8 October 2020, NIICE Commentary 6109
Sanchana Srivastava
The Relationship between the European Union and the United States has always been complicated and riddled with disagreements. It is, after all, an unconventional pairing between one of the most powerful countries on earth and a set of institutions that do their best to represent the often-disparate views of 28 individual member states. There has been a noticeable cooling of relations between the United States and European Union. Most European analysts view the Trump administration’s approach to relations with the European Union as destructive, since it proceeds from the assumption that European integration is directed against the United States and that the “disunited states of Europe” thus pursue their own strategic interests. This means that the United States now prefers to build privileged bilateral relations with individual countries, depending on their geopolitical and regional status and foreign policy priorities, which is clearly reflected by Washington’s support for Brexit.
Coronavirus has added more tension into the United States’ relationship with the European Union. President Donald Trump’s decision to ban European citizens from the US and his description of the virus as “Chinese” has strained US relations with the European Union. These tensions come on top of a range of wider transatlantic splits. Whether the agenda is Coronavirus, climate change or China, the world’s two biggest economies — the United States and the European Union — are now often divided. The West has split. This article examines downbeat on the future of US relations with Europe under any future administration.
Firstly, the US’ relationship with Europe is in a more regrettable state nowadays than beneath any other advanced US organization, counting amid the 2003 Iraq war. In expansion to EU-US differences over arrangement — such as on exchange, defense, climate alter and Iran — envoys criticized the Trump administration’s “ideological hostility” to the EU and NATO. One portrayed the organization as appearing a “blatant neglect for shared values that have supported transoceanic organization together for decades” and the president’s “lack of decorum” when locks in European partners. The president’s calling the EU a “foe” and European nations “crime-ridden” was portrayed as “offensive” and President Trump as “impulsive” and “unpredictable.” A few felt that “the most perfect way to work with the US was to “stay beneath the radar” with the White House and work with Congress and the states instep. One gruffly depicted this procedure as: “stay absent from the individual within the White House and contribute within the nation”.
Secondly, most European ambassadors anticipated transoceanic pressures to urge indeed more regrettable beneath a moment Trump organization. As one commented on the relationship, the “fear is that we have not hit shake foot yet.” Their three greatest stresses were: the US pulling back from NATO or setting conditions on Article 5; more exchange taxes; and developing US universal non-interference with the ensuing chance that China and Russia “fill the void.” There is also a clear caution that the moment Trump organization might see Europe conclude that “it may now not depend on the US” and start to work more with other powers and start to draw a “moral equivalence” between Washington, Beijing and Moscow.
Third, conversely, the United States’ relationship with the European Union would improve under a Democratic administration. A Democratic win in November would be met on the other side of the Atlantic with “huge relief.” But many also feared European leaders would end up disappointed by a Biden or Sanders administration, as many current transatlantic tensions would remain. The US would co-operate more with the EU on climate change and multilateralism, but transatlantic tensions on defense, trade and China would remain. These reflected a bigger, more structural and longer-term divergence of the EU and US interests.
Indeed, one can worry that a Sanders administration could be as — or possibly even more — difficult for Europe as the Trump administration on some issues, such as trade. Some Central Europeans also feared it would cut US defense spending or military deployments in Europe. Overall, regardless of the outcome in November, many European ambassadors in Washington see a negative outlook on prospects for transatlantic relations over long-term. The view of senior European diplomats in Washington is that the Trump administration’s focus on isolationism, protectionism and burden sharing reflected wider changes in Americans’ view about United States’ role in world. This view — combined with US domestic political polarization — will likely continue, they say, and constrain whoever occupies the Oval Office next year. Whatever the outcome is in November, transatlantic relations will likely not return to the pre-2017 period: European trust in US global leadership has been permanently damaged.
To conclude, the current relationship between the United States and Europe Union is in state of crisis. Measure must be taken to strengthen their relationship in times of crisis. EU–US foreign policy coordination is necessary to shape the global political environment. Partnership between the United States and Europe has been an anchor of the world’s economic, political and security order for more than seven decades, but we should not take it for granted. The transatlantic relationship faces many dangers. However, the issues that bring the two sides together ultimately carry much greater weight than those that might divide them.
