03 March 2026, NIICE Commentary 12332
Kim Wilhelm Perez & Amadeus Quiaoit
Is Might Still Right? Reviewing Realism in the Current International Chaos
With the ongoing conflicts in Iran, Ukraine, and Palestine, the current international system departed from the post-Western hegemonic order, which is now better understood as a condition of a ruptured liberal international world order due to an unreliable and declining U.S. hegemonic architecture, marking an increasingly fragmented international society. Thus, a brave new world for middle powers to survive in an evolving international system.
With recent global developments foreshadowed by Prof. G. John Ikenberry suggests that no great power has been able to sustain and maintain its regime, can simply provide public goods and sacrifice domestic interests. Instead, it should be able to balancing-act of enlightened self-interest and legitimize a coalition of states that recognizes mutual gains. In the case of the US, the 2nd Trump presidency has responded to a new order that reshaped American foreign policy, the Donroe doctrine, marked a strategic shift in U.S. grand strategy, from liberal internationalist stewardship toward a more illiberal and predatory hegemony anchored in unilateral coercion.
These tough times show the prevailing and indomitable spirit of realpolitik. Power remains the normative conduit that drives inter-state affairs. In International Relations, Defensive Realists argue that state behavior is shaped mainly by the structure of the international system rather than domestic politics or ideology. Developed by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979), explains that the global system has no central authority, which causes states to act in self-interest to survive and maintain a balance of power. Building on this idea, John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism argues that great powers seek not only security but also greater power and regional dominance, since uncertainty about other states’ intentions makes the safest strategy.
Recently, value-based realism, as articulated by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s landmark speech at Davos 2026, offers a corrective framework grounded in values, not substitutes for power, but rather multipliers of strategic credibility. Carney argues that the world is currently entangled in a power struggle among great powers.
Taking the world as it is rather than how it should be is becoming a normative practice for middle powers to maneuver within a highly deterministic structural system by great powers. Carney’s battle cry for middle powers makes perfect sense to outmaneuver asymmetrical competition, as they cannot directly compete against great powers, the logical alternative is to create a third way with impact, a redemptory path to navigate present realities.
It is now fairly evident that the destruction of the post–Cold War liberal international order is fragmented and has led to a renewed sense of the US becoming a predatory hegemon; universal norms erode in favor of selective compliance, interdependence is weaponized across trade, finance, technology, supply chains, and gray-zone coercion and lawfare have become normalized instruments of policy. This colossal fallout of liberal international relations clears a path for middle powers to embrace a new kind of realism.
Value-Based Realism as the Logic for Philippine Foreign Policy
With contentious issues over the West Philippines Sea (WPS), diplomatic maneuvers under Marcos Jr. administration have calibrated an approach in managing its complex relationship with China. In 2024, Marcos Jr. was extremely vocal in condemning China’s actions in the WPS by implementing a response and countermeasures against threats from China. This statement was followed by an initiative that convinced top security and defense officials to push allies to support the Philippines against China's coercive actions. In early 2026, the Chinese envoy singled out Philippine Coast Guard Spokesperson Jay Tarriela, questioning Sen. Kiko Pangilinan's understanding of international law, accused Rep. Leila de Lima (Mamamayang Liberal Partylist) of spreading falsities, told Rep. Chel Diokno (Akbayan Partylist) to stop spreading blatant lies and falsified narratives relative to China’s claims and stating that lawmakers openly criticized Chinese leadership which crosses diplomatic incidents that gives an authority to the Chinese envoy the right to respond.
Consequently, Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan was accountable for his grave remarks against lawmakers for being persona non grata, resulting in stark criticism by lashing out Philippine’s sovereignty claims over WPS. However, the Marcos Jr.’s administration has rejected these demands, signaling a preference for strategic restraint over diplomatic escalations. By not expelling the diplomatic envoy, it preserves diplomatic channels, underscoring heightened diplomatic disagreements that require a medium for serious and formal dialogues. In the same scenario, Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan was declared by local officials of Kalayaan municipality persona non grata. This decision was not new, his predecessor also experienced dismay when the former Chinese envoy, Ambassador Huang Xilian was tagged as persona non grata as diplomatic exchanges intensified with local officials when they were banned from entering China, including Hong Kong and Macau.
Alleviating these tensions with China, First Lady Liza Marcos attended the celebration of the Chinese New Year on 10 February 2026. During the Chinese New Year event, Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan implied the necessity for the sustainment of expanding cooperation with the Philippines and continuous political dialogues in pursuing the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, as the Philippines hosts this year’s ASEAN 2026. Warm interaction with the Chinese envoy and First Lady Liza Marcos gained speculations about a potential policy shift, but the Palace has quickly clarified that such engagements were ceremonial and should not be conflated with the official stance on foreign policy positions.
Foreign policy approaches of the Marcos Jr. administration give emphasis by expressing a value-based realism, which magnifies the need to maneuver foreign policy approaches to avoid political complexities with China. This strategic alignment deems that foreign policy is at stake is not an option, and therefore, the Marcos Jr. administration did not concur with the idea of expelling the Chinese envoy to the Philippines. Value-based realism explains that the Philippines is still true to what it stands for without harming diplomatic channels with China, which could resort to negative repercussions.
The grand strategy of the Marcos Jr. administration allows relations with China to have good dialogue at modest efforts to maintain the status quo in the WPS while saving economic relations with China. This action demands a crux of strategic imperatives without sacrificing diplomacy over political ends that could endanger national interest in a volatile global security environment.
Middle Power Moment? Revisiting Philippinedization
Famously espoused by Professor Dr. Chester Cabalza and Prof. Joshua Espena, Philippinedization is defined as “the process whereby a weaker state, backed by a powerful country, goes through great lengths in temporarily refraining from opposing a neighboring great power by resorting to economic and diplomatic rapprochements at the strategic level but strengthening its national security infrastructure on the operational level with an eye for potential conflict in the foreseeable future”, this eloquent semi constructivist approach to traditional realist strategies, such as balancing and hedging, coincides in harmony with the essence of value based realism. This concept suggests a more nuanced approach to the dynamics of power relations between great and middle powers. The big question is how Manila, as a strategic actor, navigates its maneuverability as the world evolves?
The Philippines’ rise to middle power status is a recalibration of its ascension in Southeast Asia as one of the top players in the region. This growing trend has been Manila's stable position as an indispensable link to the West in the Indo-Pacific region, especially as a US treaty ally, thwarting Beijing’s maritime incursions as an effective archipelagic buffer. Its unique geopolitical composition becomes a natural barrier against Chinese aggressive expansionism westward to the Pacific, as well as the bulwark of the First Island Chain, and the Philippines' ascent among its ASEAN ranks as one of the most prominent middle power actors in the region. Enforcing its position is not only ideal but necessary to adapt in uncertain times.
Recalibrating the Future and Lessons from the Past: Duterte and Marcos Jr.’s Strategic Ambivalence toward the AFP Modernization Program
As Dr. Cabalza and Prof. Espeña analyzed in their book The Rise of Philippinedization, the Philippines lacks a sense of strategic culture, which complicates the government’s ability in crafting overarching and comprehensive mechanisms based on country’s defense strategies such as the National Security Policy (NSP), National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and National Military Strategy (NMS).” The AFP Modernization Program, which was revamped in January 2024 following previous delays and funding shortages, has been operational for over 15 years and is slated to continue through 2028. The program is structured into three stages: Horizon 1 (2013–2017) and Horizon 2 (2018–2022), focused on strengthening defense requirements for internal security operations. Re-Horizon 3, which now spans a ten-year period (2023–2033) instead of the original five, aims to address unfulfilled projects from previous phases. This stage is expected to accumulate a planned budget of USD 35 billion, covering the AFP’s wish list for the next decade.
As a middle power, two decades ago, the Philippines sought to modernize its armed forces, which started under the Ramos administration. However, the country’s security environment has shifted over time, often forcing the AFP to prioritize domestic threats, which persisted until the Duterte administration neutralized key remnants of terrorist groups in Southern Mindanao. Duterte’s "independent foreign policy" sought to put the AFP towards external defense operations. His administration's strategic intuition, balancing relations between the U.S. and China, was leveraged to craft defense policies that addressed both traditional and non-traditional security threats.
In the Marcos Jr. administration, the AFP’s operational focus remained outward. The Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) embraces and expands upon the defense strategies of the Duterte era. Furthermore, the Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program has become a central priority, intended to embolden the domestic acquisition of military technology and materiel by promoting a national defense industry and strengthening R&D capabilities. These actions are closely tied to Marcos Jr.’s "ironclad" relations with the U.S., which have amplified the security blanket provided by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Conversely, these moves have aggravated maritime relations with China, leading to frequent confrontations over the WPS. As China becomes more assertive, diplomatic relations with the Philippines have gradually deteriorated.
Viewed through the lens of value-based realism, the Duterte administration attempted to balance the U.S. and China, allowing the AFP to benefit from growing WPS tensions by recalibrating operations from internal to external defense. This was achieved by maintaining the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and expanding Balikatan Exercises. However, pitfalls emerged when early anti-U.S. rhetoric and closer ties to Beijing created strategic friction. In contrast, the Marcos Jr. administration views a robust U.S. alliance as a strategic option for surviving potential conflict in the WPS. The AFP has become more integrated into the U.S. security umbrella.
Critically, this shift risks infuriating China and potentially turning the Philippines into a prime target should regional conflict escalate. Such a scenario could result in the Philippines becoming collateral damage, with strikes on defense assets weakening the AFP’s ability to execute its core operational roles.
Amadeus Quiaoit is a resident fellow of the International Development and Security Cooperation and a graduate of BA International Studies at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Philippines. Kim Wilhelm Perez is a graduate of AB International Studies at Far Eastern University - Manila, Philippines.
