22 July 2021, NIICE Commentary 7117
Prakash Jangid
After decades of armed conflict with foreign troops led by the United States, the Afghan Taliban has clearly emerged as the formidable power in deciding the future of war-torn Afghanistan. The US-Taliban deal of 2020 having acknowledged the Taliban’s logic that they are the guarantor of peace in Afghanistan, the West has now lost whatever interest it had in the survival of the Ashraf Ghani government. All American assurances of future support are nothing but false promises.
The new power struggle in Afghanistan has begun; both Afghan government and Taliban are trying to maximize their influence as the power struggle seems to have reached a crescendo. However, despite having an unmistakable edge over their adversary, all may not be well within the Taliban ranks. Doubts over the changing nature of the Taliban movement persist as the political delegation at Doha under Mullah Baradar seems to be facing stiff opposition at home in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The resistance comes from within the organization, mainly the Haqqani Network (HQN), and from those splintered groups that parted themselves in opposition to the Doha agreement of February 2020.
The Afghan Taliban’s political leadership based in Pakistan seems to be supporting the peace deal whereas the senior hard-line military commanders are vociferously demanding a ‘back to square one’ approach, as witnessed during the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. The insurgency is not under a centralized leadership and is regulated through ‘Shuras’- the consultative councils. There are the Quetta Shura in Karachi and Quetta, the Mashhad Shura in Iran, Shura of the North in Badakhshan, and the Rasool Shura in Farah. Among these, the Quetta Shura holds a prominent position when it comes to deciding the military strategies for ground operations against the government troops. As a result, there is an ongoing tussle for power between the Taliban chief Haibatullah Akhundzada and the deputy emir Sirajudin Haqqani, who is son of the founder of the Haqqani network Jalaluddin Haqqani. As viewed by observers, Haibatullah’s apparent willingness to negotiate with the Kabul regime is severely opposed by Haqqani.
The HQN operates from the Miram Shah town in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and maintains a stronghold in the Loya-Paktia region of Afghanistan. Given this strategic hold, it controls the cross-border flow of arms, terrorists, and illegal narcotics trade across the border. The US-Taliban deal forced the Afghan Taliban to curtail its terror activities, resulting in a shift of operational control under the Haqqanis. The group follows a military-centric approach and seems to have played a double game of attacking the military installments and superficially supporting the peace deal simultaneously. Its intention of ousting the foreign forces and taking over larger control of Afghanistan has not been in doubt.
The HQN comprises 20 percent of the active fighting force in the Taliban and even maintains an independent financing mechanism mainly through narcotics and extortion. Its relationship with both state and non-state actors makes it an important player in the success or failure of the peace deal. With strong ties in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the network seems to be getting closer to Iran recently, as Islamabad and Riyadh are believed to have decreased their financial support to the group. There are reports by the US Treasury department over discussions between senior HQN members and al-Qaeda planning a new joint unit of armed fighters.
The Haqqanis have maintained coordination with the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), LeT, and JeM, as evident from the Gurudwara attack in Kabul coordinated by Mawlawi Farooqi on the behest of HQN and LeT. Further, the deep state in Pakistan seems to be pushing Haqqani to build strong ties with ISKP as the group is seen losing relevance for some time. The same was mentioned in last year’s UN report regarding the tactical accommodation between Haqqani Network and ISKP. The JeM-HQN relationship provides leverage to JeM in operating training camps in Nangarhar province and returns providing training to HQN operatives in Pakistan.
Though the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Afghan Taliban follow the same Deobandi school of Sunni Hanafi Islam, one cannot deny the differences between them. The TTP, also referred to as Pakistani Taliban-dominated by the Mehsud clan, is an anti-Pakistan group. Its relationship with Al-Qaeda is stronger than that of the Afghan Taliban as Al-Qaeda played a key role in the foundation and expansion of TTP. The TTP’s call for global jihad and its presence in Afghanistan is in violation of the peace deal which is almost defunct now. Recently, the Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami, or Party of Islamic Guardianship, parted its relationship with the Afghan Taliban from the time the deal was signed in Doha. Other opposition includes Iran-linked Taliban’s former military chief Mullah Qayum Zakir and former military commission Chief, Ibrahim Sadr, getting the support of the Feday-e Mahaz (Suicide Brigade) part of mainstream Taliban along with financial and training support from the Iranians.
The concerns of former US Secretary, James Mattis, regarding the challenges of reconciling the Taliban in one fell swoop looks true. Maybe the Trump and Biden administration has fallen into the trap by considering an irreconcilable enemy as a negotiating partner. A sizable number of experts believe the Taliban to be a divided house as the political leaders of the group are younger than the battle-tested commanders who have fought in far remote areas of the country. They may have their agendas which can be at odds with the prospects of peace. Despite concerns over a factionalized Taliban, it appears the insurgent group will be more cohesive and unlikely to fragment in the near future, as they have a persistent fear of foreign intervention. And their belief in radicalized extremism will also be a binding force in post-US Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the US exit will bring opportunities for the breeding of terror organizations in the war-torn country and the peace on paper seems to be fading away with relentless march of the Taliban. A gloomy picture of Afghanistan ravaged with civil war is waiting ahead.
Prakash Jangid is a Researcher with the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs initiative Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers.
