1 October 2021, NIICE Commentary 7421
Palak Maheshwari
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949, it decided to adopt an official policy of atheism. This was not an easy task since China has a long civilizational history of religion and spirituality. Its official atheism has not stopped China from using religion to further its soft power goals. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP has tried to imbue all religions with a ‘Chinese’ characteristic to further its own agenda. This ‘sinicization’ of religions is an overlooked but important aspect of Chinese foreign policy, and it is only expected to intensify in the coming years.
The Constitution of China recognizes five religions; Buddhism (Chinese and Tibetan), Taoism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam. It has been perceived that the CCP favours Asian religions like Taoism and Buddhism over Christianity and Islam. It is perhaps more wary of Christianity and Islam because of the immense foreign influence that exists over these religions and the fact that their highest religious authorities lie outside of China and Asia (and therefore beyond the CCP’s control). In his speeches, Xi Jinping has often said that he hopes that China’s traditional cultures of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism could help curb the country’s “moral decline”. His regime is attempting to co-opt the influence of religion to further its own agendas in a more direct way. But this does not mean that the crackdown on religions has subsided. In a Freedom House report of 2017, it was found that religious suppression has increased overall, with four religious groups bearing the brunt of it – Tibetan Buddhists, Protestant Christians, Hui Muslims and Uighur Muslims.
Beijing and Buddhism
Xi Jinping has issued a firm call for the ‘sinicization’ of Tibetan Buddhism – that Tibetan Buddhism needed to adapt to socialism and to Chinese conditions. What does this mean exactly? In terms of religion, ‘sinicization’ involves ensuring that spiritual beliefs and teachings conform to the CCP’s principles and objectives. These attempts have classified Buddhism into two separate sects in China; the distinct form of Tibetan Buddhism practiced in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) by six million ethnic Tibetans, and the CCP-approved version called Chinese Buddhism practiced by over 250 million Chinese people. Chinese Buddhism has the highest number of followers of any institutionalized religion in China.
Being seen as the leader of the Buddhist world can help China achieve two objectives; attracting tourism to its many Buddhist institutions which it has heavily invested in, and having the ability to use Buddhism as a strong mediator while dealing with Buddhist countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia. To achieve this goal of becoming the global leader in Buddhism, the CCP attempts to discredit any influence that any outside power can possibly have on the global narrative of Buddhism. The Buddhist Association of China (BAC), associated with the United Front Work Department (UFWD) is the supervisory authority of Buddhism in China. The CCP approved 11th Panchen Lama is the Vice-President of the BAC. Since 2006, the BAC has been organizing the World Buddhist Forum (WBF), which is a global congregation of Buddhist leaders and followers. The WBF is an attempt by the CCP to convey to its own Buddhist population and to neighbouring countries that the Communist Party approves of – and supports – Buddhism. The WBF is also China’s primary exercise to project itself as an integral component of Buddhism’s history in Asia, and the leading stakeholder in the contemporary discourse on the religion. It is also a forum to raise the profile of the Panchen Lama and gain support for him (as opposed to the exiled Dalai Lama).
The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism but devotion towards him is strictly disallowed in the TAR and elsewhere in China. Beijing is especially wary because the current 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, enjoys immense global popularity and patronage. China has even tried to persuade the 14th Dalai Lama to “spend his last days” in his “motherland” so that they can have control over who becomes the next Dalai Lama. According to latest reports, China is stepping up its fight with US and India over the legitimate authority to appoint the next Dalai Lama.
On a surface level, it seems that China’s influence over the narrative on Buddhism is increasing. Some Asian countries with strong links to Buddhism, like Myanmar, South Korea and Vietnam, have not permitted a visit by the Dalai Lama to be careful towards their relationship with Beijing. This also gives China a crucial geopolitical advantage in South Asia. Controlling the narrative on Buddhism gives Beijing immense power over Buddhist populations in India (Sikkim, Tawang, Ladakh, Dharamshala), Bhutan, and other parts of the world. Beijing sees this as an attempt to neutralize “hostile foreign forces” who may influence protests and uprisings amongst the Tibetan population in China.
The Chinese government has also spent millions of dollars to link its Buddhist heritage to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, especially in South and Southeast Asia. By gaining significant footing in Buddhist soft power, China expects that its BRI projects will be welcomed more wholeheartedly in countries with Buddhist leanings. In the future, the CCP is also expected to use this soft power to gain international recognition for Beijing’s appointment of the 15th Dalai Lama. The BRI’s debt-trap diplomacy and the Chinese push for soft-power are widely interconnected in this scenario. Using Buddhist links, if China is able to trap a lot of Buddhist countries into its debt, it may not be difficult to get their support for a CCP-approved Dalai Lama later.
But what the CCP has not factored into this equation is where does the faith of devout Buddhists of the world lie – and it is decidedly with the 14th Dalai Lama. Tibetan Buddhism remains an integral part of life for Tibetans within and outside China. The Dalai Lama enjoys much more legitimacy than the CCP can ever wish to garner, and he has time and again pointed out that if Tibet remains “occupied by China”, he will decide to reincarnate outside of Tibet. In Tibetan Buddhism, reincarnation is based on a deeply religious and spiritual practice and if the CCP fails to realize the limits of state-intervention, it can adversely affect their Buddhist soft power goals.
Palak Maheshwari is student of Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, India.
