10 April 2026, NIICE Commentary 12440
Samir Ahmad
On 28 February, a joint military strike by the United States and Israel targeted strategic sites in Iran, escalating into a full-scale war between the US and Israel with Iran. The early strikes in the ongoing conflict resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The assassination of a sitting head of state or supreme authority through external military action triggered immediate global reactions. Many countries showed reluctance to openly approve or condemn the strikes, while some, particularly China and Russia, condemned the attack and the killing of the supreme leader as a violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty under international law and the United Nations framework. Such reactions were largely predictable as both countries maintain longstanding strategic partnerships with Iran and have consistently opposed unilateral military interventions led by Western powers, viewing them as undermining the principles of non-interference and the rules-based international order. Given this, their condemnation reflected not only normative concerns regarding sovereignty but also broader geopolitical contestation with Western dominance in global security governance. Pakistan, despite its evolving relationship with the United States, issued statements criticizing the strikes and expressing concern over regional stability.
In contrast, India, one of the major regional powers and the world’s 5th largest economy, took a restrained stance and neither condemned nor endorsed the military attack. This measured diplomatic silence regarding the outbreak of war and the subsequent killing of Ali Khameini has sparked debate among policymakers, analysts, and opposition leaders both within and outside India.
Opponents argue that India’s subdued response signals a departure from its traditional commitment to normative diplomacy and international law. Moreover, they opine that it reflects a weakening of India’s strategic autonomy under the changing global order and multilateralism. However, an alternative interpretation situates the silence within the framework of pragmatic statecraft, suggesting that such a response is neither accidental nor indicative of indecision, but rather a deliberate and calculated diplomatic strategy.
This divergence in interpretation and opposing viewpoints raises an important question: should India’s restrained response to the West Asian crises be seen as surrender to Western pressure or as a strategy driven by national interests rather than immediate reactions influenced by ethical imperatives and selective international norms?
My central contention in this paper is that India’s response should not be interpreted as mere silence, but rather as “diplomatic silence”- a purposive and meticulously calibrated modality of statecraft. Far from signalling indecision or disengagement, the posture reflects an erudite exercise in strategic circumspection, shaped by the imperatives of competing geopolitical alignments and normative constraints. It embodies a conscious deployment of restraint as an instrument of foreign policy, enabling India to safeguard strategic autonomy while navigating the complexities of an increasingly fragmented and volatile international order without prematurely committing to positions that may constrain future policy options.
The theoretical underpinning of this argument may be located within the tradition of ‘Realism’, which prioritises national interest, power considerations, and strategic calculation over normative or ideological commitments. In an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world order, States are less guided by moral proclamations and more by the logic of survival, interests, and power balancing. Normative commitments, while rhetorically important, remain subordinate to national interests when vital security or economic considerations are at stake. According to Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism, States adjust their behaviour according to systemic pressures rather than ideological preferences. Thus, from this realist perspective, India’s response reflects a rational assessment of competing interests rather than a failure of diplomatic engagement.
Over the past decade, India has pursued a policy of multi-alignment, carefully balancing its relations with competing global and regional actors. It has simultaneously deepened its strategic partnership with the United States and strengthened defence and technological cooperation with Israel, while maintaining functional and economically significant ties with Iran, particularly in the domains of energy security and regional connectivity. India-U.S. trade relations have developed into a global strategic partnership, based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional, and global issues. In the recent past India-U.S. cooperation experienced intense engagement under several bilateral dialogue mechanisms in a wide range of areas, including defence, security, health, trade, economic, science & technology, energy, and people-to-people ties. The US is India’s largest trading partner. In the financial year 2025, the bilateral trade between the two countries stood at a record US$ 132.2 billion as against US$ 119.71 billion a year earlier. The USA is the third largest investor in India with cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows of US$ 70.65 billion between April 2000 and March 2025. Iran anchors the Chabahar Port, India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan and supporting the International North-South Transport Corridor, India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Given these overlapping and, at times, contradictory interests, an explicit alignment in the context of the US-Israel - Iran conflict would risk undermining India’s broader strategic objectives.
Lest we forget, it is not the first time the government of India has adopted such a diplomatic posture. Earlier as well, India adopted a similar stance during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when it abstained from voting in the United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia. Rather than describing Russia as an aggressor, the government in Delhi maintained a position of strategic ambiguity, calling for dialogue and diplomacy while safeguarding its national interests, including defence ties and energy imports from Russia.
Thus, India’s current stance should be seen as a continuation of this broader doctrine of strategic autonomy, not in its idealistic, Cold War era non-aligned form, but in a more fluid, interest-driven manifestation suited to contemporary geopolitics. According to C. Raja Mohan, India has transitioned from moralpolitik to realpolitik, prioritizing outcomes over ideological consistency.
Calling this posture mere ‘Silence’ jeopardies its intent and purpose vis-à-vis national interest. It should be seen as a diplomacy of calculated restraint and statecraft where speaking less allows for manoeuvring more. In a volatile geopolitical environment, overt alignment can constrain future choices, whereas ambiguity preserves flexibility.
Therefore, India’s response is not an absence of policy, but a policy rightly described as ‘diplomatic silence as strategy.’ It reflects a nuanced balancing act- engaging all sides, avoiding entanglement, and prioritising long-term national interests over short-term rhetorical positioning.
To conclude, indeed, Iran remains an important regional partner for India, particularly in the context of long-term energy security and connectivity ambitions. However, positioning Iran in direct strategic equivalence with the United States and Israel risks overstating the geopolitical significance of the relationship. Iran contributes to India’s energy diversification and regional access, especially through initiatives such as the Chabahar connectivity framework. It does not occupy the same structural space within India’s broader strategic architecture as Washington or Tel Aviv, whose partnerships encompass defence cooperation, advanced technology transfer, and global political alignment. India’s engagement with Iran is therefore best understood as functional and interest-driven rather than as a competing strategic axis.
Dr Samir Ahmad is a US Fulbright Scholar and currently teaches Political Science at Government Degree College for Women, Nawakadal, Srinagar, India.
