16 March 2020, NIICE Commentary 3289
Dr. Monish Tourangbam
President Donald Trump came on a standalone visit to India last month and an extravagant reception welcomed him and his family, in Delhi and Gujarat. The optics of an American President’s visit to India cannot be entirely decoupled from the substance. Symbolism is a crucial reflection of the broader strategic arc of a bilateral relationship. What one saw during a largely gaffe free visit from President Trump, reflects the priority that is being currently accorded to the relationship in Delhi and Washington. The presidential visit came amidst concerns over a procrastinated India-US trade deal; President Trump’s reported offers to mediate over Kashmir and indications of some uneasiness in the US Congress and Democratic presidential contenders on India’s controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). However, the visit managed to paint a picture of stability and resilience in Indo-US partnership at a time when Washington seems to be struggling with traditional allies and partners. It managed to build on the broad positive arc of the relationship built over the last two decades, under the supervision of different political parties on both sides. So, what is it about the India-US partnership, now dubbed as a ‘comprehensive global strategic partnership’ that helps withstand domestic and international circumstances?
What has transpired in this bilateral relationship, over the last two decades, is nothing short of transformational, which has significantly impacted not only how these two democracies interact, but also how South Asian geopolitics and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific is being reimagined. The dynamics of India-US relationship during the Cold War is a tale of great potential but unfulfilled expectations, opportunities for greater engagement and sporadic bonhomie leading to unsustainable partnership. Among others, navigating the China factor, the Pakistan factor and the impact of Soviet Russia remained major anxieties for the leadership and multiple agencies on both sides. After the end of the Cold War and amidst the multipolar flux, these factors still occupy salience in how Washington and Delhi recalibrate their approaches to craft new horizons of India-US partnership.
The strategic environment of the changing balances of power in the dawn of the 21st century that pushed Delhi and Washington to shed historical inhibitions and produce the game changing India-US civil nuclear agreement will remain a matter of inquiry for generations of analysts deciphering this intriguing relationship. When strategic minds across the globe were deliberating on what President Trump would mean for American foreign policy and its approach to bilateral ties, Delhi and its strategic thinkers seem hardly ruffled. Where did this relative confidence on the future of India-US partnership come from?
One of the reasons, certainly, is the level of institutional linkages that both sides, across political regimes have managed to build over the years. The foreign and national security bureaucracies seem to have built habits of cooperation, accounting for a sense of resilience, that has managed to bring the relationship to the point where differences are over ‘nuts and bolts’ of active bilateral engagement rather than any unmanageable strategic divergence. The ‘2+2’ dialogue between the foreign and defense ministries of the two countries, the holding of the first tri-services military exercise ‘Tiger Triumph’, the elevation of the Quad dialogue, including Japan and Australia to the ministerial level, and the emerging collaborations on countering terrorism are proof of significant tangibles of the partnership. The commitment towards taking the India-US defence trade to higher levels, both quantitatively and qualitatively, forms a major plank of the strategic partnership that has recognizable implications for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific.
The latest joint statement reflects the priority accorded to this aspect with both sides pledging, “to deepen defence and security cooperation.” This will be done, “specially through greater maritime and space domain awareness and information sharing; joint cooperation; exchange of military liaison personnel; advanced training and expanded exercises between all services and special forces; closer collaboration on co-development and co-production of advanced defence components, equipment and platforms; and partnership between their defence industries.” In the next steps, priority has been accorded to ink one of the pending foundational agreements, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation Agreement (BECA) after having operationalized the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), aiming to further increase interoperability between the militaries of the two Indo-Pacific powers.
New efforts seem to be geared towards realizing the true potential of the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) after the designation of India as ‘Major Defense Partner’ of the United States. Moreover, post the renaming of the US Pacific Command as the US Indo-Pacific Command, it remains to be seen how both sides intend to realise the potency of this strategic move in terms of developing better coordination between the militaries for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Joint strategies, along with like-minded countries like Japan and Australia, to provide “sustainable, transparent, quality infrastructure development” in the Indo-Pacific is also emerging as a major point of convergence, in view of the implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Besides, a new point of focus in India-US partnership seems to be in the realm of greater energy cooperation, with the US emerging as a major supplier of energy to India in recent times.
Undoubtedly, India is more strategically aligned and engaged with the US, compared to any other major power in regional and global geopolitics. In recent times, Delhi has invested more on its partnership with the US, than on any other power. However, greater alignment with the US, throws up its own sets of challenges, more particularly, in India’s engagement with countries, on the wrong side of Washington. Therefore, as the India-US partnership scale new heights, India needs to be clearer about what it wants in its relationships with other countries like Russia and Iran. Moreover, India will be constantly tested in terms of scripting its own journey with China, apart from the strategic compulsions of building synergies with the US vis-à-vis China. What Washington will do in Afghanistan, will be for its own good, and that would mean cutting deals with Pakistan, to retract from this war zone. Given India’s own interest in Afghanistan and the many challenges confronting it, in the rapidly changing security environment there, Delhi needs to be nimble footed in terms of what it wants in Afghanistan, and what it is willing to do there. Moreover, the outbreak of the novel Covid 19 raises new concerns, about national, regional and global responsibilities. In view of two countries’ commitment to global health and humanitarian assistance, it is imperative for Delhi and Washington to communicate and work more closely, not only for mutual benefits, but to contribute more significantly to global good, at a time when it is easy to think and do otherwise.
