Implications of Russian and Chinese Inroads in Central Asia

20 September 2024, NIICE Commentary 9594
Arfat Ahmad Bhat

Central Asia is known by the Silk Route and ‘great game’ that is about Anglo-Russian rivalry. But these two concepts provide a large picture of history and the present competition in the region. The rail networks established by Russia in Central Asia during the 19^th century played a vital role in the defining of present Central Asia. However, after Soviet collapse, the Central Asian trade growth with China and Russia remained stagnant. With time, multilateral arrangements emerged led by Russia like Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and likewise China formed Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to influence the Central Asian countries in their respective domains, although both powers focus on regional cooperation for security and economic development. But the geopolitical aim of these two powers cannot be ignored. History is witness that China and Russia were regaining control over lost frontiers since Qing government. After the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese interests in Central Asia could be summed up in one line by General Liu Yazhou of PLA: “Central Asia is the thickest piece of cake(natural resource and market)  given to the modern Chinese by the heavens”.

Policies and Interest of  Russia in the Region

Central Asia was part of the Soviet Union for a long time and it shares deep social, cultural and economic connections with Russian Federation. Central Asia is also important because different pipeline networks connect Central Asia with Russia such as the Atyrau–Samara oil pipeline, the Makhachkala–Tikhoretsk–Novorossiysk oil pipeline, the Tengiz–Novorossiysk Caspian Pipeline Consortium, and the Central Asia–Center gas pipeline, and the Bukhara–Ural gas pipeline.

Russia promoted multilateral settings in Central Asia only to serve its economic (natural and human resources) and geopolitical (to be looked as its sphere of influence)  goals to be seen as equal partner with other powers in the region as the counter weight to China and as protective buffer beyond borders. The geopolitical considerations seems to be driving force for Russia’s interests in the region. The Russian involvement in Central Asia appears to promote its interests in the region and to promote its international deteriorating image because it does not have influence in the other former Soviet spaces (Baltic region in particular) as they joined either EU or NATO respectively.

Russian foreign policy in the recent past had demonstrated lesser role for deeper integration in the region. Furthermore, the Chinese presence in the region didn’t lead to any visible conflict of interests between these two powers to demonstrate common cause against the Western perception of world order and is evident by the US- Uzbek security cooperation post- withdrawal from Afghanistan as Uzbekistan’s independent foreign policy obstructs its integration into Russian dominated regional arrangements. The recently echoed calls for Eurasian Union would change Russian policy aimed at to counter Chinese presence in the region.

China promoting its Interest through SCO

The SCO represents the Chinese style of integration with the aim of economic prosperity, cooperation, solving of border issues peacefully and had added within its fold security dimensions including solving border conflicts as well as to fight the three evils –Separatism, Terrorism and Extremism. For China, this forum provides platform to serve its national interests as well. China inclusive approach in Central Asia exposes them to the fact of Xinjiang (Uighurs’) re-education camps and human rights violations exposed their negative publicity in Central Asia.

China Challenges

Central Asia as a region has served as the sphere of competition between China and Russia. Both these countries had tried in the past upping their image in the eyes of Washington. But recently, the relations has deteriorated with the West, especially USA, and Sino-Russia cooperation emerged in the scene with Chinese shift of focus on Belt and Road Initiative, meanwhile Russia is reluctant of the rise of SCO more than a ‘dialogue partner’ because it serves Russia’s interest and wants China at arm’s length in Central Asia. Russia is contributing to SCO development fund so that China may not dominate the organization. The bilateral trade of Russia and China was growing before pandemic and in 2020 central Asia’s combined trade with Russia and China was 28 billion dollars and 40 billion dollars respectively.

Following the Belt and Road Initiative, China is showing its commitment to the development in the region and it has led to the rise of investment from USD 8.9 billion (2013) to USD 14.7 billion (2018). But the investment has led to rise of debt to these central Asian countries for example, USD 1.8 billion owed by Kyrgyzstan, USD 1.2 billion by Tajikistan, USD 3 billion by Uzbekistan in 2019. There numbers are cited as the Debt Trap Diplomacy of China but other would also argue that the elites in the region mismanages the money.

The labour force from Central Asia to Russia as the leading destination brings a lot of money via remittance. In 2019, almost USD4 billion remittance flowed from Russia to Uzbekistan (6 percent of its GDP),  USD 2.5 billion (to Tajikistan) and USD 3 billion ( to Kyrgyzstan) were send as remittance amounting to 30 percent of Tajik and Uzbek GDP. China is poised to replace Russia as the dominant power in Central Asia due to its growing economic influence, particularly through the region’s labor force and its earlier efforts, such as opening markets for agricultural exports from these states in 2019, signaling a potential shift in regional dominance. Russian officials had time and again made it clear that the economic future of Central Asia lies with Russia more than China, but the elites in Russian were wary about BRI as they believe it may be alternative or competitor to Russia led Eurasian led projects.

Conclusion

China-Russia cooperation has not worked well for BRI because of their competitive goals of interests in Central Asia that hinders the broader goal of regionalization of these states itself. The another factors like mutual distrust, feat of domination, pulling each other out of region, minimising influence, role of leaders, individuals, and decision makers had impact on their relations. The fear of small central Asian states and choosing economic policies between the two powers are essentially surviving and stability factors of governments in these small nations. China is very new in the region and has ambiguous policy approach and central Asians are not confident about the transformation of their overall economic growth and stability in the region as compared to Russia that had historical ties and had built most of their modern transportation infrastructure and had infact played a crucial part in shaping the region.

Arfat Ahmad Bhat is a Research Scholar at Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.