8 October 2020, NIICE Commentary 6112
Shivani Yadav

Global fulcrum of power is shifting towards Asia and a newer geo-political construct like the Indo-Pacific region, that spans across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is gathering focus for its potential in advancing strategic and economic partnerships. The term ‘Indo-Pacific’, that has emerged as an alternative to the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ over the last decade, is reflective of competing interests in Asia. As the world’s largest economy, China has been growing as a regional as well as global power, and its rise is contrasted by a relative decline of the US in Asia which has so far been the chief security provider to its allies. India, another Asian power and one with high stakes in the Indian Ocean, is also vying for maritime expansion and gradually embracing a framework in the Indo-Pacific, with the cooperation of Western powers including the US, aimed at elevating its own status vis-à-vis China.

Competing Interests in the Indo-Pacific

Traditionally, the littoral nations and members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have played a central role in Asia-Pacific. The conception of a contiguous and interconnected region of Indo-Pacific was initially proposed in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who called the Indian and Pacific Oceans as ‘one common space’ and ‘confluence of two seas.’ The notion was further advanced by Australia, India, the US, France and eventually to ASEAN nations like Indonesia. While the prospects of development and investment ensured growing acceptance among the ASEAN countries, there was also scepticism about initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue led by the US, Japan, Australia and India which led to fears among the smaller island nations of being side-lined. Such fears have prompted India, for whom East Asia features significantly in its foreign policy, to issue reassurances that the Indo-Pacific region is ‘not a club of limited members’ and that India supports ‘ASEAN-led mechanisms’ in the region.

However, India itself has only gradually embraced the idea of playing a more central role in Indo-Pacific. Its vision for the region has been cautiously developed over time, and more confidently embraced recently as was highlighted by the keynote speech delivered by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018. The speech insisted that an Indo-Pacific grouping does not aim to dominate but to bring a ‘rule-based order’ that champions ‘equality of all nations.’ In a cloaked reference to what China is often accused of, India further insisted on faithful dialogue instead of ‘dependence on force’. Prior to such open embrace and wilful role in the Indo-Pacific, India had struggled with the idea of maintaining its autonomy while joining hands with western powers, in what is essentially a containment strategy in response to rising China.

China, on the other hand, has had no qualms about establishing itself as a major stakeholder in development of the Asia-Pacific region, a prospect that encroaches on India’s influence vis-à-vis smaller nations. China’s military and strategic might significantly surpasses that of India, which extends to its maritime domain. India, on the other hand, has traditionally been preoccupied in managing threats and expanding capacities along its continental borders, and has only recently been evolving its maritime strategy in response to expansion and aggression by China. Additionally, as China builds its economic diplomacy and military presence, it has prompted the US to assert its continued relevance in the region by pushing its allies towards contributing and ensuring greater American hegemony in the region.

The US-China tussle for dominance is at the heart of the powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region. The US is strengthening its Indo-Pacific strategy by pooling in greater resources. Since the start of the term of President Donald Trump, USD 4.5 billion in foreign assistance has been provided by US Agency for International Development (USAID), along with several hundred billion dollars invested by American businesses. The US’s interests in the region also align with its grand strategy that involves ensuring open commerce, preventing rising threats to critical geopolitical areas and global commons, and expanding the liberal political order internationally.

Converging Interests between the US and India

Since mid-2000s, the strategic partnership between the US and India has been on an upswing, and the Indo-Pacific region figures prominently as a site for collaboration. Trade, connectivity and investment are the three tangible mainstays of their collaboration, along with realising the idea of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific.’ The US and India first collaborated on a joint strategy in 2015 by launching a joint vision for the ‘Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region.’ Though the vision has evolved since, the core interests of the US are still in the Pacific, and those of India are in the Indian Ocean.

Rebalancing China is the common doctrine of the US and India in their Indo-Pacific cooperation. The recently established Indo Pacific Deterrence Initiative (IPDI) is a testimony that the US is committed to maintain a credible deterrence in the face of increasing military build-up by China. This supplemented with the US’s withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treat in 2019 has potential to turn the Pacific into a theatre of power demonstrations by both countries. India, too, finds China closing in on the Indian Ocean region through the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy and in response has acquired three new bases since 2018 in Singapore, Oman and Indonesia. India has already expressed its reservations about China’s Border and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 that paves the way for Chinese investment in India’s neighbourhood and main circle of influence. China has also found an opportunity in fulfilling the increasing infrastructural needs of island nations like the Maldives and Sri Lanka as well as their diplomatic limbo with India. Hence, India’s approach to the Indo Pacific includes expanding its strategic, economic and diplomatic footprint in the Indian Ocean region.

Yet, there are certain diversions in the approaches of the US and India. First, there are differences in the strategic mapping of Indo-Pacific. Indian Ocean remains the main focus for India, but the western Indian Ocean (including the Persian Gulf) doesn’t figure in the US’s conception of the region. Second diversion arises out of the role that India envisions for itself in the region. While the US has been quite encouraging the participation of its partners and allies in Indo-Pacific initiatives, India so far has envisioned a limited military role in the Pacific as its focus is preserving its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. A third diversion pertains to the degree to which both countries are willing to engage and antagonise China. Despite a decided pushback against unilateral actions aimed towards creating new norms in the region, India has still been conscious of provoking China directly and realises the implications of any ensuing tensions with China. The US, on the other hand, is already embroiled in a trade war with China and has few apprehensions about China’s responses.

Both the US’s and India’s Indo-Pacific strategies, however, are highly partnership driven. As the two countries are direct stakeholders themselves with common interests, along with their expanding strategic partnership, the opportunities for them to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific are also expected to expand.

Shivani Yadav is a PhD Candidate at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.