10 June 2020, NIICE Commentary 5293
Shrabana Barua
The Pricewaterhousecooper report of 2017, ‘A World in 2050’, estimated China to be the largest economy by mid of the 21st century. Although the post COVID-19 world and its impacts on the world economy has not been accounted for in this report, apprehensions are afloat that there may be little changes in the position of China nevertheless. Its increasing prowess has forced most powerful states to take cognizance of this Asian giant. The most conspicuous proof of an ever-rising China in the recent past have been twofold. First, the Belt and Road Initiative, (initially named One Belt One Road) announced in 2013 not only vindicated the practice of infrastructure and connectivity diplomacy as a niche tool of influence, but also got written into the Chinese constitution in 2017, increasing the political importance of building connectivity networks for China’s international vision. Secondly, the abolition of a two-term limit of the President of the PRC instated Xi Jinping as President for life. This has made the CPC’s political hold both domestically and internationally more assertive, if not aggressive. Both in terms of the expanding grip of infrastructural diplomacy, particularly though not exclusively, through the BRI, and the political ambitions of President Xi Jinping to achieve a ‘Chinese Dream’; the one country that stands as a geo-strategic hinge point for China’s policies in the great game brewing is Myanmar.
Myanmar is crucial for China not simply because it shares an approximately 2200 km border with it, but because it is seen as an outlet to the Indian Ocean for the landlocked provinces of Yunnan. This was made amply clear back in 1985 itself when the Beijing Review carried an article by Pan Qi stating China’s aims in Myanmar. Further, China’s forays into the ocean through Myanmar opens up an alternate route, as a solution, to the Malacca dilemma it finds itself in. More recently, China’s thrust into the Indian Ocean is an attempt to gain a maritime prominence that it lacks since the times of Zheng He, a fleet admiral much eulogized as the marine conqueror of the 15th century, to justify China’s maritime territorial claims, albeit filled with prevarications. At the intersection between South Asia and Southeast Asia, undoubtedly Myanmar plays a very important role for China, especially for its strategic pursuits in the Indo-Pacific.
The modern history of both states has been marked by what is described as a ‘pauk-phu’, meaning kinship, relationship. In June 1950, then Burma, became the first non-communist state to recognize the PRC diplomatically. The initial years proved problematic on the political front. However, since 1988 when the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took over in Myanmar, China made measured steps to woo the Tatmadaw (military) through both economic and military aid in return for political and strategic support to fulfill its larger vision. Bertil Lintner states that Myanmar was turned into a ‘vassal state’ in the 1990s. Though this may not hold true today, the growing importance of the maritime arena has created the need for China to mark its footprints in Myanmar today more than ever.
Throughout the 1990s, China has built roads, bridges and railways inside Myanmar that went up to Ruili, Baoshan and Kunming in Yunnan. It sanctioned an SEZ in the Dehong Prefecture at the border to facilitate trade and business, that was already opened up in 1988. By the 2000s, China was already developing four ports in Myanmar, the most important being the deep-sea port at Kyaukphu. In 2008, 69 Chinese MNCs were estimated to be associated with nearly ninety projects in the country. China, therefore, started becoming the largest trading partner of Myanmar in 2011, followed by being the largest investor as well, pushing Thailand and Singapore behind, within a short time. Yet, China faced opposition at many points, especially during the Thein Sein period, due to which it has had to downsize project capacities (Kyaukphu port) and even face suspension of projects (Myitsone Hydropower Project, Letpadaung Copper Mine project). This did not dent bilateral relations, however, that had already been upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership’ level.
By 2015, Myanmar was proclaimed a democracy, which marginally translated to the easing of Western critic. This meant China might still have to provide Myanmar with a backing at the international front. After all, the bondage between the two had some basis in their anti-democratic stances of the late 80s that had isolated both countries internationally. When the new capital was shifted to Naw Pi Taw, China became the first country to set up a liaison office, marking its diplomatic presence in the new capital. There are also growing talks about the Embassy of the PRC shifting from Yangon to Naw Pi Taw, that so far has remained rather dull. Earlier, China provided economic assistance in building the airport in the city, that has become relatively busy over time.
Meanwhile, China under President Xi unified its scattered infrastructural forays across continents under the BRI network, in covert pursuance of global dominance. The Bangladesh China India Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor, an outcome of the Kunming Initiative of 1999, was pushed under the BRI umbrella in 2015 (though left out of in a list released at the second BRI Forum in 2019). Myanmar officially joined the BRI in 2017, also acknowledging the China Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC) as a part of it. Further, China has proposed the project development of a China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) based on three pillars – the Kyaukpyu SEZ, the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone and the New Yangon City, all to be built with Chinese assistance. This has the potential to make China the undisputed foreign power in Myanmar in the near future.
2020 marks the 70th anniversary of China-Myanmar diplomatic relationship. Chinese steps in Myanmar reveals incremental broadening of its economic, infrastructural and strategic footprints in the last decade. In that case, the commemorative visit by Xi Jinping in January this year, a first by a Chinese President in nineteen years, is in congruence with China’s plan of maintaining Myanmar as one of its most important loci in global politics. 33 agreements were signed during this visit itself. The year has been marked as the ‘China-Myanmar Year of Culture and Tourism’, which however has been diluted due to the spread of COVID-19. On that note too, China has not stayed away from providing medical supplies and personnel to Myanmar, among many other countries. This is being read by some China observers and scholars as an extension of China’s ‘COVID Diplomacy’ or ‘Health Diplomacy’, a new means to garner soft power across the globe. Though Myanmar considers it as a genuine humanitarian move, the meeting of their Ambassador from China with Deputy Minister for Planning Finance and Industry on 6 May, to discuss implementation of the CMEC projects amidst such crisis, raised concerns about China’s motive. However, one may argue, the visible footprints as well as a foothold that China has made for itself in Myanmar is an interesting dynamic that will certainly factor in China’s geopolitical, geo-economic and importantly, geo-strategic policies, in its global endeavours.
