3 May 2024, NIICE Commentary 9071
Dr. V. Lenin Kumar

The outpouring of discussion on the Indo-Pacific region in the Indian foreign policy discourse in academia as well as in research and advocacy groups makes one wonder where India is geographically. Are we letting go of historical opportunities, if any, or are they simply expressions of the fear of missing out. The academic push towards the political location of India in the Indo-Pacific debate also comes side by side with the discourse of the ‘emergence of Bharat in world politics’ by Hindu nationalist supporters. Post-2020 Galwan border clash with China, there is a consistent US posturing regarding any ‘future India-China clash, the US and QUAD members will stand by India, and Indo-Pacific will create an alternative trade partner to reduce the dependence on China in the Indo-Pacific region’.

The deliberate and forceful projection that India and other QUAD members share a common interest is misleading and distorts India’s statement on the QUAD Alliance. In 2022, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “India stands for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity.” This was reiterated by India’s External Minister (EMI) in February 2024 at the QUAD think tank forum. In the same meeting, S. Jaishankar, EMI, asserted that India stands for the ‘multi-polar world’, which differs from the US vision of the Indo-Pacific region, which is the containment of China.

The South Asian Question

The South Asian region is perhaps one of the unique regions in the world where three nuclear powers, India, Pakistan, and China, share borders and subsequently have border disputes. India, despite having border disputes with its neighbours, continues to oppose external intervention in bilateral matters. Former US President Donald Trump offered to be the arbiter between India and Pakistan, who in turn continue to refuse US intervention. The US offering help to India is just a smokescreen for the US to segue into and gain control of South Asian waters and airspace and eventually establish a military base. In 2021, India strongly protested the use of the US Navy’s 7th Fleet in India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near Lakshadweep. While the US Navy justified its action by quoting the freedom of navigation operation (FONOP), the 7th Fleet USS John Paul Jones is a missile destroyer, not a common commerce ship. The South Asian region will be a key factor in the US Indo-Pacific military strategy.

According to the 2023 US Congressional Research Service report, the US has military bases in eight Indo-Pacific countries and 66 defense sites. Last year, the US established four new military bases in the Philippines. The same report also underlines the core reasons for the expansion: ‘building a resilient joint force and defense ecosystem’. The report further emphasises that ‘all the partner countries allow US defense presence in their soil’. One can understand the nature of the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy to encircle and contain China. In this macro strategy, India is merely a stepping stone for the US to establish its military presence in the South Asian region.

There are few ‘Think Tanks’ and concerned US citizens of Indian origin who want India to achieve ‘Vishwa Guru’ status by joining the Indo-Pacific. They argue that during the Cold War, due to the Congress party’s negligence and misguided foreign policy, India has missed out on the opportunity to join the US-led military alliance. At the 2023 G20, since India’s presidency was projected as a landmark achievement in Indian foreign policy, joining the Indo-Pacific military strategic alliance is a logical conclusion. This continued projection that India needs protection from China and that India is in the anti-China camp is fundamentally flawed and is detrimental to long-term Indian strategic interests, and more importantly, India-China relations.

India allowing third parties in its geographically influential sphere will weaken its military autonomy and independent foreign policy; the living example being the case of Ukraine in Europe.

The South Asian Conundrum

India’s South Asian foreign policy is neither incomplete nor confusing. There are few public records or debates on the BJP’s (Bharatiya Janata Party) Neighbourhood First Policy for the last decade. The influence of narrow domestic policies stemming from religious ideological beliefs motivated by electoral gains has been pushing Indian foreign policy towards hostile and uncertain relations with its neighbours. Calling Bangladeshis as termites and infiltrators, Pakistan as an eternal enemy, and depicting Nepal as part of Akhand Bharat has antagonised India’s neighbours creating strong anti-India sentiment among them, which in turn is a matter of concern for India’s future national interest. China’s eagerness to expand its presence in South Asia through various projects in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh, using Yuan as currency to pay Russia for nuclear power plants, shows the expansion of Chinese footprints in the region.

India’s economic deficiencies make its global ambitions weaker, and just rhetoric of emergency in Bharat is not sufficient to address the emerging global crisis. Indo-Pacific will help India economically accentuate its purpose to create free trade movement and connectivity, but the US-led initiative Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) excludes China.

The US transatlantic-focused politics has now changed into an Indo-Pacific alliance, showing the signs of the rise of Asian century arrivals in world politics, but the question for India is whether it will aim to rise as an economic, military, and regional hegemon or be satisfied being a part of an old western containment strategy.

Dr. V. Lenin Kumar is a Programme Director at MIT School of Government, MIT World Peace University, India.