27 October 2020, NIICE Commentary 6404
Mohammad Omar Faroque

According to the ‘Rimland’ geopolitical thesis, John Spykman, a classical geopolitical theorist, predicted many years ago about the rise of China due to its access to the sea and then greater contact with the outside world. To make this geopolitical hypothesis true and to facilitate the rise of China as a superpower, in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the proposal of jointly building a Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and a 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), popularly known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

There are many narratives and contestation around China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the one hand, it has been popular as “China’s grand connectivity project”, a project to “foster international cooperation” and an initiative to enhance economic and social ties focusing on ‘five connectivities’ instead of political and security cooperation. But on the flipside, it is purported that, BRI is China’s geopolitical project to compete with other regional and global powers.

From critical geopolitical perspective, practices of economic connectivity, political cooperation, infrastructure development are the code of geopolitics, those have the short-term achievement, but the longer-term or ultimate goals and visions of these practices are to change the regional and global geopolitical dynamics. Thus, many observers see BRI as China’s new geopolitical strategy aimed at extending its sphere of influence, fostering new norms of international economic cooperation, and promoting a new (Asian) world order.

After having set the geopolitical dynamics of the BRI, now let us examine its implications for South Asia. In doing so, firstly, three specific corridors of BRI should be analysed, those are running through South Asian countries: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor BCIM-EC, the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor. Then, Secondly, to analyse the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) from South Asian perspective.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) aims to connect Gilgit in northern Pakistan to Gwadar in the south, which has been recognized as the reviving old Karakoram Highway (KKH), that allows China to provide military aid to Pakistan in case of Indo-Pak military confrontation. It is argued that the CPEC has been changing the geopolitical dynamics in South Asia in many ways and for many reasons: intensifying the Indo-Pak rivalry mainly on border and regional power politics; worsening the US-Pak relations with strengthening US-India security arrangement in Indo-Pacific; and lastly but not the least, establishing three-axis (India-Afghanistan-Iran) as an alternative economic and strategic bloc within and beyond South Asia.

BCIM-EC has direct linkage with India, which connects three regions from Asia together; East, Southeast and South Asia. Bangladesh already started to love BRI projects to pursue lucrative economic and infrastructural incentives, and joined primarily in BRI initiative, that impacts on the Indo-Bangladesh relations. Ironically, if India do not join in the BCIM corridor, neither it will be halted nor be affected in large extent, it may just change final destination from Kolkata to Chittagong port, but ultimately it will be materialized today or tomorrow. Recent development in China-Bangladesh relations shows how historically pro-Indian government in Bangladesh swinging to China like pendulum, besides maintaining good relations with India. Swinging of Bangladesh is the burning example how BRI changing geopolitical dynamics in South Asia.

The Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor is known as a “handshake across the Himalayas”. Despite of natural and political barrier, China and Nepal are proceeding with BRI projects to pursue their own interests respectively. It is purported that “infrastructural politics” of China in Nepal is changing the geopolitical dynamic in Nepal, and South Asia. It is the popular narrative nowadays that recent territorial dispute between India-Nepal around Lipulekh and Kalapani, is the indicator how Nepal is trying to get rid of Indian influence, and trying to be straightforward for their territorial claim.

On the other side, it is argued that the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) is an emerging key geopolitical project to ensure strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific Ocean. MSRI includes Sri Lanka and Maldives besides India, from South Asian region. Maldives and Sri Lanka have Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation (TMSC) with India, and Maldives and India have been conducting joint coast guard exercise Dosti (means friendship) since 1991. Despite of having historical ties and security cooperation with India, Sri Lanka and Maldives already have enjoyed the huge economic incentives from China under the BRI projects.

Above all, South Asia has been the crucial ‘battlefield’ for the geopolitical competition among great powers, especially between India and China, for two reasons. Firstly, as India is rising with massive influence in its smaller neighbour states, where China also has political and strategic interest. Secondly, India has been allied with United States to contain China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region and Eurasian heartland.

Ironically, while other regions of Asia are connected by either silk road or maritime silk road, but South Asia is encircled with both – Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road. China believes that without engaging South Asian countries, BRI will not be successful as the grand initiative. On the other hand, India and US believe China’s BRI should be halted in South Asia to curtail its growing influence worldwide. Thus, South Asian phase is the touchstone and acid test to examine the viability and possibility of BRI in any extent.

Notwithstanding, from critical perspective, BRI will not change geopolitical dynamic in South Asia in larger extent except CPEC and Pakistan. Other countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives will receive the economic benefit from China’s BRI. But they will also be in close ties with India for security ties and historical relations. Constantino Xavier defined the current leadership of Sri Lanka as shrewd ‘small state realist’, who will only seek in Beijing what he is unable to get from New Delhi. This stand has also been echoed in the expression of Bangladeshi foreign minister, who says that bilateral relation with India is originated from blood, and relations with China is for economic purpose’. Above all, all South Asian states will play balancing strategy between India-China dichotomy, except Pakistan. However, if China’s BRI proceed without any geopolitical intention, and honestly facilitate the regional integration and economic cooperation, India and Bhutan might also join BRI in future.

Mohammad Omar Faroque is a Research Coordinator at the Youth Platform for Sustainable Development, Bangladesh.