19 February 2021, NIICE Commentary 6853
Dr. Hiroaki Nakanishi
The world today is in a stagnant phase in terms of nuclear arms control and disarmament (NACD). The deteriorating international security environment and divisions over how to proceed with the NACD cast a shadow of uncertainty and insecurity. In the midst of this, the only remaining NACD treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty was extended for a maximum of a five years, under the leadership of US President Joe Biden. This development brought hope to the dismal situation of arms control and paves the way to seek and design more ambitious but realistic NACD frameworks which cover the Indo-Pacific region and the whole world. The goal is to go for creative and effective NACD measures including disarmament and non-proliferation education and capability-building (DNPE-CB) to ensure that for the future generations can live in a world without nuclear weapons (WWNW).
Cooperation with China in the Indo-Pacific Region
There is a pressing need to explore necessary steps to restore and rebuild lost NACD architectures and agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, and action plans stipulated in the Final Documents of respective Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences agreed by both the Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWSs). The challenge is to rebuild a post-INF treaty in a trilateral, regional or global setting in the current world dynamics. This would mean possibility of creating an Indo-Pacific INF treaty framework, which includes China and other stakeholders in the region. The key is to include China and work with it on transparency and predictability for controls over the intermediate nuclear weapons. Discussing such a possibility might be timely if we look outside the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Stoltenberg urged for adaptation of NACD regimes to new realities. On the other hand, Russia has been proposing multilateralising the INF treaty since 2007 and offered a moratorium of deployment of ground-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles, specifically in the East Asian Summit last year. Although the NATO Member States rejected the Russian offer, but it is worth revisiting these ideas.
China, might not be interested in negotiating a formal NACD framework with the US and Russia, or even within the P5 framework, or with other stakeholders such as the NATO and Indo-Pacific Countries like India, Pakistan and other NNWSs like Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea. Some scholars argue that China might be against any negotiations due to a significant disparity of its nuclear forces’ vis-a-vis the US and Russia. A foreseeable disincentive to negotiate for China is reduction and limitation of comparative advantages in its nuclear forces too. Having said that, China’s inclusion in such processes is on utmost importance. One of China’s emerging and modern nuclear forces, specifically the dual-capable land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles, named DF-26 and called an “aircraft-carrier killer,” might be employed in flash points in the Indo-Pacific region, such as South China Sea, Taiwan, and Senkaku Islands, and might cause potential risks of unintended escalatory and accidental use of nuclear weapons in combat. Thus, incentivizing China to join in these measures is to say the least necessary.
In order to lure China into the process, the US and Russia may initiate a well-structured ban on nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. This would limit the use, deployment and development of the dual-capable grand-based intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. Such arrangement eliminates the danger of misinterpretation of a launch of a conventionally-armed missile to be nuclear-armed in terms of reducing nuclear risks and the role of nuclear weapons. This is possible with credible verification, monitoring, counting the number, on-site inspection of intermediate-range missiles, specifically checking the absence of nuclear warheads at declared facilities for such missiles.
There are other significant steps which the US, Russia and China can work on. First, all NWSs may issue a declaration mentioning “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” which is the sole conviction made by the Former US Present Roland Regan and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev in the Cold-War era when the INF Treaty was signed. The declaration, if possible, which mentions the intension of working on a ban on nuclear-armed intermediate-range nuclear forces, will pave the way for the US’s move to the sole purpose of nuclear deterrence. Such action can contribute to fulfilling one of the President Joe Biden’s NACD plans of taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, specifically put the belief of the sole purpose of nuclear deterrence into practice. Second, the NWSs should hold strategic stability dialogues to elaborate necessary confidence- and security-building measures. For instance, holding a discussion on nuclear doctrines of each state, specifically the issue of compatibility of the use of the dual-capable nuclear forces with the No-First Use doctrine, and implications of emerging and modern military technologies such as space, cyber and hypersonic technologies, to strategic stability, and necessary Trust and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) such as missile launch and exercise notifications. These topics mentioned above might make up a good agenda for initial U.S.-Chinese strategic stability talk, or other settings such as trilateral, multilateral, or 1.5 track meetings.
Another important point is socializing in NACD culture. Not only China, even the UK and France, do not have enough experiences of being involved in NACD measures such as TCBMs, verification, monitoring, on-site inspection, and dismantlement measures. These measures are indispensable to realise a WWNW. In the trilateral NACD context, the U.S. and Russia may invite China to a data-exchange exercise under the New START Treaty framework, as a potential area of CB cooperation.
Furthermore, if such an INF framework is established, it may bring a greater impact into other regions. For instance, in South Asia, it would give certain stability improvements to China-India-Pakistan, or India-China-U.S. triangles. In the Middle East, it would bring certain stability improvements into relevant regional issues related to Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In North East Asia, it might bring a stimulus into denuclearization of DPRK. It might provide a good synergy with creation of remaining regional nuclear weapons free zones, specifically, the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which was allegedly the cause of failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
Education and Capacity Building towards a World without Nuclear Weapons
For multilateralising NACD and socialising such culture, the NWSs and its Allies need to share the notion that advancing DNPE-CB and R&D is required in order to create necessary human, technological, scientifical, institutional, and financial resources for creative, effective, and sustainable NACD measures towards a WWNW, and take concrete actions for enhancing global capacity to proceed with actual verification, monitoring, on-site inspection, dismantlement, disposal and non-proliferation activities. Even the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) shares the same common agendas, including the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces. In this regard, it might be a point of convergence for the NWSs, NNWSs and TPNW supporters to cooperate in a unified way. Hence, we should discuss some practical aspects, specifically, how to effectively create, rearrange, consolidate, and advance existing architectures, assets, resources, and global efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and so on. In the Indo-Pacific region, the role of the UN regional offices, such as the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Hiroshima Office, civil society organisations such as universities, research institutes, think-tanks, NGOs, and respective Governments in the region, is indispensable in this regard.
Revitalizing Dialogues in the Indo-Pacific
Revitalising the lost momentum of the NCAD, holding an inter-governmental conference, desirably which world leaders attend, or a 1.5 track meeting to discuss the issues elaborated in previous sections, is indispensable. To this end, it can be proposed to hold an Indo-Pacific Conference on Arms Control and Regional Security Issues to be held in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, and the 28th United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues back-to-back the before-mentioned Indo-Pacific Conference, before the coming NPT Review Conference in this August, more specifically, during the period between the Tokyo Olympic Game, to be held from late July to August, and this year’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies in early August. Yokosuka would be a key place to initiate a NCAD dialogue among world leaders, having considered specialty of the city which has a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the US, named after the Former US President Ronald Regan.
Last but not least, if the US President Joe Biden, who led the INF treaty negotiation, and First Lady Dr. Jill Biden, who is a great educator leading the US’s public education policy in terms of enhancing carrier education programs and civic-military engagements, could participate in the proposing international conferences in Yokosuka and DNPE-CB events and meetings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would bring a tremendous opportunity towards a WWNW. Holding these events is of utmost importance as the current world order struggles with a pandemic, economic pressures and other insecurities. Efforts like this will contribute to reducing tensions and enhancing trust, confidence, and amity among great powers, which paves the way for taking a more globally unified action to end a pandemic and tackle climate change and other challenges we face today and making the Indo-Pacific and the world the more free, open, inclusive, secure, peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable one.
