12 May 2020, NIICE Commentary 4621
Sampurna Goswami
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has compelled nation states to isolate themselves and shun cross border movements and trade. But the smaller nations of the global south, those that depended largely on larger countries for their economic sustenance, the pandemic has left them in a limbo. Myanmar, a country that still remains a victim of international isolation, is looking up to its regional partners for economic assistance and medical support to fight the pandemic, thereby furthering the geostrategic motives of two of its major partners, India and China, in the country and the region.
The year 2020 began with two strategic developments in Myanmar. First was Chinese President Xi Jinping’s official visit to the country in January, where both the sides stressed on bolstering the Phuakphaw (fraternal) relationship. President Jinping’s visit was directed towards gearing up the key infrastructural projects that fall within the ambit of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Myanmar. The second most important development was Myanmar President Win Myint’s state visit to India in February, where both the neighbours decided to cooperate on developing the Rakhine State for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, and launch a bus service from Imphal to Mandalay, that will enhance connectivity and ease people-to-people contact between the two countries. The geopolitical interventions made by India and China in Myanmar, in reality, can be seen as their attempts to outdo each other.
In spite of sharing the largest porous land border with China’s Yunnan province, reporting zero Coronavirus cases until March 23, 2020, seemed scrupulous for Myanmar. Two substantial reasons can justify the claim, however – firstly, the country’s poor healthcare system that was unable to diagnose COVID-19 patients. Secondly, reporting higher number of cases would trigger anti-Chinese sentiment among the Myanmar population, compelling the government to scrape its relations with its closest ally and the largest investor. China’s inroads in Myanmar’s health and economic sectors are palpable. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, the country has already supplied test kits, electric thermometers, N95 masks and surgical masks to Myanmar, and has also installed 20 sets of ventilators. Recently, a Chinese medical team from Yunnan visited the country to train and set guidelines to fight COVID-19.
On the economic front, China’s decision to provide USD 6.78 million for 22 Myanmar projects under Mekong Lancang Cooperation initiative seems to be a life-saving drug for Myanmar’s ailing economy. On 6 May 2020, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai met Myanmar’s Deputy Minister of Planning to push forward China’s ambitious BRI projects in Myanmar, as part of the Myanmar government’s COVID-19 Economic Relief Fund (CERP). Naypidaw however, is considering this Chinese move as a strategy, whereby adding the BRI projects to CERP will prioritise them. Furthering key infrastructural projects, including the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port, the New Yangon City and the Myanmar China Border Economic Cooperation Zone under CERP will give China a huge impetus to encroach Myanmar’s economy post COVID-19.
Support from Myanmar’s western neighbour, India, centres mostly on its recent ‘Pharma-diplomacy’. In line with India’s “Neighbourhood First Policy”, the Ministry of External Affairs affirmed its decision to supply Hydroxycholoroquine (HCQ) to the South Asian countries that depend on India’s medicinal capabilities. New Delhi’s calculations to supply HCQ to its neighbours were based on two notions – one, to resuscitate India’s “responsible power” image that was long lost because of its brusque attitude towards its neighbours and second, to expand India’s sphere of influence in order to shift the balance of power in its favour. However, the reassessments regarding HCQ’s vague effects on COVID-19 victims, seem to have blurred India’s diplomatic footsteps in Myanmar to some extent. India’s economic presence in Myanmar until recently has been outmanoeuvred by China, but of late, China’s “Carrots and Sticks” diplomacy and the giant leaps it has been taking under BRI, is coaxing Myanmar to shift the power balance somewhat in favour of India. However, for India, which is already struggling with its own economic distress since the country imposed the longest nation-wide lockdown from 24 March 2020, it seems unlikely that the country will respond to Myanmar’s call for economic assistance.
Will then, the post-COVID-19 Myanmar theatre witness an even more pronounced influence of China? It is paramount to understand that China’s ambitions in Myanmar are to gain access to the Indian Ocean Region, and achieve its BRI ambitions. On the other hand, for India, although the engagement is largely a strategy to counter China’s policy of encirclement, its objectives of securing a trans-border development also remain a priority. Moreover, Naypyidaw’s perception that China’s BRI ambitions might, in reality, not benefit Myanmar, will definitely lead to some resistance towards BRI on its part. But since Myanmar remains a victim of international isolation, with the absence of any substantive economic aid from western nations, its decision to look up to Beijing for economic assistance during the COVID-19 crisis seems to be a pragmatic move at the moment.
If Myanmar decides to move the China-India balancing act in favour of Beijing, post-COVID-19, Myanmar might fall into huge debt trap that might further jeopardise its economy in the near future. On the other hand, for its western neighbour, the journey in Myanmar post the pandemic will be highly challenging in the face of increasing Chinese influence. But India cannot compromise on Myanmar if it aims to expand its presence in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India’s future in the geopolitical theatre of the region depends on how well New Delhi tackles Naypyidaw’s balancing act, and to what extent it can boost its ongoing projects, especially those that surround the Rakhine state, Myanmar’s most disturbed and underdeveloped province where India has invested heavily under its Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport project. Hence, it won’t be obstinate to state that post-COVID-19, Myanmar might open up avenues for investment for both the competing Asian powers in its public health sector, based on which the future of this geo-strategic feud will be largely sketched.
