26 September 2020, NIICE Commentary 6018
Paras Ratna
The ‘truly’ elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi is about to complete its first term with elections scheduled in November. Owing to Rakhine conflict Aung San Suu Kyi’s government’s image has suffered severe setback. There are calls for sanctions and arms embargo. From being a messiah of peace to pariah, international community’s view of her has come a full circle. An electoral term then is a long time in politics. This is especially true for conflict settings such as Myanmar where peace is fragile. However, any serious study of Rakhine conflict can’t discount structural factors such as the ongoing democratization, colonialism, and race that transcends personality and is embedded in polity and society. Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the Rakhine conflict from a politico-historical lens.
Paradox of Democratization
Although this ‘democracy in progress’ is shadowed by large scale ethnic violence in the Rakhine province, Myanmar’s progression towards a democratic framework is assuring. The competitive electoral logic coupled with the proliferation of social media has led to the sharpening of identity and visible outpour of historical resentments/ grievances. Liberalization of the telecommunication sector has led to the proliferation of the internet. Approximately 39 percent of Myanmar’s population has access to it and uses platforms like Facebook. In fact, Facebook was used generously to peddle fake narratives as a prelude to military operations in Rakhine. Amidst growing pressure, Facebook suspended many accounts including that of the Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing and military-owned Myawady television network in 2018. The democratization of online platforms could trigger conflict in an ethnically polarized society.
It is pertinent to note that democratic transitions are generally violent. In fact, quasi-democracies like Myanmar is far more prone to disproportionate violence. According to Havard Hegre, ineffective political institution and the centralization of state apparatus incentivizes the use of political violence. He goes on to argue that successful democracies like Britain, France and even Scandinavian countries too are the outcome of political violence. However, in the long run, democratic institutions are much effective in containing political violence.
Melting Pot or Salad Bowl?
It is argued that ethnic identity is embedded across Myanmar’s society and polity. There is an ongoing deliberation as to whether some societies are melting pot or salad bowl. Drawing over that discussion, Myanmar’s society could metaphorically be termed as ‘salad bowl’. Ethnic identity in Myanmar manifests itself first as Bamar and non-Bamar and second between ‘taing yintha’ i.e. native races and foreigners colloquially referred to as ‘Kala’ for Bengali Muslims, Burmese Indians etc. and ‘Toyoke’ for Chinese descent. The concept of ‘taing -yintha’ i.e. indigenous/ native race is crucial for understanding ongoing tensions in Rakhine. The term gained political significance during Gen. Ne Win administration. Battered with ethnic conflict, Gen. Ne Win in an attempt to achieve reconciliation started deploying ‘taing-yintha’ with great fervor. It became a state building vocabulary where a clarion call was given for ‘national races’ to unite for the betterment of the nation. The change in nomenclature from Burma to Myanmar too was done on the premise that while Burma refers to ‘Burman’, latter represents indigenous races i.e. ‘taing-yintha’.
Rakhine conflict is not about denying citizenship as is being perceived. According to the 1982 citizenship law, Bengali Muslims weren’t stripped of citizenship. In fact, descendants of ancestors who have arrived during British times post-1824 are deemed as full citizens by the third generation. Therefore, offsprings of 20th-century migrants are extended full political rights. The reluctance lies in acknowledging Bengali Muslims / ‘Kala’ as ‘Rohingya’ translating into “Of Rohang or Arakan (now Rakhine)” and thus indigenous i.e. ‘taing-yintha’. Thant Myint U in his book notes:
Any ‘taing-yintha’ that constitutes more than half of contiguous township is entitled to an autonomous zone. Very much like Shan or Kachin state. Bestowing “Rohingya” status would lead to an autonomous zone.
It is pertinent to note that during the partition of India local Muslim leaders contemplated joining East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). An autonomous Rohingya zone contiguous to Bangladesh then generates territorial anxieties. Besides, Burma historians have expressed doubts about ‘Rohingya’ as a historical ethnic identity.
Rakhine, a Backwater in Backwater
Arakanese nationalism is intimately connected to the insecurity of being overwhelmed by the outsider and finds solace in reminiscing Mrauk-U kingdom. For them both Bamar Buddhists and Rakhine Muslims are outsiders. 31 December 1784, is etched in their memory as the day when their homeland became a Bamar colony. This stands in stark contrast with the common understanding that Arakanese Buddhist and Tatmadaw operate hand in gloves. Ethnic differences with Bamar prevail over shared and assumed Theravada unity. Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic militia representing the interests of Arakanese Buddhist is fighting with Tatmadaw for confederate status to Rakhine. In August last year, AA along with its Northern Alliance partners targeted Tatmadaw’s Defense Training Academy. Similarly, Tatmadaw is carrying out clearing operations against Arakan Army in Rakhine.
Similarly, the Anglo-Burman war of 1824 led to the British capturing of Arakan. Colonial administrators encouraged large scale migration of Bengali Muslims across the Nafs river to work as low skilled laborers. Thereby, threatening Arakanese Buddhist of a demographic change. During the Second World War, British recruited Bengali Muslims as a part of their ‘V’ force while the Buddhist sided with the Japanese. It led to communal violence after the British retreated in 1942. This interaction guided by colonialism has led to profound suspicion that gets manifested till this day. This complex interaction of Race, Religion, and History makes Rakhine (erstwhile Arakan) a backwater within backwater.
Way Forward: Managing Fault Lines
In a quasi-military setting like Myanmar where twenty-five percent seats and crucial administrative apparatus like the Defence, Border, and Home are controlled by the Military. The ability of the elected NLD government to pass constitutional amendments and act decisively in crisis are constrained. Although any elected government needs to be scrutinized, there is a need to appreciate constraints under which it is operating. Despite the constraints, Aung San Suu Kyi government constituted Rakhine commission under Kofi Anan in 2016 and fully endorsed the recommendations. This was a significant step from the point of engaging the international community and addressing the grievances of the minority. However, any decisive stride towards peace in Myanmar needs full cooperation from Tatmadaw. There is a need for democratic socialization of the military/ junta. Political guarantees to Ethnic Armed Organizations and Minorities need to be extended, followed by disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of EAOs as a part of federal defence forces.
However, this democratic opening albeit military guided has thrown up avenues for political inclusion and voicing of grievances in a constitutional manner. Two-thirds of the parties that registered and contested in the 2015 election were ethnic parties. Notwithstanding participation, their overall representation in the parliament is around 11 percent. The limited formal and substantial representation is being attributed to vote-splitting as well as weak party institutionalization in terms of internal democracy, party values and organization. It is pertinent to note that democracy is an evolving process. International organizations should prioritize the capacity building of political parties as a part of the peace building effort. There are demands for devolution of power to the regions/ provinces. Although important and crucial it should take into consideration minorities within the ethnic states and put in place adequate safeguards for them. Lasting peace in an ethnically fragmented society depends on Myanmar leadership’s ability to weave together EAOs, adequate safeguards for minorities within ethnic states, and robust civil society engagement.
