12 May 2020, NIICE Commentary 4628
Srimal Fernando & Abhishek Ganesh
In South Asia, the extension of the Indian defence force has brought about greater power in India’s position to guarantee its prominent dependability for the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region. With this advancement, India has extended its maritime orbit of security in the Indian Ocean, with special focus on its southern neighbours, like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Then again, India’s relationship with its southern neighbours is unblemished, and there is a need for India to create a zone of aggregate security and monetary cohesiveness among itself, Sri Lanka and the Maldives; a zone stretching up to roughly 3.7 million sq.km. India being an emerging superpower and gradually moving towards becoming a worldwide force, requires its regional approach to be brought up to a more elevated pitch. This has to be done by showing capable conduct towards its neighbours to achieve political, financial and military dependability in the region.
It is the topographical setting of Sri Lanka and the Maldives that gives India the exceptional chance to rise as an oceanic and Maritime logistics hub in Asia. There are two main considerations here. The military and the foreign policies of these island states, in relation to enormous countries like India and China, aren’t clear. To diminish the effect of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, India needs to reinforce its air, maritime, land and nuclear protection abilities.
Sri Lanka’s Maritime Security Strategy
The completion of the war in Sri Lanka had led to an adjustment in the national security and the maritime capacities of the island country. The most critical maritime heritage of Sri Lanka is the way in which it had made itself ready in formations of fast attack crafts, special arrow boat squadrons, amphibious vessels, the high frequency surface wave radar system, and the commissioning of several Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV). The Sri Lankan government had additionally requested two propelled OPV’s worth USD 150 million from India. In this way, for Sri Lanka, allocating seven percent of its yearly financial budget for national security (assessed to be around USD 2 billion) is a lot higher than even bigger nations like China and India. Since Sri Lanka has an immense national security spending plan, nations like India and China straightforwardly profit by offering protection to Sri Lanka. Subsequently, these activities lead towards creation of strategic interdependence between two countries.
Revitalising India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives Maritime Trio
India’s rise as a territorial force led for its flagship aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya to be commissioned in 2013, which was a major jump forward for the nation’s maritime security approach. India allocates approximately USD 57 billion a year as its military budget, out of which 15 percent is allotted to the naval force and 23 percent to the aviation based armed forces. In spite of this expanded spending and the dispatching of the aircraft carrier, one of the least evolved act in the Indian Maritime security area is that of nuclear capable submarines. India’s naval barrier approach should focus on creating nuclear submarines, offshore patrol vessels, battleships and quick assault crafts to restore its capacity in the Indian Ocean. India ought to likewise have a progressed maritime surveillance framework around its 7,500 km coastline, covering the Andaman Nicobar and the Lakshadweep islands as well.
Sri Lanka’s geographical position in the Indian Ocean puts the nation at the centre of Cargo movement to and from Asia and the world. Moreover, a great amount of maritime cargo, about 45 percent of which is from the Indian subcontinent itself, moves through the port of Colombo. Also, about 60,000 ships traverse universal transportation paths that lie a couple of nautical miles off the shoreline of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, every year. Out of the six principle ports in the nation, the ports of Colombo, Hambantota and Trincomalee have assumed a noteworthy role in guaranteeing the effective movement of cargo between the ports of origin and destination ports. This requires developments and advancements in the port cargo system, involving growth of road, rail, ocean and air networks connecting the cargo movements. In this light, we can see Sri Lanka’s renting out of the vital ports to both China and India, and the Maldives’ changing position towards China, as an indication of the extraordinary vulnerability small island countries face in development and resistance.
Maldives, located 500 kms. off the coast from India and Sri Lanka, it located between vital chokepoints at either end of the Indian Ocean, from where more than 40 million barrels of oil pass every day, consistently. These chokepoints include the Straits of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait. During ‘Operation Cactus’ in 1988, the maritime defence capabilities of the Maldives were exceptionally low, and throughout the years, the Maldives has updated its coast guard services monitor to shield its sway as a small island state in the region. Being near the equator, the Maldives has an Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) with immense potential, that needs observation and security along essential delivery paths. Since 2009, Maldives has experienced a fast modernisation process as it has joined the Marine Corps, Special Forces and Airborne Unit into the present cohesive structure of the Maldivian Forces. The current Maldivian Coast Guard Services have a few fast attack crafts, landing crafts and an offshore patrol vessel named Huravee, to give maritime defence services to 20 atolls spread over an area of 960 kms. from the north toward the south, excluding the EEZ. Other than the Indian and the Chinese impact, the United States also provides an immediate protection coverage on these small island states and inside the Indian Ocean through the nearness of their maritime base in Diego Garcia. This 35 sq.km. base has the nearness of around 30,000 US safeguard work force to give assurance to the Indo-Pacific locale, and to counter the Chinese impact in this region.
Conclusion
India has collated its security strategy with the island countries of Sri Lanka and the Maldives. However, the key security standard of India should be to follow the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and the other South Asian nations. In contemporary times, these two island countries are key for India’s Neighbourhood First and security policy. In the end, it is all about promoting peace and stability through these strategies in the Indian Ocean Region.
