2 September 2020, NIICE Commentary 5923
Dr. Rachit Murarka
Abraham Accord is lauded as a historic peace deal between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel by the US President Donald Trump. On the other hand, there are few things which are not historic for president Trump. The deal is historic in a sense that it’s the first deal of its kind between Israel and a Gulf nation, but the deal is not at all historic in terms of achieving something groundbreaking. Before, Abraham Accord, Israel had peace deal with Egypt known as Camp David Accord. The deal was praised as a significant step in achieving peace and stability in the region. Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin were awarded Nobel Peace prize for their bold move in 1978, but the Camp David Accord ended up in Cold Peace and led to the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Similarly, Oslo Accord was signed in Washington DC with much fanfare, and for this peace deal, like in Camp David Accord, Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin got the Nobel Peace Prize of 1994. Unfortunately, the peace accord led to the assassination of Rabin and led to the Second Intifada (uprising). The point is not to deter any party from making any peace initiative, but the track record of peace deals with Israel are not encouraging. In the case of Egypt and Palestine, Israel had a confrontation with them, therefore peace deal is justified. However, in the case of the UAE, the point of discomfort is that UAE doesn’t recognize Israel, other than this there was never any confrontation with Israel, unlike Egypt and Palestine. Therefore, the peace which has a justification in the case of Egypt and Palestine is lacking in the case of the UAE.
There is one perplexing question, if the current peace agreement suspends the annexation of West Bank by Israel then why are there protests against UAE in Palestine. The deal with the UAE appears to be the safest option rather than a most strategic one. Had Saudi Arabia been party to the deal, it would reflect on the seriousness of the accord. Saudi Arabia is a de facto leader of GCC and it was visible in Saudi-Qatar crisis.
All GCC members are monarchies with varying degree. Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain are the constitutional monarchies; Saudi Arabia and Oman are absolute monarchies, and the UAE is a federal monarchy. Even though all members of GCC are monarchies public opinion still matters, and at a time when the economy is suffering due to global pandemic, public opinion becomes ever more important. GCC is a group of rentier states. The basis of rentierism is that the state by allocating wealth from the rent generated by natural resources effectively secures public support. However, with downward pressure in crude oil prices assessing public support has become a tedious task. Therefore, UAE seems to be a natural choice because unlike other GCC countries UAE is less dependent on oil revenue, therefore, its economy is less vulnerable to the volatility of oil prices, thanks to UAE diversification efforts. UAE also has the largest number of expat population in the region, thereby reducing the risk of public outrage. Moreover, the deal adds to the international image of the UAE, which UAE has built over the years.
It is true that over the past few years, relations between Israel and GCC have become more open and visible. Israel’s PM Netanyahu visit to Oman was not a hush-hush affair; in fact, the visit was broadcasted by many channels. Similarly, Saudi’s crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman acknowledging the rights of Jews to have their own country is a big step. From the series of events, it appears that GCC leaders are positive about improving ties with Israel, but the public opinion in GCC is still against Israel. An informal survey by Israel’s Foreign Ministry shows that public opinion is still hostile to Israel. Therefore it is not a surprise that Bahrain rejects the US push to normalize ties with Israel. Similarly, Kuwait opposed the deal from the day it was signed. On the other hand, because of worsening relation of Qatar with other GCC nations, Qatar is not positive about this deal and criticized it. Saudi Arabia and Oman are closely watching the developments and have not come out publicly in support of the deal. Saudi Arabia and Oman are heavily dependent on oil revenue and compare to other GCC nations, Saudi Arabia and Oman have lowest expat population thereby making public opinion more important. Public opinion coupled with downward economic pressure is not the right time to take the deal one step further. Therefore, it is not surprising that the UAE itself is cautious in its statement. President Trump said that UAE and Israel have agreed to establish full diplomatic ties, but the statement by UAE does not reciprocate the same enthusiasm. UAE said it will not establish an Embassy in Israel without Palestine-Israel peace deal. Similarly, Israel also does not seem to appear in full agreement with the deal. The deal required Israel to halt its annexation plan, but Netanyahu said the annexation plan was “temporary hold”, therefore contradicting officials of UAE.
Timing of the Deal
When the entire region is grappling with the challenges of COVID-19, the timing of the deal seems a bit inappropriate. One possible explanation could be to view the deal as Trump’s reelection bid. After failing miserably in handling COVID-19 at home, the deal could serve as a face-saver for Trump. Another reason could be to counter the increasing presence of China in the region. Israel signed the deal because Netanyahu has been indicted of corruption charges which will intensify in coming months. The deal will placate the domestic voters and strengthen Netanyahu claim that he can only bring Arab nations to the peace table. The deal can be an image booster for Netanyahu. On the other hand, the UAE signed the deal, because it will boost its international image, which is good for a business environment. Dealings with Israel which are under the table can be conducted out in open, and most importantly UAE can sign security agreements. Saudi Arabia and by extension UAE, consider Iran to be a greater threat than Israel, therefore to secure itself from any threat originating from Iran, UAE might have signed the deal.
The deal is historic in a sense that it’s the first kind of deal between Israel and a Gulf nation, but the significance of the deal as some watershed movement is questionable. The deal appears more to be a push from the US rather than organically evolved out of some need between Israel and UAE. UAE is circumspect in its responses, and Israel also does not seem to be in full agreement with the main agenda of the deal that is about the annexation plan. Neither the action of Israel corresponds to the spirit of the deal since 6 August Israel has bombed Gaza almost daily. During the signing of the deal President Trump though jokingly remarked that the deal should be called “Donald J Trump Accord” says a lot about the seriousness of the deal. The deal is more about the image of Donald Trump as the architect of this accord than about actual peace in the region. The current accord appears as a half-hearted attempt, where actions of the parties do not correspond to the spirit of the accord.
