12 April 2023, NIICE Commentary 8618
Thirtha Manoj
Nuclear weapons are seen as the international currency of force and power in the world today. India as a nuclear power turns 25 this month since it tested its nuclear devices and came out in the open in May 1998. Over the last 25 years, there have been a lot of developments and recently the strategic community has been calling for a review of India’s nuclear doctrine, questioning the credibility of India’s nuclear weapons and figuring out the relevance of sticking on to the ‘No First Use Policy’ of India when its nuclear neighbours which include Pakistan and China are busy building up their nuclear arsenals. Posture of ‘No First Use’ says that in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.
Security of India as a Nuclear Power
There can never be a firm and rigid ‘yes or no’ answer to the question whether nuclear weapons have made India more secure or less secure. If nuclear weapons were to stop wars from happening, that did not happen. In less than one year of India going nuclear it had to face the Kargil conflict, over the last 20 years it faced several big and small terrorist attacks, and the threat perception has increased manifold. Nuclear capability is not the answer for all kinds of security challenges. It is meant for nuclear deterrence and to that extent they have been useful to India and made it more secure by infusing a certain level of deterrence at the strategic level. There is always the possibility of conventional conflicts which is still possible with the presence of nuclear weapons and they are challenges of a different kind that are to be handled in a different way.
Is India Sufficient as a Nuclear Power?
With the United States, Russia and China modernising their nuclear arsenals and Pakistan moving towards full spectrum deterrence and inducting nuclear weapons, it is believed that India has been too quiet about its nuclear doctrine and is passive in developing its arsenals. We are in a world where if we are not doing something, it seems it is not right. It has been questioned if India is truly sufficient in terms of nuclear arsenals in surviving the dynamic nature of the nuclear landscape in its neighbourhood and around the world. We need to understand that the logic of nuclear sufficiency comes from understanding the basics of nuclear deterrence. The nature of the weapon in question and the degree of damage it causes, be it one nuclear weapon or hundreds, is very fatal and carries on in time. So, the number of nuclear weapons a country has under its wing doesn’t have any significant say in deciding who is stronger. The requirements for nuclear deterrence are not much and are very limited because numbers don’t really matter in the nuclear game; it is the accuracy that matters. So, we need to keep up our sharpness in research and developments. It is the timely use of the nuclear weapon and what its target is, that decides if a country can stand strong in the world.
Ambiguity and Credibility Factor
It can be said that the recent statements by the Indian leaders which conveyed the point that India adhering to ‘No First Use’ in the future will depend on the circumstances was to inject ambiguity into the ‘No First Use Policy’. The clarity on ‘No First Use’ is required to reassure the international community about India being a responsible state while ambiguity about ‘No First Use’ is required for deterrence. The common criticism against ‘No First Use’ is that it puts India on the back foot. It is more like making India respond to a situation with its hands tied. People always question why we should take a hit before we hit back. There are stability benefits that ‘No First Use’ brings that are largely ignored and it is the desire to be the one giving the first blow that is ultimately manifested. When we have neighbours with assured second strike capabilities, the first strike from our side will never be able to disarm or decapitate them completely and we are just inviting retaliation if we strike first. We need to bear in mind that in real life it is always the last person to throw the punch that wins the fight because there is no assurance that the one to give the first blow will always win.
Given the absence of a well detailed has always given rise to the question of credibility of the nuclear weapons and questioning why we don’t address the question of credibility and be clear about it. Credibility is the heart of deterrence. One doesn’t always have to have clarity to be credible especially when it comes to national security. It is always a good option to plant the seed of uncertainty and leave a certain amount of doubt in the opposite mind, so that they won’t necessarily take a chance and assume that when the time to use the nuclear weapons comes, India’s weapons won’t actually function. Deterrence is a mind game and doesn’t need to make noise to project nuclear supremacy. The lack of clarity keeps the other side away from using the weapons in question to an extent and you protect yourself better in chaos rather than in clarity.
Lacuna of the Doctrine
The main issue that still remains to be a question mark is how to counter the non-state use of nuclear weapons because we would never know whom to hit and where to hit. The lacuna of the doctrine is that it doesn’t make any pointer to the non-state use of nuclear weapons. Non-state actors are very difficult to deter using nuclear weapons. Unless that non-state actor is complicit with a state and it is known that it is from the state help they have been able to use it, can India figure out whom to hit and where to hit. India is put on the back foot in order to establish that link with the state because of the benefit of deniability despite the fuzzy linkage between the state and non-state in Pakistan and the history of non-state actor use of terrorism from Pakistan. We need to make remarks about the non-state actor use of nuclear weapons in the doctrine so that other states will ensure that their nuclear materials do not fall in the wrong hands.
Way Forward
To conclude things, an official rollback of ‘No First Use’ declaration can be much more provocative than never having a declaration in the first place. The best way to achieve the objectives of deterrence is to bring ambiguity and make it hollow and not formally change the policy so that in formality the doctrine still exists but in practicality it is effectively eroded.
Thirtha Manoj is a student of Politics and International Relations at Central University of Gujarat, India.
