12 April 2020, NIICE Commentary 4051
Md Yasin
After the COVID-19 crisis defuses, will China play a bigger role in the emerging new world order? The answer to this question hinges on the resilience of global economy and the speed of recovery as well as the economic gap between the US and China. It is not that any country is immune to this COVID-19 pandemic that debilitated the balance of political and economic power shifts by disrupting global supply chains with a hint of huge economic slump.
Despite an early cover-up and nervous response to the deadly virus, China attempted to rebrand the lethal COVID-19 from a disaster to a success story, as if a soccer-star is trying hard to prove his/her worth and skills after being shown a yellow card at the very first minute. One can still do it but an utmost caution is needed throughout the game.
Although Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian repeatedly denied the accusation of ‘covering up and in-transparency’ as groundless, Wuhan-based Chinese novelist Fang Fang’s ‘Wuhan Diary’ or ‘Quarantine Diary’ portrays an altogether different picture. A ‘solemn apology’ by Wuhan police to the family of Dr. Li Wenliang and declaring whistleblower doctors ‘martyrs’ will probably not mend the mayhem caused by China’s botched attempt in early days. Contrary to this disadvantageous position, China is visibly set to honing its soft power toolkit amidst the global public health crisis.
Soft power is defined as the “ability of a state to influence events/actions of others through persuasion and attraction, rather than military or financial coercion”. Joseph Nye positions country’s soft power in three dimensions: culture (the attractiveness of its culture to others), the appeal of its domestic political and social values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and the style and substance of its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Apart from hard power elements, the general consensus is that the status of the US as a global leader has been grounded on its legitimacy and moral authority, which is the result of its strong domestic governance and readiness to initiate a coordinated global response to any crisis. Notwithstanding, the United States’ faulty handling of the crisis and an exposed unpreparedness reveal the ineptitude of domestic governance and the current leadership, as Joshua Kurlantzick, calls the US authority’s response to the COVID-19 crisis ‘shambolic’.
At this point, as professor Christopher Isike of the University of Pretoria observed, “China may be offering the world an innovation – responsible statism: strong domestic governance that justifies the Lockean essence of the state even though it is intrusive”. Prof. Christopher believes that China’s successful lockdown and efficient enforcement, which contributed to contain the outbreak, is a good indicator of this responsible statism that exhibits Chinese political values.
Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard University represented a rather gloomy viewpoint: “COVID-19 will also accelerate the shift in power and influence from west to east. The response in Europe and America has been slow and haphazard by comparison [with China, South Korea and Singapore], further tarnishing the aura of the western ‘brand’.”
With apparent containment of the COVID-19 and appealing ‘facemask diplomacy’, China remains well-positioned to participate in a careful, concerted campaign to act on “international humanitarianism” and to implement the vision of a “community with a shared future for (hu)mankind”.
Having acknowledged China’s ability to build makeshift hospitals in just over a week and ramped up production of medical kits, as part of its ‘innovation’, which is imbedded in its culture; however, the obstinacy of Chinese political system to not accommodate different viewpoints and its treatment to dissents perhaps flopped its locus to script an alluring story in this respect. In the midst of pandemic, Beijing’s crackdown on civil society and freedom of expression, from professor Xu Zhangrun’s confinement to home and barring from social media to disciplinary action against the former Chinese property tycoon Ren Zhiqiang, has not yielded desired outcomes in this respect. On the contrary, it raises more questions on the sustenance of this governance model.
The strongest challenge in recent times by Chinese academia to President Xi has stuck in murky meadow. The first open letter, signed by ten Wuhan academics, including Tang Yiming of Central China Normal University, called for freedom of speech as protected by the Chinese constitution. The second open letter by nine professors, including Zhang Qianfan of Peking University and Xu Zhangrun of Tsinghua University, recommending the day of Dr. Li’s death (6 February) to be marked as ‘National Freedom of Speech Day’ went unaddressed.
Health diplomacy, a multi-level and multi-actor negotiation process, is a soft power, which allows a country to buttress its image by earning the gratitude of the people of other countries while also offering necessary medical assistances. The strategy of winning over ‘hearts and minds’ had worked for the US following its health interventions in places like Banda Aceh (Indonesia) and Thailand after the 2004 Tsunami. Similarly, the H1N1 influenza (flu) outbreak (2009) prompted France to launch the REACTing initiative (REsearch + ACTion against infectious disease) that eventually contributed to improving its soft power points. China amid coronavirus pandemic stepped up its ‘facemask diplomacy’, spearheaded by philanthropic foundations of Friends of President Trump, Chinese business magnates – Jack Ma and Joe Tsai. According to statistics from Chinese customs, from 1 March to 4 April, China exported RMB 10.2 billion worth of anti-epidemic supplies, including 3.86 billion masks, 37.52 million protective gears, 2.41 million infrared thermometers, 16,000 ventilators, 2.84 million testing kits and 8.41 million protective goggles. By 8. April, China has sent 12 teams of medical experts to 10 countries, to help them combat COVID-19. As reminded by Zhao Lijian, these efforts are being made to reciprocate the goodwill China received earlier during the pandemic. The results of some of these activities are instantaneous, as Serbian PM, in a letter, addressed his Chinese counterpart ‘as a friend and brother of Serbia’; an EU spokesperson ‘highly appreciated’ China’s offers of donations; Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, following the arrival of a Chinese medical team and equipment, said, ‘we are not alone’. Lucrezia Poggetti, a Berlin based analyst opined, “China’s one-party state and record on human rights is generally viewed negatively in Europe, but its actions during the current crisis may help win over some”. This is, without any doubt, result of absence of coordinated response by the EU and the US. Remember, in mid March President Xi described China’s current activities in Europe as an effort to foster a “Health Silk Road”.
Although health diplomacy will arm China with additional soft power arsenals, but efforts can be hamstringed by disinformation campaign regarding the origin of lethal virus and ambiguity in the number of asymptomatic patients by an aspiring world leader. China needs to overcome the trust-deficit challenge as well. Meanwhile, Mira Rapp-Hooper of the US Council on Foreign Relations cautioned, “if the US remained absent without leave, China might take this crisis as an opportunity to start setting new rules”. Therefore, it is for us to see in the coming days whether this COVID-19 offered China a game-changing watersheds or turning point, keeping in mind the fact that China has the world’s largest network of diplomatic missions. The possibility is contingent upon the US response or inaction to the pandemic in later days; China will readily attempt to fill the void if there is any.
