23 September 2021, NIICE Commentary 7367
Dr. Cauvery Ganapathy
The Indo-Pacific, despite being at the center of the massive pivot by different countries of the region, carries a disputed threat perception. A difference in threat perception results in the absence of a cogent stand against any threat- particularly so against an actor like Beijing that is so deeply intertwined with the economics of the region- and makes it inordinately difficult to come up with a coherent and sustainable Indo-Pacific policy per se. The reception of the AUKUS by the different members of the ASEAN demonstrates this cleavage. Given that an avowed ASEAN principle is the dissuasion of external influence in the region- the very fundamentals of the AUKUS, should be understood as being at variance with the grouping’s rationale, when viewed through that prism. Yet, the reactions of countries such as Singapore and the Philippines, is indicative of a receptivity that belies that principle. This lack of concordance is further compounded by the fact that most of the region is as dependent on Beijing for their economies, as they are on Washington for their security guarantees.
The US’ role as a long-distance guarantor and balancer of security in the Indo-Pacific, however, has been an increasingly difficult commitment to fulfil. Simultaneously, the UK’s own departure from the EU has brought far greater clarity and assertiveness in its foreign and security engagements, and AUKUS demonstrates an enmeshing of a resultant reinvigoration of its Indo-Pacific strategy with the US and Australia’s own felt compulsions in the region. Under the circumstances, AUKUS may be considered as the equipping of a regional actor with power projection abilities in a strategic arena where the US and UK’s strategies are tied inextricably to the ability to have their allies and partners commit to forward posturing and a sustained presence as a robust and dependable counter to China’s growing assertiveness.
The features of the agreement, suggest that AUKUS is a function more of strategic signaling, where sides have been chosen most deliberatively, rather than an urgent response to the perceived threat or about any immediate security advantage in the Indo-Pacific. Two issues are pertinent to this assessment. First, there is, in fact, a clear rationale for diesel-electric submarines, the kind that the botched deal with the French, was to provide the Australians with. They are far more cost-effective and they rank higher on the stealth quotient as well. By being cheaper to operate, maintain and more difficult to detect, diesel-powered subs, such as the Japanese Taigei Class, should ideally, on purely technical terms, have been a more suited match to Australia’s immediate defense capabilities and requirements. The very fact that the nuclear ones were chosen instead, is indicative of a much more complex strategic calculus which may be assessed as laying out the contours of long-term Indo-Pacific strategy, the results of which will become more readily apparent over a period of several decades. Any export or sharing of nuclear related technology affords a leverage concomitant with the life-expectancy of that technology. Based on that consideration alone, even a successful start of the AUKUS’ arrangements, would reasonably lay down the trajectory of the IP’s security architecture for the next fifty years, if not more, given the leverage of energy politics in the defense sector.
Secondly, the difference in the actual time when these subs may be expected to be in operation when compared to the French Shortfin Barracudas is of 4 years. It becomes necessary then to consider if the urgency and immediacy being cited as the underlying logic for the AUKUS (“Australia lives in a time of great uncertainty not seen since the 1930s”) is not premised more on strategic signaling than any real immediate on-the-ground changes to the RAN’s power projection capabilities.
Vis-à-vis the Quad
In purely security terms, AUKUS indeed overshadows the Quad by leaps. The question to be asked, however, may be, if the conundrum in the Indo-Pacific is chiefly a security issue or if it is a confounding panoply of multiple issues, including security, which the Quad alone, at the moment, appears to be grappling with, even if in fits and starts and with more near-misses than successes.
The concerns with a possible discounting of the Quad in the larger scheme of the Indo-Pacific due to the creation of AUKUS, therefore, may be rather extravagant, and an oversimplification. The absence of a codified decree of any sort has been an impediment to both, the clout and the efficacy of the Quad. AUKUS, on the other hand, comes with a clearly defined and articulated mandate. While this helps the pursuit of the AUKUS’ objectives, it also amply demonstrates that the Quad continues to be the only real grouping that has a comprehensive Indo-Pacific agenda. The Quad comes with its own problems, no doubt. However, it remains a potent force for good in the region, and given the laser-focused mandate of the AUKUS, continues to be the only real grouping that would be effective in working on issues of supply chain resilience, viable infrastructure finance, promulgation of best practices through the sharing of technical know-how, mitigation techniques addressing the impact of climate change and the renewed non-traditional threat components from the Afghan fallout.
The merits of AUKUS are all too apparent. Yet, it may be prolonging a blind-spot. It is in essence, a security arrangement- undeniably critical for the circumstance of the region. Yet, the long-game that Beijing appears to be mastering, however, is one as significantly economic as it is security related. It is also on the economic front and the compulsions of needing funding and infrastructural assistance that the smaller countries of the region find Beijing to be an indispensable actor, complicating the impulse to side with the US and its partners. China’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific is a twin-pronged one- the first is military modernization at unprecedented levels, and the second, is to mount an economic and diplomatic outreach to supplant the US’ primacy in world affairs, and to force the hand of countries on issues such as the Taiwan question. It becomes necessary then to contend with the need for both the Quad with its comprehensiveness as well as the AUKUS with its security focus, to be equally important and effective.
Regardless of all that the Quad is trying to organize and accomplish to substantiate their repeated public claims that the grouping’s motive force is not that of an anti-China grouping, with the announcement of the AUKUS, it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that the US’ approach to the Indo-Pacific, and the solutions it is finding for it are not security centric. The very presence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative widens the web of Chinese presence and efforts at being indispensably entrenched into the everyday life and economics of the countries of the Indo-Pacific and this often nullifies even the most blatant security concerns. Despite the inherent need and logic of the security-centric approach, it may then be useful to consider if the US and its allies are not bringing a knife to what is essentially a gunfight.
