14 September 2026, NIICE Commentary 12724
Kawsar Mia & Dr. Abdul Momen
BRICS has spent successive summits presenting itself as a forum for countries seeking greater representation in a changing global order. At the 2026 New Delhi summit, members again backed greater use of local currencies in trade and investment and continued work on making national payment systems more interoperable. Importantly, the declaration also recognised that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. That qualification captures the central problem facing BRICS: financial diversification may be a shared objective, but a common monetary or geopolitical strategy is much harder to build.
The obstacle is not simply pressure from the United States or the continuing strength of the dollar. It also comes from inside BRICS. Its members have different economic structures, security concerns, strategic partnerships and political priorities. Those differences become particularly important when discussion moves from reducing dependence on the dollar in selected transactions to reshaping the wider international financial order.
The Currency Question
BRICS countries can expand trade in national currencies without creating a single BRICS currency. That distinction matters. Local-currency settlement can reduce transaction costs, diversify financial channels and limit exposure to particular payment networks. A common currency, however, would require a much deeper level of monetary coordination among economies with different inflation records, exchange-rate systems, capital controls and policy priorities.
The continued strength of the dollar also limits the speed of any transition. The Bank for International Settlements reported that the US dollar was on one side of 89.2 per cent of all foreign-exchange trades in April 2025. The Chinese renminbi has grown in importance, but its share remained far smaller. This does not mean de-dollarisation is impossible. It means that replacing the dollar is a much more demanding project than increasing the use of national currencies in selected bilateral or regional transactions.
Russia, China and Iran have stronger incentives to support financial mechanisms that reduce vulnerability to US sanctions and dollar-centred banking networks. India occupies a different position. It is a founding BRICS member, but it also maintains extensive economic, technological and strategic ties with the United States and other Western partners. In 2025, Washington and New Delhi reaffirmed their Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership and launched new cooperation across defence, commerce and technology. India therefore has little incentive to turn BRICS into an explicitly anti-Western bloc.
India’s Strategy of Balance
India's position illustrates why BRICS cohesion has clear limits. New Delhi retains a long-standing strategic partnership with Russia while deepening cooperation with the United States. India's Ministry of External Affairs continues to describe Russia as a time-tested partner and a key pillar of Indian foreign policy. At the same time, India engages China through trade and multilateral forums despite unresolved strategic and boundary questions. This gives New Delhi room to work with different centres of power without fully aligning with any one of them.
What may look like inconsistent diplomacy is better understood as strategic autonomy. India can participate actively in BRICS, maintain close ties with Russia and simultaneously strengthen economic and security cooperation with the United States. For India, these relationships are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For BRICS, however, this flexibility makes it difficult to transform a diverse forum into a coherent geopolitical bloc.
De-dollarisation Does Not Mean a BRICS Currency
Another challenge is that reducing reliance on the dollar does not automatically mean accepting another national currency as the replacement. A BRICS financial system dominated by the Chinese renminbi could create its own strategic concerns for members that want diversification without exchanging one form of dependence for another. India and China are major economic partners, but they are also competitors with unresolved political and security differences.
The current BRICS approach therefore appears more pragmatic than revolutionary. The 2026 summit focused on local-currency settlement, cross-border payment mechanisms and greater interoperability rather than a single common currency. This allows members to widen their financial options without requiring them to surrender monetary autonomy or adopt a common position toward the United States.
Can BRICS Really Speak with One Voice?
That may be BRICS' most important long-term challenge. Its members do not share the same relationship with Washington, nor do they join BRICS for the same reasons. Some want to reduce exposure to Western sanctions. Others seek greater representation in global economic governance. For others, BRICS is another platform through which they can engage several competing centres of power without committing themselves to a fixed geopolitical camp.
It is therefore unrealistic to expect all members to take the same position on major international questions. Yet this does not necessarily make BRICS ineffective. The grouping may exercise influence precisely because it gives states additional diplomatic and economic options while allowing them to preserve national autonomy.
Why BRICS Summits Still Matter
If these internal divisions are so substantial, why do BRICS leaders continue to invest political capital in high-profile summits? The answer is that multilateral groupings do not need complete strategic unity to remain useful. BRICS summits provide a platform for economic cooperation, financial reform, development finance and political consultation. They also allow members to coordinate where interests overlap while managing disagreements elsewhere.
BRICS should therefore not be judged only by whether it creates a common currency or becomes a unified counterweight to the West. A more realistic measure is whether it can expand the political, financial and economic choices available to its members. On that measure, BRICS can remain consequential even if it never truly speaks with one voice.
Kawsar Mia is a Lecturer of Civics and Good Governance at the Cosmopolitan College, Dhaka, Bangladesh & Dr. Abdul Momen is an Associate Professor at the Department of Islamic History and Culture, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
