10 May 2024, NIICE Commentary 9129
Kyle Dane Ballogan

Countries like the United States, India, Australia, Japan (QUAD), and countries from far Europe like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have already communicated their support for the Philippine territory in the disputed South China Sea. Generally, these countries helped the Philippines in two ways: through acknowledgment and condemnation. Some of them fiercely and openly expressed their disapproval of China’s aggression and dangerous maneuvers in the disputed sea. While some acknowledged and recognized the Philippines’s favor in the Hague arbitral tribunal ruling in 2016, others did both. The most recent condemnation that favors the Philippines was South Korea expressing its grave concerns over China’s provocations that “undermine efforts to maintain peace, stability, security, and a rules-based maritime order.”

ASEAN’s silence is as deafening as the territorial disputes.

Yet despite the overwhelming support the Philippines gained from different countries, why is the ASEAN to which the Philippines is one of the founding members, elusive and silent about the territorial mayhem?

Since the inception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Way has been established as the guiding norm of the members. ASEAN Way refers to the six fundamental principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) namely,

  1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;
  2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion, renunciation of threat and force;
  3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
  4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
  5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
  6. Effective cooperation among themselves.

When these principles are combined, the ASEAN Way becomes synonymous with restraint, avoidance, and postponement in terms of conflict to give way for relaxation and diplomatic discussions in pursuit of peaceful co-existence.

ASEAN’s Struggle in Navigating the South China Sea Dispute.

In 2023, the interstate dispute escalated between the Philippines and China when the latter’s vessels started bombing a water cannon against the supply boat of the Philippines transporting supplies for its troops in the Ayungin Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal. Since then, continuous confrontations have existed between the two from water cannons, collisions, and dangerous blockings mainly from China. As described by President Marcos Jr. in two separate interviews, the maritime dispute “is a David and Goliath situation” and the “conflict might not come from [a] strategic decision by anyone but by a serviceman making a mistake or some action that’s misunderstood”. It is a brewing conflict that may develop into war anytime. Yet with the high temperature in the region, ASEAN is once again muted.

With the SCS maritime dispute in which four ASEAN members are parties– the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, each claimant naturally has its foreign policies and strategies for dealing with the dispute. And some members, except the Philippines who lodged the strongest protest alongside Vietnam, cannot be expected to talk against China due to underlying economic interests and adherence to the non-interference stipulated in TAC. However, as a collective body expected to bring regional peace and stability, the ASEAN union has long shown its weakness in tackling the tough issue of binding its members as the SCS is concerned. No other than the Philippines has resorted to international venues like the Hague’s Tribunal due to the delays of ASEAN’s “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” provisions.

While the association made an effort to draw mechanisms for dispute resolution to the decades-long issue like the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties with China and the Code of Conduct draft in 2017, the ongoing silence of the regional body is just the result of the ASEAN Way that impedes the role of the association in conflict management. The avoidance that the dispute receives in the name of non-intervention or voluntary cooperation backlashes the mantra of ASEAN Centrality as a broker for peace and security.

Challenges to the ASEAN Way in Addressing the South China Sea Dispute.

There are four issues with the ASEAN Way especially non-interference and quiet diplomacy in the case of dispute settlement in the region.

First, the ASEAN Way of over-adherence to non-interference with the external and internal affairs including interstate disputes leaves the affected members little to no venue for necessary mediations.

Second, ASEAN’s exaggeration of consensus to produce unanimity in decision-making stops the body from releasing quality statements because, in reality, not all members can be consolidated into one anyway. It must be noted that the dispute is neither an ethnic nor religious war that bears critical decisions and approaches that can swiftly kill people, but a maritime dispute that simply demands a strong and collective communique to support its members, and strictly comply with international law for a rule-based order. In short, ASEAN’s consensus–supposed to gather support for its members– has been counterproductive and prevented the association from releasing a quality and bolder stance.

Third, ASEAN’s Way of self-restraint, assisted by the underlying factors like the national and economic interests of other members with China made the union apathetic despite the rising tension of its neighbors. One indicator of China’s influence is a survey from a Singaporean think tank showing that 7 out of 10 countries polled higher in favor of China over the United States if ASEAN is forced to align itself with one of the strategic rivals. That implies the concealed interest of ASEAN members and their interfered decision-making from external powers.

Fourth, the highly distant culture and religion of the Philippines from other members coupled with non-intervention makes the association feel ambiguous, as other members tend to be low-profile and indifferent to disputes that do not touch them. Even the ASEAN Summit where everyone meets at one table, tends to lay aside the SCS which the Philippines continuously brought up.

When left untreated, these four issues will be a score for China to take advantage of ASEAN’s division. ASEAN non-interference coupled with China’s antics makes it complicated to navigate support in the union leaving the Philippines the option to hard-balance with the United States and like-minded countries. If ASEAN maintains its quiet diplomacy to play safe with the current geopolitical landscape in Asia. Then the Philippines, having more damage and loss from China has a reason to challenge and test the three-decade ASEAN Way to make it ripe and beneficial to all members.

A Final Note to Philippines’ Grand Strategy

In July 2023, the Philippine Senate tried to adopt a resolution urging the Philippine government to sponsor a resolution before the UN General Assembly about China’s aggression. Later on, the Resolution was revised making UNGA an option for the government. However, the government has to court more international support and play the game of addition before it can confidently avail such an option to lobby UNGA and call out China or welcome the 2016 Hague Arbitral Award. As far as ASEAN is concerned, the Philippine government has to wait patiently for two years for the ASEAN chairmanship to be able to impose a centralized and assertive political leadership in the union. The Philippines should capitalize on ASEAN chairmanship to advance internal political reform, especially ASEAN’s stance on pressing issues that affect its members. But while UNGA and ASEAN chairmanship have yet to come, the Philippines should exert more effort in internationalizing the issue while courting for support. Doing so will not just attract global care based on UNCLOS but also dilute Chinese power in ASEAN.

Kyle Dane Ballogan is a Research Intern at the Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE).