25 August 2020, NIICE Commentary 5874
Arushi Singh
Xi Jinping in China and Vladimir Putin in Russia have paved their way to remain the leaders of their nations for life. This has been enabled through the utilisation of personality cults where power is consolidated through meticulous image management while giving the leader enormous leeway to exact his will without institutional oversight and in the process becoming part of a model to be emulated for leaders seeking to solidify their power.
Jan Plamper distinguished personality cults through five criterions. First, through mass legitimacy derivation facilitated with policy direction, geared towards the mass approval rather than elite approval. One of the ways to measure mass legitimacy is via mass popularity. Putin’s popularity has declined due to the state mandated increase in retirement age being higher than life expectancy, decline in living standards, increasing poverty, inflation, corruption, and wealth inequality and even inadequate waste disposal. However, Putin famously used to have remarkably high approval ratings because of his anti-nineties stance; squashing of the internal terrorism in Chechnya, the annexation of Crimea, Putin’s gumption in standing up to the “decadent West”, promotion of aggressively neo-Soviet stance favoured by the public, the force of his personality and control over media.
In stark contrast is Xi Jinping who has reinforced the social contract that existed between the citizens of China and the government through increased focus on social, welfare and equity demands. Initially under Xi, the economy was strong, corruption was being rooted out with international acceptance of China as a responsible nation. Under his rule, the one-child policy has been removed and he is seen to be curbing the spectre of state monopolies leading to increase in popularity.
The second criterion involves the use of mass media to exalt and praise the virtues of the leaders to the citizens. The Communist Party of China (CPC) outlawed the personality cult after Chairman Mao resulting in almost clinical public appearance of subsequent Chinese leaders. However, Xi Jinping has intentionally brought rustic charm back to the leadership. His name has appeared in the People’s Daily more times than any leader except Mao consequently reflecting the power dynamics in the party. Additionally, Xi’s photographs have increasingly been given more space in the Qiushi, the Tianjin Daily, the Sichuan Daily and the People’s Tribune with a focus on the personal leadership and a fatherly role shown by his moniker “Xi Dada”.
On the other hand, Vladimir Putin has severely curtailed even smothered civil society participation and the press especially outlets which have criticised him or his policies through control of state-owned as well as privately owned media networks. Putin uses television channels such as First Channel, Second Channel, NTV and Russia Today to extol his image. The internet, newspapers even the radio have become the weapons of the Kremlin. Mass media was utilised to construct the concept of “Putin majority” and it became a reality with circulation of carefully chosen photos such as of Putin fishing in the South Siberian region on the Mongolian border exemplifying the masculine ideal that all Russian men strive for.
Third criterion is necessity of closed societies where dissenting or unconventional narratives are not allowed to germinate. Demonstrably, the Chinese government has put “Great Cannon” to moderate content and the “Golden shield” whose subsystem is the Great Firewall to stop other narratives from streaming into China. The Chinese have replaced global conglomerates with their own version such as Alibaba, Tencent, WeChat even coming up with “chinanet” which is censored by the government. This isolation is further enforced by less than fifteen percent of Chinese citizens possessing a passport.
Similarly, Russians under Putin have been working on domestic internet labelled the “sovereign RuNet” which contains restrictions when connecting with its “global counterpart.” The country is planning to launch its own version of Wikipedia and a bill signed by the Putin prohibiting sale of phones, computers and smart TVs without pre-installed Russian software and an app. Furthermore, more that seventy percent have never been outside of countries part of the former Soviet Union while less than seventy percent of the population in possession of a passport. Moreover, both the Russian and Chinese societies have historically been closed societies fortified through static, hierarchical social structure, isolation from the outside world and state backed dogmatic ideology.
The fourth criterion states that modern personality cults must have a secular base. China is officially an atheist state and none of the modern leaders have used religion as their basis of legitimacy including Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has cracked down on religion such Uighurs and cults like Falun Gong. Several underground churches have been targeted and are forbidden to have anyone under 18 enter the premises. Moreover, the Ten Commandments have been painted over with Xi Jinping’s quotes, a Party approved Bible with quotes from Confucius and Xi Jinping is in circulation and Buddhist temples have been converted into Temples to honour Xi. Religious practices are being Sinicized and are subject to strict party guidelines.
Alternatively, in Russia, when Putin first came to power more than sixty percent of the population was largely unaffiliated with any religion. However, after more than two decades of Putin’s rule more than seventy percent of Russian citizens affiliate themselves with the Christian religion whilst the number of unaffiliated having fallen below twenty percent. Under the rule of Putin, the number of followers of the Russian Orthodox Church have substantially increased as have Putin’s ties with the Church. Putin is utilising religion for his own advantage by increasing the influence of the Church which in turn is influenced by him. Although, the persecution of other religious groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses continues unimpeded. For both Xi and Putin, religion is a tool to be employed to advance their personality cults.
The last criterion is “patricentric” societies where men are dominant in power structures. Consequently, both the Chinese and Russian leadership for the past century comprised of male leaders almost exclusively. In Russian society, men are considered to be “the stronger sex” with the narrative of manliness enforced by the concept of “siloviki” which is hegemony displayed by men in the current regime who were part of institutions such as the KGB and a mechanism which idealizes a “homosocial experience” while highlighting the disparity with the West.
While in China, roots of male dominance are rooted in history and justified by philosophy. In Confucianism, there is a “natural hierarchy” with men being dominant. Another influential element of Chinese society is the adherence to Taoism, symbolising the gender roles in the yin and yang wherein the yang represents the dominance of men. This is further worsened by the mentality developed through thousands of years where the worthiness of the sexes was determined in the Chinese agrarian based society by those who were able to do most of the work.
Cults of personalities for centuries enabled the survival of innumerable dynasties and dynasts by constructing a perception where an individual is essential for the survival or prosperity of the state by inextricably affiliating themselves with the state. Putin and Xi are prime example of this.
