12 April 2020, NIICE Commentary 4048
Dr Aradhana Talwar
The much anticipated agreement between the US and Taliban took place on 29 February 2020, in the coast of Persian Gulf at Doha, Qatar. With this, the eighteen-year-long bloodshed has came to a standstill that saw pleasantries and handshakes taking place between the US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban group’s prominent political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.
Content of the Deal
The agreement pertains to the commitment by one of the most powerful countries – the US – for the withdrawal of American and coalition troops within next fourteen months and at the same time, an assurance by Taliban for non-use of Afghan soil for any activity that would lead to a threat to the national security of the US including non-cooperation with other groups including Al-Qaeda or individuals undertaking such activities. Among the other important provisions, the agreement also includes clause which talks of prisoner exchange wherein 5000 Taliban prisoners will be released and 1000 from “the other side” as part of confidence-building measures. Simple as it may seem, however, the deal has raised number of questions, curiosity and points of discussion among the foreign policy analysts.
Long Awaited Deal
The attack on the power symbols of the US in September, 2001 ruptured the much spoken world order and saw the beginning of the US’s war of Afghanistan with an objective of hunting down the terrorists involved in the 9/11 operations. As the then US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld opined at the start of the US’s Afghanistan war, “If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the US will not achieve its aim.” However, the background to the present agreement can be traced to former US President Barack Obama who was known to be critical of war and propounded concepts such as “Good War” and “Afghan Good Enough”. In other words, the underlying principles of these policies envisioned a stable Afghanistan and reduction of the US troops with eventual withdrawal from the country. However, Obama oscillated between his policies of reduction and sending in more troops to Afghanistan due to compelling security reasons and hence, complete withdrawal of the US troops remained only a distant dream.
The coming to power of President Donald Trump in 2017 with his strong convictions and notions of ‘America First’ resulted in dramatic changes in the US foreign-policy decisions. In other words, foreign policy analysts began referring to Trump’s foreign policy as inward looking in nature and tone, and hence, the inevitable implication was rethinking the US’s role in Afghanistan. The untold truth about the US’s Afghanistan war and the recent US-Taliban agreement highlights the point that the consistent foreign policy objectives of the successive US Presidents (starting from George Bush) have been to extricate the country from Afghanistan without having discredited its apparent global military might. This is because the war has come with a huge cost for both the countries which saw approximately 2400 American military casualities over the years and similar number of Afghan soldiers losing their lives. The overseas operations taken by the US defence personnel in Afghanistan spanning for eighteen years has cost the American economy approximately USD 2 trillion (till 2019) as reported by Brown University’s Costs of War Project. The US foreign-policy makers, therefore, have found it difficult time and again to maintain balance between the country’s strategic goals and the tangible outcomes in Afghanistan policy. Moreover, what better timing of the deal than now, considering the forthcoming US Elections in November! These considerations were reflected when both the sides broke the ice which saw the beginning of negotiations in 2018 and finally culminated in February 2020.
Risks and Implications
The US-Taliban agreement which was signed in the presence of the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also witnessed foreign diplomats from different countries including India. India has played the role of a major stakeholder in Afghanistan and has invested around USD 2 billion in the reconstruction activities. India’s reaction to the agreement was significant as stated by Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Spokesperson Raveesh Kumar, wherein emphasis has been laid on “a lasting political settlement through an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled process”. The terms “Afghan led” and “Afghan-owned” are significant which were earlier mentioned in India-US Joint Statement titled “Joint Statement: Vision and Principles for India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership” during the US President Trump’s visit to India in February while discussing security situation in Afghanistan and counter-terrorism mechanisms. The question remains whether the US-Taliban agreement is truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. The fact remains that by signing a separate agreement with Taliban, the US has given legitimacy to the group and contradicted its counter-terrorism strategies with India thereby putting the latter in great risk.
The agreement further states that the complete withdrawal by the US from Afghanistan including “all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel within fourteen months.” In other words, there are no planned mechanisms in place to ensure the coming back to power of Taliban in Afghanistan once the US withdraws. Certainly, international community including India wishes for an independent and sovereign Afghanistan which has an inclusive and pluralistic social fabric. The bigger question for India is – Can this be achieved if given a hypothetical situation of Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan. The most neglected are the minorities and women in Afghanistan who have experienced the worst of human rights violations under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. According to US State Department Report titled “Taliban’s War Against Women”, in the pre-Taliban regime era (pre-1996), “70 percent of school teachers, 50 percent of government workers, and 40 percent of doctors in Kabul” were women. These numbers reduced drastically after 1996 under Taliban regime with its heinous policies of closing down of women universities, no education to girls above 8 years of age, restrictions on the movement of women and their dress code, etc. In this context, the question remains whether the February US-Taliban agreement can still be referred to as “Afghan-led” or “Afghan-owned”.
The peace element in the agreement is questionable as the provision states that Taliban will not use Afghan soil to conduct any activity which is a threat to the US security. However, the fact remains that Taliban fighters are sheltered by the neighbouring state Pakistan that has implicitly harboured the group’s activities over the years and finds no mention in the agreement. Moreover, the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan will leave a complete vacuum in the security situation and will give a leeway to Pakistan to undertake notorious activities on a larger scale from this part of the globe. This will certainly impact the security dynamics of South Asia at large and India in particular.
The US has been at the forefront of the so-called democracy drive in West Asia and shares the vision of international community against global terrorism in terms of violence. Surprisingly, the US has not asked Taliban to distance itself from violence outside Afghanistan. Further, UN designated terrorist organizations such as LeT, JEM and the recent ISIS find no mention in the agreement which have been the concern of countries across the globe.
The US-Taliban agreement finds itself with a tough road ahead and needs cooperation from the entire Afghan section for it to result in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. Moreover, the domestic imbroglio in Afghanistan between two leaders – Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah have stalled the intra-Afghan talks, especially the prisoner exchange clause of the agreement and added to further mess. The need of the hour is to implement the agreement clauses and remain true to the title of the agreement, “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan,” which will result in real stability considering the interests of the entire Afghan people.
