26 August 2021, NIICE Commentary 7313
Samriddhi Roy
The panic gripped the state of Afghanistan where Taliban fighters marched to Arg (Kabul) and claim their ‘righteous’ seat at the heart of Kabul, as doleful Afghan eyes watch their ruination in shock. Unleashing acts of terror arrived much earlier than anticipated, from releasing their fellow fighters from prison on the east side of the city to painting black over billboards of women in public one is reminded of the ghastly ruination of Western Rome where humanity ceased to exist when the barbaric tribes untethered new tremors of horror. No doubt the gruesomeness of state of affairs has pipelined the flow of essential information in media. Streets flocked with Taliban fighters who wasted no time in emblazoning the Sharia law, rife rumours with little reliability makes it hard for authentic data to emerge in real-time. The American backed government in Kabul disintegrates minutely, following questions on the governance structure and style the Taliban will aim to establish. The ex-government system had a domino-like collapse of power at a nauseating speed which is only expected to get worse under the Taliban regime. Typically, futuristic questions over Taliban’s state capacity and involvement are a headscratcher for policy specialists globally. Hence, it is highly essential to draw a comparison in Taliban’s association with state structure and governance patterns in the 1990s and its relevance in present-day conflict.
The 2021 Taliban is not identical to the group operating in the 1990s. In its early days, Taliban closely associated power around a clique of ex-mujahidin religious students from Kandahar. Leaving the state of affairs majorly unchanged in 2001, despite the repeated tries by the Islamic Emirates and their opponents to arrive at a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict. Interestingly, Taliban in their recent statements reflect new learnings from the past, throwing reinterpretation of their beloved law to somehow ground and rationalize their past actions. Taliban’s understanding of governance can be plucked from their need to assert the composition of Emirate to accommodate future power-sharing provisions. For instance, the “caretaker government”, buttressed in the belief that the sarparast Wazrian (“acting ministers”) will successfully eliminate political adversaries and aid the formation of the Council of Ministers in Kabul.
Afghan Re-order: Taliban 2.0
Taliban is a group on a mission. The wing of Taliban related with political outlook argues that the situation today is fairly different from the Emirate time period. Not only the organization is in a fitful position- as of a rural insurgency group camped in Pakistan, but it is also far weaker than what it used to during its direct rule in Afghanistan. Even if the Taliban seeks to claim its military victory in Kabul, it may not necessarily translate to acquiring a monopoly of power. Thus, breaking from its monopolist view of the 1990s is Taliban’s biggest challenge today. The power-performance stage has observed a sharp shift in ideological positioning, senior Taliban leaders no longer enjoy a “majority” status, Afghanistan’s dreams of freedom from the former group is now occupying a majority space. From recent news briefs on Taliban’s probable administrative structuring released by Afghan Times, it is evident that the group realizes how impossible it is to root a stable state whilst ignoring experienced actors from politics and the economy.
The Taliban is likely to resurrect a twelve-male based council to oversee governance in Afghanistan along with a few tractable US sanctioned state ministries (revealed by the close sources of the leadership). Such involvement may be completely ceremonial as the former group feels all eyes of the international community at this point. Three powerful protagonists in the Taliban leadership who will reclaim important titles in the new government include: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (Co-founder of Taliban), Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob (Son of the Co-founder of Taliban) and Mullah Mohammad Omar (Mastermind of brutal Military Strategies).
This vicious cocktail is served to Afghanistan with Khalil Haqqani, a figurehead of the Haqqani network responsible for causing several killings and disharmony who was later backlisted by the United Nations. Together, this group lives to discharge unbound terror and violence. Their violence against humanity stretch to crimes such as, drug (heroin, methamphetamine) and human trafficking, smuggling mining assets (lithium, gemstones) generating billions of dollars in gains. Therefore, this poisonous design of administrative control undermines the roles of Prime Ministers, Presidents or even that of ‘emir’ , a title self-imposed by the Taliban insurgents in the 1990s. However, it will be unwise for Taliban to assume neo-resistance movements are as suppressible as they used to be. Isolated, closed door-strategies will only take the new Taliban so far, sooner than before they will encounter factional struggles which may weaken ruling bodies stunting the scope of their state power. There is consensus amongst both pro and ani-Taliban groups over how the former today, wants to appear as inclusive as they can be. The ceremonial establishment of ‘coordination council’ (aimed at tabling peaceful talks) by ex-President Hamid Karzai and former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former warlord close to the Taliban and the Pakistani authorities that have bankrolled the insurgents for two decades. Part and parcel of that quest for international acceptance is the Taliban claim that they will not seek retribution against supporters of the previous government or against advocates of constitutionally guaranteed rights, including women’s equality, freedom of speech, and respect for human rights. However, their actions scream of disputed authority and vengeance. Reuters reports claim armed Taliban gunmen banged doors after doors searching for people by names in their list. Unfortunately, ground-level reporting is scarce, due to the Taliban restrictions on media platforms, the local situation is reaching global platforms through the social media accounts of the locals.
In addition to this, Baradar and Yaqoob are very much expected to place themselves in the presidential palace in the coming days as confirmed by Suhail Shaheen, Taliban spokesperson, in an interview with BBC. Ahman Massoud, the son of a former anti-Taliban commander Ahmad Shah Massoud was killed two days prior to the 9/11 terror attacks. Massoud has built a resistance movement in the Panjshir Valley, a few miles outside Kabul, as an attempt to keep the historical site away from Taliban control, Meanwhile, sporadic fighting has been reported from the mountainous areas of Kapisa, Takhar, Baghlan regions. Resistance emanating from the Panjshir Valley indicates that the internal resistance has garnished support across the country which may turn into a full-blown civil war in the coming weeks.
Although the Taliban has majorly conquered control over Afghanistan, the international community may want to shell out ample time for the Taliban regime to announce its diplomatic tactics. However tempting it may be to look away and succumb to self-interests, it is best for extra-regional powers to tone down their strategic interests. Instead, the international community must push for basic rights of recognition, human rights, women’s rights, freedom of speech and sustaining the republic status of Afghanistan.
Why will Taliban 2.0 fail at governance?
Fiscal Issues
The Taliban’s governance structure harps on ideals of- draconian injustice, repression, negligent focus on macroeconomic and other unhealthy elements. The former acting governor of Afghanistan’s central bank envisages deadly inflations, currency devaluations, plummeting state revenues and higher food prices. The ongoing conflict has not been kind to the existing economic crisis, for instance, the money transfer service Western Union which allows for remittances from abroad has intermitted services for now. Afghanistan’s economic crisis predates the Taliban capture. In the year 2020, its GDP shrunk by two per cent with urban poverty climbing up by six per cent making inflation swell by three percent in total. Given the totality of demographic change, reduction in jobs and destruction of public property, hostile environment, the “emergency levels” of food security are foreseen to make economic conditions worse from hereon.
Internal Resistance
Rapid evacuation strategies and the desperation of citizens to leave their homeland even before the setting in of formal Taliban rule is highly denotive of how the insurgent group will struggle to gain public trust. Critical mass legitimacy from a population that has seen generations of oppression, violence, corruption, dysfunction may continue to resent the Taliban rule for years to come especially in the face of economic rupture.
If at all the Taliban fail to dispense genuine support and subsequently fail to consolidate legitimacy and power, armed opposition will occupy centre stage and energize resistance movements. For instance, Panjshir, the only province untouched by the Taliban will invite other terrorist organizations to camp, remunerate strategies to cause further disruption and economic strain.
Fall of Security Wall
The twin blasts at Kabul airport killing ninety Afghans and thirteen Americans have thrown the latter’s evacuation plan in a frenzy. The intensity of evacuation has decreased but the will escape the country remains high. Thousands of Afghans have taken refuge at the airport awaiting the tiniest window to flee from the Taliban. This demonstration of attacks underscores the challenges the Taliban face, as they are processing their new government post demolition of democracy in Kabul. For now, the Taliban must stand tall in the face of the threat of violence posed by their rival contemporary Islamic State- Khorasan, a group that continues to stage attacks in this volatile situation.
Conclusion
The US’s twenty years of misstep in Afghanistan requires in-depth speculation and investigation. It is not, without doubt, the US withdrawal has dire mid and long-term imperils for the locals and the South-Asian region. Historically, the Taliban’s notorious association with Al-Qaeda will exacerbate the document of insurgency and terrorism in the region. Besides the issue of foreign fighters, the Taliban is faced with another ghastly truth from their past- governance is much preserve than victory through fighting- especially with groups who lack the expertise and empathy to tackle deep policy challenges.
