Bertil Lintner (2017), “China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World”, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Neeraj Singh Manhas
Two worlds clashed in October 1962. After years of tensions along the border, China unleashed its military might on India and won. The battle still haunts both sides, as illustrated by the 2017 Doklam standoff. However, we still lack a complete picture of Indian and Chinese decision-making leading up to 1962. The Henderson Brooks Report’s second section is still classified, and Chinese primary documentation is scarce. After more than 50 years, the question remains: why did 1962 happen? Like Neville Maxwell1, John W. Garver, M. Taylor Fravel and Mahesh Shankar, most of these narratives blame the Indian side for some part. Mao Zedong cites India’s aggression on the border, its misunderstanding of Chinese concerns, the Forward Policy, or Nehru’s intransigence as grounds to punish India by destroying its war fighting capabilities in the border region.
To this end, Lintner presents a new theory. A full-scale attack on the ‘Forward Policy’was not warranted, he says, and the war was planned rather than an impulse in October 1962. In 1959, China began improving its logistical and warfighting skills, as well as gathering intelligence in the areas it planned to strike three years later. Beijing built prisoner camps six months before the attack. Why? Not to conquer land. Mao started a war for two reasons: to humiliate Nehru and to maintain his tenuous domestic political position after the Great Leap Forward project failed.
Lintner expands on his point in eight chapters. The book’s first part covers the period leading up to and following the 1962 war. The first chapter summarises the full book. The author explains that China was fully prepared for war, with six infantry regiments and newly constructed highways in the contested territory. He also informs the reader on the 1962 war’s origins. China’s incursion into Tibet sparked Indian anxieties. To counter the Chinese threat to the North-East, Nehru made friends with Beijing. The Sino-Indian fraternity bloomed into a Tibet agreement in 1954. Then came the Tibetan uprising in 1959. Deng Xiaoping promised to teach a lesson to India, believing that India was a hidden orchestrator of the revolt in south-west China. Chapter 2 covers a lot of ground. His aim is to set the scene for the Sino-Indian border dispute. The Shimla Convention of 1914 between the Chinese Central Government, British India, and Tibet is mentioned. It is also debated whether there were secret plans to bypass the Chinese representative and secure a deal. He then elaborates on the western sector boundary alignment and the Chinese strategy. The Dalai Lama fled to India after the 1959 Tibetan uprising.
Chapter 3 summarises the author’s position on the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. It was properly organised and based on intelligence obtained years before 1962. He also emphasises China’s position strengthening in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He also contends that the commonly accepted narrative that China fought a war due to Indian border assertiveness is incorrect. In truth, China had been preparing for the attack since late October, when the Cuban missile crisis distracted the major nations. Lintner also claims Mao attacked for personal reasons. Mao launched the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s, hoping to catapult China into the ranks of industrial superpowers. The initiative failed horribly, causing widespread starvation and tarnishing Mao’s image. The failure triggered a power struggle among the CPC’s top leaders, which Mao used to divert attention. Chapter 4 discusses post-1962 developments. He begins by removing Indian officials like Menon and Kaul. He then elaborates on the Cultural Revolution, China’s assistance for the Naxalbari insurgents, and the creation of Arunachal Pradesh, a new Indian state.
The second half of the book looks beyond the border war to other Sino-Indian rivalries. Chapter 5 examines Sikkim’s position in Sino-Indian ties. Although no fighting occurred on the Sikkim–Tibet border in 1962, it did subsequently. After India built a road between Gangtok and Nathu La in 1963, China ordered its neighbour to build new outposts on Chinese soil. To dissuade India from fighting Pakistan again in 1965, China chose the centre sector. In September 1967 (the author wrongly states 1966, p. 167), Chinese and Indian troops exchanged fire at Nathu La. A secret war against India ensued, the author claims, with China aiding the Naxalite and Mizo movements. Then comes Bhutan in Chapter 6. This Himalayan monarchy is China’s only non-diplomatic neighbour. Bhutan’s foreign policy is a nuanced process of striving to balance close friendship with India and avoid upsetting China. Chapter 7 deals with the Nepal–China–India triangle. The author claims that China wants excellent relations with Nepal to gain strategic ground against India. However, the 1970 Indian blockade and the decoupling of the Nepalese and Indian rupees have strained relations. Chapter 8 covers a wide range of topics, from Brahmaputra River dams to the Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indian Ocean.
It is difficult to review Lintner’s book as a political scientist because it does not provide a new theory or test an existing one. It’s not a historian’s description either. It’s a journalist’s story. Nonetheless, the book has its flaws. The greatest strength is that it highlights aspects commonly missed or minimised in previous study. Little is written about Mao Zedong’s position after the Great Leap Forward plan failed, and how it may have influenced his decisions in the autumn of 1962. It’s hard to picture Mao’s call to arms being uninfluenced by the fear of losing power. In addition to the 1962 border war, China’s role in the 1967 Naxalbari revolt, and the geopolitical competition in the Indian Ocean Region, the book presents an innovative analytical framework. Finally, the author is a superb writer, delivering colourful descriptions and substance that is accessible to non-experts.
However, there are several flaws. He promises to present an account of Chinese top-level decisions relating to India. However, this reviewer found few, if any, references to Mandarin-language documentation. Announcing state-level Chinese decisions on India must be handled with caution in this context. Lintner’s claims are based on educated guesswork. The second flaw is that his story lacks a unifying argument. Why is China fighting India? In 1962, he claims Mao initiated the fight to deflect from his shortcomings. It cannot be extended to the following chapters. He also claims China and India are vying for Asia’s leadership, but why? The book reads more like a collection of fragmented stories than a cohesive whole. Finally, the author tries to cover too much area in each chapter, preventing him from completing a thorough study. The book is a must-read for anyone interested in Sino-Indian ties or the 1962 conflict. Nonetheless, we may wonder, why did 1962 happen?
