21 November, 2024 NIICE Commentary 9736
Ammu S Anil
When people think of water, the initial association is typically with the colour blue or the visible water that moves in a river. Considering the alterations that have transpired in the water discourse over the last two decades, we assert that the WEBS approach is a more suitable acronym for delineating water. According to Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, the letters W, E, B, and S represent wetlands, energy, biodiversity, and sediments, respectively. This provides a thorough comprehension of water and the collaboration on transboundary water is an essential necessity at now. Undoubtedly, water is the most crucial natural resource at humanity’s disposal. South Asia, although having only 4 percent of the world’s yearly renewable water resources, is home to 25 percent of the world’s population, making water resources very valuable in this region. Responsibility for supplying water to the region lies with 20 primary transboundary rivers. The primary river systems in the area, including the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna and Indus River basins, play a crucial role in providing sustenance, water, and energy. South Asia lacks collaboration in managing water resources and the establishment of formal agreements and organisations to facilitate such cooperation. governments often employ concepts and techniques to settle water usage issues, although these efforts often focus on their own territories and seldom include other governments in the region.
China as an Upper Riparian
The convergence of these forces is most evident in China’s role as the upper riparian. China’s control of Tibet, known as the “Water Tower of the World” or the “Third Pole,” has provided them with a strategic edge in regulating the water supply to South and Southeast Asia. The power imbalance between upper and lower riparian governments becomes strategically exploited when historical problems such as boundary disputes and border conflicts are included into the equation. The poor collaboration on transboundary waters between India and China may be attributed to two factors: insufficient institutionalisation and the behaviour of drivers. Indeed, the collaboration is embedded within a broader geopolitical competition, which has frequently been compromised to achieve strategic goals.
India-China Hydro-politics
China controls most of the water in Asia with water originating in the heights of Tibetan Plateau spilling into most of the region’s major river systems and providing water to more than 20 downstream countries. This essentially means that China’s neighbours depend partially on the goodwill of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for a reliable fresh water supply. Fortunately, for everyone involved for most of modern history relations between China and its downstream neighbours have been cordial and a patchwork arrangement of by and multilateral agreements have been enough to diffuse the occasional disagreement. However, as demand has grown and China’s relations with some of its neighbours have become more strained. Water has suddenly become a point of contention especially between China and India. Tibetan Plateau which is home to the Himalayas and known as the Third Pole because they hold the largest concentration of ice and glaciers outside of the northern and southern poles. As such most of Asia’s large river systems basically originate in Tibet which was annexed by China in 1951. Then flow downstream into the rest of Asia. TLDR News reported that in 2002 for instance after a dam along the Tibetan part of the Brahmaputra caused a devastating flood in India. China began sharing its hydrological data with both India and Bangladesh and created a bilateral forum for water related discussions.
Issues and Challenges
The lack of trust resulting from the imbalance in riparian relations and historical problems has led to a deficit in confidence, which restricts India-China collaboration on transboundary waters to the minimal level of agreements for exchanging data. Both are susceptible to the volatile nature of political shifts. China’s construction of dams on rivers is driven by both internal political pressures and motivations. China’s upper Mekong streams have around 100 reservoirs and 11 dams, with further constructions planned. The motivation behind China’s construction of dams on rivers in South and Southeast Asia is rooted in the water shortage experienced in the Northern areas. In response, the central government has instructed provinces in the South to carry out water transfer projects. The construction of dams in South-East Asia has significant environmental and ecological consequences that directly affect the food security of millions of people. Nevertheless, China’s internal economic and political pressures take precedence over the importance of a collaborative and fair method for sharing water. The non-participation of China in institutional processes such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has made them useless in this setting, which is detrimental to regional water governance institutions. According to Reddy, due to its advantageous geographical position, China has gained control over the river systems in South Asia and Southeast Asia.
The pursuit of dam building and hydropower is motivated, in part, by the need for water for both industrial use and human consumption. China’s motivation also stems from its intention to utilise water resources as a means of exerting political influence over its regional adversaries, primarily India. Nevertheless, Beijing’s hesitance to engage in water sharing accords is rooted in its privileged position as the highest upstream country in South Asia. China has a very low water dependence ratio, indicating that South Asian nations and China interact with each other across transboundary rivers without any external influence. According to Reddy, China’s lack of motivation to engage in bilateral and international cooperation frameworks has resulted in its continued operation outside of South Asia’s restricted water governance system. However, China still wields significant influence over the water security of governments in the region.
Husein et.al pointed out that dams, being located at the convergence of water, resources, environment, and human security, serve as an ideal starting point for water-based diplomacy. This approach aims to prevent the negative consequences of self-centred national interests in a shared transboundary basin and foster collective and cooperative objectives. Considering that water-based diplomacy extends beyond the immediate water-related issues and has a broader and more enduring political involvement, Molnar et.al argues, it is preferable to pursue a complete collective engagement among governments.
Conclusion
In the absence of tools for communication and a consultative approach to institutionalisation, together with the inclusion of diverse stakeholders in the process, it is becoming more and more improbable for states to avoid adopting a zero-sum attitude. In addition, due to the prevalence of a zero-sum mindset, nations in South Asia are ill-equipped to address shared difficulties, which pose a danger to both economic development and the well-being of millions of people. China being a hydro-hegemon in this region plays a significant role and any hydro-diplomacy is possible if we take that riparian into account especially in Southeast Asia. Downstream Northeastern states have their concerns regarding the Chinese dam building over Brahmaputra. The effectiveness of the regional multilateral frameworks is hindered by bilateral political disagreements, which impede any advancements in water administration. Regional organisations such as SAARC and BIMSTEC lack the ability to effectively encourage collaboration on shared water resources.
Ammu S Anil is a Research Intern at NIICE, a PhD Candidate and a Junior Research Fellow at the MMAJ Academy of International Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India.
