5 June 2020, NIICE Commentary 5237
Jean Yves Ndzana
Fifty years after its entry into force, the overall efforts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons are meaningful. Indeed, the non-proliferation and disarmament objective are broadly achieved. On the one hand, notwithstanding the fraudulent accession of certain States to the status of Nuclear Weaponized States (NWS), the NPT successfully managed, under the impetus of the great powers like the United States, to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, there has been a substantial reduction of the nuclear arsenals of Cold War powers, thanks to the signing of numerous international treaties such as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) or the various Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). However, the sustainability of the NPT which was initiated in 1995 is increasingly uncertain considering the challenges it faces today. The aim of this article is to analyse those challenges, as well as to suggest potential solutions aimed at sustaining the NPT. The main argument of this article is that incentives to the Global South constitute a more credible way to break the current deadlock between the NWS and the Non-Nuclear Weaponized States (NNWS).
Challenges Surrounding the Sustainability of NPT
Despite the relative aforementioned successes of the NPT, it faces many challenges that threaten its sustainability. Among them is firstly, the pace of implementation of the nuclear commitments of legal or official nuclear powers, in particular the disarmament commitment. Although NWS, mainly the USA and Russia (Soviet Union), have significantly reduced their nuclear arsenals, current nuclear weapons have even greater lethal or destructive capabilities. This vertical proliferation gives rise to many frustrations the Global South which perceive the preservation and improvement on nuclear weapons as a bad faith and failure of the NWS to fulfill their NPT commitment. The adoption of the Nuclear Ban Treaty in 2017 was a response of the Global South to the perceived hypocrisy of the NWS. In the same vein, the lack of consensus between international powers and the global South regarding the creation of Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) in the Middle East during the NPT review conference of 2015 strengthened the Global South’s perception that NWS, especially the US was more interested of Israel and its regional nuclear monopoly. Finally, the sustainability of the NPT is also threatened by the end of arms reduction agreements such as the INF which heralds a new global arms race or the violation by the USA of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the extension of the arms embargo against Iran, could lead the latter to simply denounce the NPT by evoking article X, thus undermining the NPT further.
Alternatives to the Current Nuclear Stalemate
As the international nuclear cornerstone framework, the NPT undoubtedly plays a strategic role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Its sustainability is therefore a top priority. Several solutions have been proposed in this regard. With regards to the consensus statement issues which is hitherto the main criterion of success of NPT review conferences, a pragmatic methodology, emphasizing on clear and technical aspects has been proposed to highlight the progressive advances in areas relate to the NPT. Although this approach has the merit of avoiding a Manichean understanding of the conference outcomes, the fact that it focuses on subsidiary nonetheless important aspects of the NPT will not lessen the distrust of the Global South regarding the slowness of the implementation of the resolutions adopted at previous conferences.
In addition, too much emphasis has been placed only on the NPT’s “Non-Proliferation” and “Disarmament” pillars, to the detriment of the “peaceful use of nuclear energy” third pillar. Although the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) is an interesting approach in this regard, it has been widely criticized since the accession of India (a non-signatory member of the NPT). The official recognition of the right to enrichment under Article IV of the NPT constitute a more credible initiative in the direction of strengthening the “peaceful nuclear energy” pillar. Clarifying the ambiguity surrounding article IV of the NPT is a fiery desire of the Global South, as it was demonstrated by their support for the “right” to enrichment claimed by Tehran during negotiations over its controversial nuclear program in 2015. Obviously, this privilege should be conditioned by the adherence of NNWS to the safeguard measures and the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to limit the risks of a misuse of nuclear energy for military purposes. The Iranian precedent in this regard, especially before the reimposition of the unilateral American sanctions, augurs a promising future in this regard.
