24 January 2020, NIICE Commentary 3147
Shrabana Barua
With the first bilateral state visit by a Chinese President in 19 years, Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar on 17-18 January 2020, has filled new vigour into the age old ‘Paukphaw’ (kinship) relationship between the two countries. As Myanmar’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade touching USD 16.8 billion in 2019 and given that Chinese investment in Kyaukphu is among its most strategic ones, a state visit of this stature was quite expected.
A day before Xi arrived in the capital city of Naw Pi Taw, a signed article by him was published by three newspapers in Myanmar. The article underlined the heralding of a ‘new chapter’ in Myanmar-China ties. In this context, it is important to go beyond simply analyzing the most recent collaborations in their already warm relationship.
China’s tic-tac-toe with Myanmar
Myanmar was the first non-communist country to diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 8 June 1950. President Xi acknowledged the importance of this during his recent visit, which also marks the 70th anniversary of their diplomatic ties. But it is not without compunction that the relationship has reached what it is today.
Myanmar has had a choppy journey with China. The 1950s was marred by issues concerning the active operations of the Kuomintang (KMT) from Upper Burma, challenging the Communist government in Beijing. The1960s was also problematic as Burmese President Ne Win turned rather autarkic with his policy of Burmanization, which even witnessed many anti-China riots during the early decades of their interface. In fact, Myanmar severed diplomatic ties with Beijing from 1967-70. At that time, the PRC pursued its foreign interests in Myanmar through the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in exchange of aid, including arms and ammunitions. China also supported many insurgent groups in Myanmar that fueled domestic troubles.
A relationship between Myanmar and China, which was truly ‘new’, emerged through the eve of 1980s. The restoration of diplomatic ties in 1971 was followed by a complete U-turn of the Ne Win regime, to the extent that Myanmar began to woo China. In 1979, Myanmar pulled out of the Non-Alignment Movement and drew closer to Beijing. With Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Myanmar in 1978 for a notable six days, it was obvious that a new decade was waiting to cement the Pauk-Phaw relationship.
The takeover of political reigns by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988 catalyzed the Myanmar-China bonhomie. China signed border trade agreement with Myanmar in 1988, assisted in banning the CPB in 1989 and also started to build roads, bridges and railways inside Myanmar in perusal of its strategic vision thereon. Today, it is increasingly acknowledged that China’s Myanmar policy was reflected in 1985 itself when Vice Minister of Communication, Pan Qi, wrote in the Beijing Review about ‘opening the southwest’ i.e. Yunnan and Sichuan via Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal.
The most recent example of China’s thrust towards the Indian Ocean via Myanmar is through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that Myanmar joined in 2017. The Bangladesh China India Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC, which surprisingly was left out of the Joint Communique in the second BRF in 2019) and the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC) are the two economic corridors that involves Myanmar under the BRI scheme. China has also proposed the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) along with its three pillars namely, the Kyaukpyu SEZ, the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone and the New Yangon City, which finds mention in the recent Joint Statement.
What is New in the ‘New Chapter’?
Unlike in 2009, when Xi Jinping (then Vice President) visited Yangon during the third leg of his four nations tour, President Xi made his maiden foreign visit of 2020 by going to and fro Naw Pi Taw. Further, 2020 has been noted as the ‘China-Myanmar Year of Culture and Tourism’. These project some new energies that has been infused into the relationship.
The recent Joint Statement calls for building a ‘Myanmar-China Community with a Shared Future’ based on three principles: mutual benefits, equality and win-win cooperation. This is not entirely new anyhow. China’s support for Myanmar in the context of the Rohingya issue, when the International Court of Justice recently accused Myanmar of ‘genocidal intent’, is indicative of its mutual benefit in providing political cushion in the international context. It is reminiscent of the late 1980s when Myanmar, after the 8.8.88 incident, and China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, found it mutually beneficial in befriending each other at a time when the international community looked at both as pariah states. The ‘equality’ and ‘win-win’ aspect of the cooperation can be debated, especially by those cautioning against China’s debt diplomacy in the BRI context.
The new aspects of Myanmar-China relationship can be gauged by understanding two important elements today. First, in acknowledging the functionality of what Hegel explicates as one of the three laws of dialectic, i.e. change in quality due to increase in quantitative changes. The new relationship between Myanmar and China is a result of incrementalism of projects over time, both in number and type, which has brought about a qualitative change in the way the two countries operate. For instance, there has been no announcement of any new significant project recently, nor any talk about the revival of the suspended Myitsone Hydropower project. The need to expedite ongoing projects under the BRI assures one of the seriousness of Chinese investment in the region, but falls short of giving concrete specifics. Yet, that President Xi signed 33 agreements within his short visit, 13 related to the infrastructure sector itself, is indicative of a new direction Myanmar-China relation is taking. These figures are more than the combined total of 23 signed by India since 2012, i.e. 12 MoUs signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s ‘historic’ visit in 2012, eulogized as the one by an Indian PM since Rajiv Gandhi’s 1987 visit, and 11 agreements signed by PM Modi during his visit in September 2017, right after his visit to China.
Second, in sensing that Myanmar has gained more bargaining power vis-à-vis China due to its strategic location, at a time when the Indian Ocean is emerging as a playground of global power politics. Notwithstanding the fact that China has strong hold over Myanmar’s energy and major infrastructure projects, the increasing investments by international players have given a solid balancing plank for Myanmar. It is no surprise that Japan singed four Official Development Assistance (ODA) loan agreements amounting USD1.1 billion to fund development projects in seven regions in Myanmar, only three days after Xi left Myanmar. Further, the 2019 Invest Myanmar Summit is a case in point, particularly because State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi praised the Thilawa SEZ (that Japan operates as a Joint Venture) and hoped for progress in the Dawei SEZ (with support from Thailand, Japan and China) but did not mention about the Kyaukphyu SEZ. It is also to be noted that the USD7.7 billion cost of China’s Kyaukphu project was downsized to USD1.3 billion, while its 85 percent stake was re-negotiated to bring it to 70 percent.
Whether anything is new or not, Myanmar-China relationship is driven by exigencies of geopolitics. The strategic location of Myanmar and the economic clout of China with its aim to balance the Western led flank in the Indo-Pacific are bound to increase the level of interactions between the two countries. Bertil Lintner writes that it is the Indian Ocean region which is China’s ‘costliest pearl’ in the 21st century. Indeed, Myanmar plays a crucial role in accessing that coveted pearl.
