proximity with economically viable regions, in bringing lucrative economic opportunities for the Chinese state. In other words, these sub-states give a soft face to the hard policy ambitions of China thus making smart outcomes.
The Xinjiang Autonomous region, with all its restiveness, is central to the Belt and Road initiative’s outreach to the Central Asian Republics and wider Eurasian region with both of which it has socio-historic linkages. Most striking is the case of Yunnan. Deriving the most benefit of China’s ‘opening up’ policy has increasingly assumed the role of an International Actor in the Greater Mekong Subregion thus taking the lead in significant diplomatic, economic and resource cooperation initiatives.
Not far from India, Yunnan has land borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam and access to Thailand. In recent years, it has become a hub of several major transnational initiatives such as the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Initiative and the Asian Development Bank.
The Chinese province’s proactive lead has even at times created displeasure in the Chinese Communist Party’s central leadership. Whereas the Chinese notion of providing a greater role to provincial authorities largely hinges on fiscal growth and infrastructure development, in the case of India this takes a slightly different turn. India has a history of a continuous tussle between provincial and central governments over the issues of the extent to which the former can have as per its own will.
Unlike China, regional units in India are basically identified as home to different cultural-lingual communities. Many regional movements spearheaded by regional leaders especially in states which lie on the periphery have posed serious challenges to the pursuit of Paradiplomacy.
Although a number of Indian states such as Maharashtra, Gujrat, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu have attracted huge foreign investment by organizing global summits and have led delegations to foreign countries. However, such limited activities lag short of being recognized as Paradiplomacy by a fine margin.
For activities by subnational governments to fulfil the criteria of Paradiplomacy these ingredients are, widely accepted, required to be present – Authority, Opportunity, Capability and Presence or recognition.
For what it is worth, India has been unsuccessful in exploiting the latent Paradiplomatic potential of states in the border regions. Take the example of Northeastern states of India which are contiguous to, and form the natural economic zones of Bangladesh, India, China and Myanmar – Assam, Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur, Nagaland and Meghalaya. Collaborative initiatives such as Invest Assam and Institutional measures like Act East Policy Affairs have failed to produce the desired output.
Another such enclave, whose potential to become a gateway for the wider Eurasian market remains untapped is the Indian state of Punjab located at the confluence of Indo-Gangetic plains and Himalayan region.
A closer assessment of relevant trends in both countries point at the ‘State systems’ for the success and stumbling of Paradiplomacy. The policymakers in India remain wary of creating such autonomous spaces in the conflict-ridden parts of the country. China has an upper hand when it comes to dealing with such insecurities. The single-handed rein of the Chinese Communist Party, carder transfer system and non-native principle leaves no possibility for things to take the undesirable route.
Incentivizing the States for undertaking Para diplomacy has been the main ingredient of the Chinese success recipe. For a country like India, where regional features such as identity, religion, demographics hold considerable sway over the social formation, Encouraging States to get involved in Para diplomacy can also be successfully employed as a peace building strategy.
Gurjot Singh is pursuing a Masters in Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi and is Research Intern with NIICE.
