27 March 2026, NIICE Commentary 12394
Dr Sinu Kunjumon
Current geopolitical developments indicate that the rules-based international order is not merely under stress but is undergoing a deeper rupture. Intensifying strategic assertiveness by great powers, characterised by unilateral interventions, coercive economic statecraft, and selective adherence to international norms, has eroded the normative foundations that middle powers historically relied upon for diplomatic leverage and legitimacy. As the global order becomes increasingly shaped by power politics rather than shared norms, the discursive space through which middle powers have traditionally exercised their influence appears to be narrowing.
Conventionally, their influence rested less on material capabilities and more on norm entrepreneurship, particularly through the promotion of multilateralism, international law, and cooperative security frameworks. By leveraging diplomacy, coalition-building, and institutional engagement, middle powers were able to shape global discourse and reinforce the normative foundations of the rules-based international order. However, this role is now under strain as dominant powers increasingly prioritise their strategic interests over collective principles, reshaping global governance structures to align with their geopolitical objectives
Notably, the United States continues to wield significant discursive power by employing narratives of counterterrorism, regional stability, and the defence of allies to legitimise interventions or coercive measures that might otherwise raise concerns about legality and sovereignty. The framing of U.S. actions in Venezuela and its coordination with Israel in strikes against Iran illustrate how great powers deploy strategic narratives to justify controversial policies.
China, meanwhile, has expanded its discourse power through the digital domain. By shaping information environments through digital platforms, media networks, and technology infrastructure, Beijing promotes governance norms aligned with its political model while advancing its preferred digital standards internationally. Through initiatives such as the Digital Silk Road, part of the Belt and Road Initiative, China also provides telecommunications networks, data infrastructure, and digital connectivity projects across the Global South, thereby expanding its influence over emerging information ecosystems and global narratives.
For middle powers, however, the situation is markedly different. They face a dilemma between maintaining their commitment to international norms and avoiding antagonising great powers that undermine the functioning of the rules-based order. This tension was explicitly acknowledged during the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, where Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney warned that the rules-based order was no longer functioning as it once did. He argued that middle powers must recognise this changing geopolitical reality and cooperate more strategically to avoid marginalisation in an increasingly competitive international environment.
Yet Carney’s own positioning illustrates the paradox confronting middle powers. While he emphasised the importance of defending principles such as sovereignty and international law, his response to the United States and Israel’s actions against Iran appeared cautious and restrained. Rather than directly raising concerns about violations of sovereignty or the implications for international law, his remarks largely aligned with Washington’s justification of the operation as necessary for regional security.
This ambiguity reflects a broader pattern among middle powers. The international responses of several European middle powers to developments in Venezuela further illustrate this tension. Many struggled to articulate consistent normative objections to the manner in which events unfolded. While some governments initially viewed the political outcome favourably, their diplomatic statements softened criticism regarding the methods involved. This cautious approach reflected a reluctance to challenge the United States' strategic dominance, even when such actions raised concerns about the integrity of international norms.
A similar pattern is evident in India’s responses to tensions in West Asia, which have largely emphasised restraint, dialogue, and diplomacy rather than explicit normative criticism of actions that undermine sovereignty or international law. Opportunities for coordinated normative signalling, such as joint diplomatic statements issued after meetings between middle-power leaders, are also frequently left unrealised. The recent meeting between the prime ministers of India and Canada illustrates this tendency, as it did not produce a clear joint position on developments in West Asia despite the potential for collective normative articulation. Even when middle powers themselves face pressure from great powers, they often appear reluctant to mount a strong collective defence of the norms they claim to uphold.
Collectively, these developments imply that middle powers are no longer effectively deploying discourse power to challenge structural breaches of international norms. Instead, their responses are frequently framed in cautious, carefully worded statements that reaffirm their commitment to international law while avoiding confrontation with great powers. As a result, a discursive erosion is emerging; middle powers continue to invoke the language of the rules-based order and shared values, yet their capacity to independently shape international norms or hold powerful states accountable has diminished.
As Michel Foucault observes, discourses are produced through relations of power within a social order, where power determines the rules and categories that define what counts as legitimate knowledge and truth. In this context, the growing dominance of great powers in shaping global narratives increasingly constrains the ability of middle powers to influence the discursive frameworks through which international norms are interpreted and legitimised.
Consequently, the challenge for middle powers is not simply to adapt to evolving geopolitical conditions but to redefine how they exercise influence within it. Whether through stronger coalitions, institutional leadership, or renewed commitment to normative diplomacy, the future relevance of middle powers ultimately depends on their ability to restore credibility to the discourse they have long championed.
Sinu Kunjumon is a guest lecturer in the Department of Political Science, St. John's College, Anchal, Kerala, India. She completed her PhD on the topic, ‘Middle Power Coalitions in the Indo-Pacific: An Analysis of India-Australia Relations.’
