19 November 2025, NIICE Commentary 11945
Sangeeta Sinha
The India–Maldives relationship continues to serve as an instructive case for scholars examining asymmetry, sovereignty, and strategic hedging in the Indian Ocean. While international relations literature often valorizes the sanctity of borders, Robert Frost’s cautionary line—“Before I built a wall I’d ask to know / What I was walling in or walling out”—captures the dilemma at the heart of this dyad. The two nations, bound by geography, history, and interdependence, repeatedly encounter the limitations of sovereignty when proximity becomes both a strategic asset and a political irritant. The documents under review collectively illuminate this tension, but a deeper commentary reveals how contemporary geopolitics, domestic political narratives, and external great-power interests transform an otherwise linear bilateral relationship into a theatre of diplomatic recalibration.
Sovereignty as Assertion and Performance
Small States Theory maintains that small states regularly oscillate between dependency and autonomy as a mechanism of survival. The Maldives exemplifies this pattern: its political leadership often frames sovereignty through symbolic resistance rather than structural transformation. The rise of the “India Out” campaign demonstrates this paradox vividly. While sovereignty is invoked as a defensive instrument, the practical limits of disengagement are unmistakable. Assertions of autonomy frequently mask the reality that economic, developmental, and security dependencies remain deeply entrenched.
This sovereign posturing can be interpreted as what Wendt (1999) called the “performative constitution of identity”—states act sovereign not because they fully are, but because recognition of sovereignty requires a continuous performance of independence. Yet such performances do not eliminate the underlying asymmetry. As the Maldives toggles between rejecting Indian military presence and courting Indian development assistance, its behaviour reveals what might be termed sovereignty on stilts: lofty in rhetoric, fragile in structure.
Economic Interdependence and the Diplomacy of Markets
Among the most compelling threads in the documents is the role of tourism as both a stabilizer and a vulnerability in the bilateral relationship. The Maldives’ tourism-driven economy—deeply reliant on a few source markets—exposes it to nontraditional forms of geopolitical influence. The precipitous drop in Indian tourist arrivals following diplomatic tensions illustrates how market behaviour becomes an instrument of power.
Unlike traditional sanctions, which require state mobilisation, the tourism backlash emerged organically from public sentiment. This constitutes what Nye (2004) would classify as “societal soft power”—a collectively exercised influence that can generate material consequences without explicit state orchestration. The irony here is profound: a small state rejecting perceived dependence on a regional power inadvertently triggered a much greater economic dependence on another global actor, China. The shift from Indian to Chinese tourist inflows is not simply an economic transition; it is a reconfiguration of strategic alignment layered upon market sensitivities.
Ultimately, tourism becomes an arena where sovereignty and dependency collide. As one Maldivian official once remarked, “Our beaches are sovereign, but our economy is not”—a sentiment that encapsulates the national predicament more succinctly than any policy brief.
Security Cooperation and the Ambiguities of Presence
Security cooperation, especially post–Operation Cactus, has long constituted the backbone of India–Maldives relations. India’s rapid intervention in 1988 is often cited as a landmark example of regional security stewardship. Yet in contemporary politics, the presence of Indian personnel—originally stationed for humanitarian and maritime surveillance roles—has been reframed by segments of Maldivian political discourse as undue interference.
This reframing demonstrates what Buzan and Wæver (2003) identify as a “securitization move”: transforming a routine practice into a perceived existential threat through political rhetoric. Such securitisation allows leadership transitions in the Maldives to position India as both a necessary partner and a suspicious neighbour, depending on domestic political incentives.
This is where the symbolic and practical dimensions of sovereignty collide. India’s intentions may be stabilizing, but perception increasingly shapes reality. What was once viewed as assistance is now reinterpreted—selectively—as encroachment. This highlights a broader truth of regional politics: asymmetric relations require not just strategic restraint but strategic sensitivity.
China as Strategic Interlocutor and Structural Variable
The entry of China into the Maldivian strategic landscape amplifies the region’s complexity. Whereas India’s engagement historically evolved from cultural and geographic proximity, China’s approach is infrastructural, financial, and decisively future-oriented. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing positions itself as an architect of connectivity, offering economic alternatives that smaller states find difficult to refuse.
However, these alternatives may come with embedded structural dependencies. The Sri Lankan experience with Hambantota remains a cautionary tale, one that scholars increasingly treat as emblematic of how infrastructure diplomacy can morph into geopolitical leverage. In the Maldivian context, China’s expanding presence—whether through construction, financing, or tourism—reconfigures the diplomatic grammar of the region. The Maldives’ strategic hedging is not merely about balancing India and China; it is about negotiating the terms of its future sovereignty.
Kaplan’s (2010) assertion that “the Indian Ocean will determine the global balance of power” finds contemporary resonance here. Small states such as the Maldives hold disproportionate geostrategic significance precisely because great powers seek influence in spaces where traditional defence capabilities are minimal but geographic leverage is immense.
Diplomacy Beyond Fences: A Conceptual Reframing
The recurring theme across both documents—the inadequacy of the “good fences make good neighbours” principle—demands theoretical expansion. Proximity in the Indian Ocean does not permit isolation; it necessitates negotiation. For India and the Maldives, good neighbours are not made by fences but by frameworks—transparent security agreements, respectful economic partnerships, and calibrated diplomatic communication. The Indian Ocean region requires, to borrow Frost again, not more walls but “something there is that doesn’t love a wall.” In context, that “something” is interdependence itself.
If diplomacy is, as Kissinger (1994) argues, “the art of restraining power,” then the India–Maldives relationship demonstrates that restraint must occur on both sides: India must restrain its instinct for regional paternalism, and the Maldives must restrain its tendency to politicise structural dependency.Kissinger (1994)
Conclusion
The India–Maldives dynamic remains a study in asymmetry shaped by history, contested sovereignty, market forces, and great-power competition. Their relationship illustrates that proximity is a double-edged sword: it binds and burdens, stabilises and disrupts. The documents collectively affirm that the region needs bridges—flexible, negotiated, and resilient—not rhetorical fences.
A future built on mutuality, transparency, and strategic maturity is not merely desirable—it is indispensable. As the Indian Ocean continues its ascent as a geopolitical epicentre, the India–Maldives relationship will remain a microcosm of the broader struggle to reconcile sovereignty with interdependence.
Sangeeta Sinha is a PhD Scholar at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India. You can contact her at sangeetasipra2024@gmail.com.
