20 March 2022, NIICE Commentary 7712
Mirwais Balkhi

Scholars have unambiguously stated that any actions that operate in international relations are in accordance with their domestic politics. Hence, it won’t be possible to examine the ties between the Taliban and other states without knowing the importance of the Taliban and its nature as a key player in the region.

Taliban’s Set of Beliefs

Contrary to the popular belief that “the Taliban has no foreign strategy”, it can be seen as a movement attempting to define its relationships with the outside world. Their “set of beliefs” is the criterion for determining these connections. We can avoid the facts by using the concept of foreign policy, a path for a state to pursue its goals. Unfortunately, the Taliban has emerged as a territorial non-state entity in Afghanistan. They maintained a different attitude toward foreign contacts and strategies before and after capturing power in Afghanistan. Before attaining control, they strived for regional and international backing in the fight against US-led forces and their allies in Kabul. However, after seizing power, they attempted to strengthen their national ambitions by yearning for the help of regional friends.

The Taliban movement is characterised by tribalism, linguistic nationalism, and religious politicisation. As an explanation, one can more swiftly evaluate the Taliban’s connections with countries in the area and worldwide. Whoever supports these principles is a friend, and anyone who opposes them is an enemy. As a result, one can easily understand the Taliban’s policies in the region and around the world: Pashtunwali tribal codes, linguistic nationalism (Pashto), and a politicised religious ideology, which is influenced by a rejectionist understanding of anti-imperialism in the early twentieth century and the late Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Friends or Foes

Countries like Pakistan and Iran will not have a vast fortune with the Taliban. In all aspects, the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be considered a Taliban supporter. Iran was a strategic and pre-power companion in the Taliban’s struggle against the United States. Though, when they came into the power position, they opposed the Taliban’s main objectives. Between the Taliban and Tehran, there lived conflicts of interest. Iran opposed the use of Pashtunwali as a blanket term. Iran’s claims to ethnic Iran, which includes Afghanistan and Central Asia on its eastern borders, reject the Taliban’s expansionist goal to govern Afghanistan.

Between the Taliban and Tehran, there is a conflict of historical memories. The Hotaki dynasty, which ruled until Isfahan (modern Iran) from 1722 to 1738 is the most anti-Iranian historical symbol. Iran is also a linguistic roadblock for Taliban linguistic nationalism. Pashtun nationalism (who share the same race and religious group “Hanifi’te” as Tajiks/Parsiwans) believes Iran is the principal barrier of the Persian language in Afghanistan. They think that if Iran had not been present and had not imported Persian texts into Afghanistan, the Pashtu language would have dominated it. As a result, the Taliban’s goal toward Tehran would be to wind up politics to deprive Iranian hands of the ability to promote Persinate literature and entice Tehran to support and enrich Pashtu-language cultural activities.

The sectarianism and politicised Deobandi-backed religious interpretations among the Taliban leadership see Iran as a “Rafidi” State. Anti-Shi’ism is an institutionalised remembrance among those who have a radicalised understanding of Islam. Taliban have attacked Shi’a gathering several times in the past. They had also beheaded the Shi minorities in different central towns and provinces. The so-called Islamic State of Khurasan is of the same mentality against Shi’s. So, Iran being a Shi state, is a threat against Islam for the Taliban. They have asserted their views about the Sunni minority rights several times since they usurped power.

The Taliban-Pakistan relationship is no different. The Taliban’s fortune with Pakistan will be short-lived. The Taliban’s “Pashtun nationalism” will be pitted against Pakistan, which is linked to the Pashtuns behind the Durand Line, shortly. Pakistan had used the Taliban as a strategic tool to debunk Pashtun nationalists in Kabul for failing to raise or support secessionist movements led by Pakistan’s Baluchi and Pashtuns. However, the Taliban’s tribal memory of Pakistan-fear would eventually turn them against Islamabad. This scenario occurred during the Mujahideen’s cycle in Afghanistan when Islamabad helped them in their war against the Mosco-sponsored government in Kabul. Nonetheless, they denounced Pakistan’s interventionist and expansionist tactics as soon as they arrived in Kabul.

The Taliban claim that Pakistan does not have a real Islamic state. Eventually, Jihad in Pakistan should be expanded and immortalised. The Taliban’s second-rank leadership has criticised Pakistan’s not Islamic government. It is a deeply ingrained mindset among all Islamists in the Af-Pak region. Over a decade of associated living between Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban has strengthened the Afghan Taliban’s perspective. The top leadership may take a diplomatic and conservative stance against Pakistan, but the reality on the ground is quite different. Thousands of Afghan Taliban will join the Pakistani Tahreki Taliban if they initiate armed actions against the Pakistani regime.

The Taliban’s relationship with Central Asia is more predictable. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are examples of political, linguistic, and tribal nationalism. On the one hand, they share ethnic and linguistic ties in Afghanistan. While on the other, they reject a politicised Deobandi view of Islam favouring the Balkh-Bukharan theological interpretation prevalent throughout Central Asia. As a result, the Taliban sees all three countries as threats to their survival, as does the rest of Central Asia.

Although Moscow’s accommodative policy towards the Taliban, which accepted them as a ground reality and anti-US asset, resulted in the conservative policies of Central Asia towards the Taliban, the Taliban would not see Central Asia as allies. Despite Taliban objectives, thousands of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other Central Asian citizens have fought against the NATO allies and Afghanistan’s National Defence Security Forces. They have been placed in Kabul, waiting for an opportunity to conduct their operations in Central Asia by crossing the Amu River. Previously observed, the Tajik terrorist groups had entered Tajikistan’s remote areas through Badakhshan and beheaded some of Tajikistan’s security forces.

Taliban are also afraid of these insupportable and radical Central Asian fighters; if they try to deport them or even reject them in Kabul and other major cities under the Taliban’s control, they would join ISK and turn against them. The Taliban leadership understands that their Central Asian allies conducted many attacks against international allied forces and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Therefore, there is a symbiotic relationship living between the Taliban and the Central Asian radical groups, which would worsen the Taliban’s civil policy towards Dushanbe, Tashkent and Ashgabat.

The Taliban have not seen the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a natural ally. In their ideology, Saudi Arabia is an ally of the US and corrupt leadership that does not support Muslim suppression worldwide. This understanding has prevailed among the Taliban fighters and under the supervision of the Afghan-Arabs Jihadists who had joined the Jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s; Abdullah Azam, the top Afghan-Arab leader, was one of these. Later on, thousands of Arab bandits sided with the Taliban from 1994 to 2001 and then from 2003 to 2021 to fight NATO-Allied forces. These fighters have shaped the anti-Saudi views of the Taliban by writings, preaching, and orations.

Initially, the Taliban’s formation and earlier victories supported the Pakistani-Saudi’s finances and military sides. Soon after, they seized power in Kabul in 1996. They kept their hospitality towards Riyadh’s notorious enemy Osama bin Laden. This resulted in Saudi’s turning back against the Taliban. So, one of the leading causes for the Taliban’s expel out of power in the previous appearance is Riyadh’s delegitimizing of the Taliban by their pessimistic approach. Therefore, they do not have cordial relations with Riyadh at present.

India, China and Russia also oppose the third living factor of the Taliban ideology (no linguistic and Pashtun aspects), the radical interpretation of Islam. Many Taliban leaders and commanders have amalgamated with Indian Kashmiri fighters, Chinese Separatists Uyghurs, and Russian Jihadists of the Caucasus. The independence of Kashmir, Xinxiang, and Caucasus nations is a long and ideal memory among the Taliban since the Jihad of Afghanistan (1979-1992). In the previous government of the Taliban (1996-2001), they had opened the Chechnyan Embassy at Wazir Akbar Khan area in Kabul. Many Taliban fighters also joined the war in Kashmir and fought the Indian defense forces. They have also been near East Turkistan Islamic Movement in the bordering areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There are reports that Al Qaeda was training both Taliban and ETIM fighters in the same training camps. Therefore, one cannot expect that the Taliban regime, after seizing power, will not be respected or sympathized with their allies who had either fought with them or joined their Jihad.

Conclusion

The linguistic pillar does not cover the Taliban’s West look policy, but Pashtunwali and radical interpretation define their policies against the West. As per the Taliban ideology, the US, NATO, and the European Union had termed “the West” as an imperialistic and colonialized power that had invaded Afghanistan to westernize it. There may be a diplomatic stand against the West since they look for recognition and humanitarian support of the people of Afghanistan under their control. Still, ideologically, they have rejections and a Jihadi approach towards them. The Taliban will not ignore their worst defeat by the US-led allied forces in 2001, in which they lost their powers and thousands of fighters. An intense memory has been chiselled in the minds of the Taliban against the West. They will continue to fight Western domination by sheltering and training global terrorists and upholding drug smuggling. They believe that the Emirate is not capable of fighting a conventional war against the NATO allied forces but in a non-conventional manner. The assets for this war would-be terrorists and drugs.

Dr. Mirwais Balkhi is Visiting Fellow at NIICE.