1 April 2020, NIICE Commentary 3886
Angshuman Choudhury
On 15 March, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi convened a joint video conference with members of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to discuss possible regional collaboration over the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. The rare meeting of South Asian leaders, first of its kind since the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in 2014, saw the heads of state of all SAARC member countries, except Pakistan, come together to mull over ways to tackle the pandemic. While Pakistan did join the emergency meeting, it was represented not by the Prime Minister, but his Special Secretary on Health.
The Meeting and Follow-ups
Indian PM Modi made eight specific propositions to check the spread of COVID-19, amongst which was the establishment of a COVID-19 Emergency Fund (CEF) and initial contribution of USD 10 million by India, medical equipment and personnel deployment, joint utilisation of India’s flagship Integrated Disease Surveillance Portal (IDSP)s, activation of the SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), and evolution of ‘SAARC Pandemic Protocols’. Clearly, New Delhi wanted to take the lead in the regional response to COVID-19.
Soon after the video conference, India’s initial contribution was followed by Sri Lanka (USD 5 million), Bangladesh (USD 1.5 million), Afghanistan (USD 1 million), Nepal (USD 831,393), Maldives (USD 200,000) and Bhutan (USD 100,000). Pakistan is yet to pitch in an amount. Another video conference was organised between senior health professionals of SAARC countries on 27 March. Further, a common response centre for COVID-19 has been set up within the ambit of SDMC, complete with a new sub-site for daily updates about the pandemic spread in South Asia, status of the joint response, and other information. According to Bhutanese media, the Indian Embassy in Thimphu delivered a consignment of 50,000 face masks, 25,000 pairs of disposable gloves and shoes cover each, and 10,000 hand sanitisers to Bhutan on 23 March within the ambit of CEF.
Harmonising National and Regional Responses
It is well known that SAARC hasn’t been able to catalyse significant regional integration, despite historical congruences and porous borders. Parallel groupings like Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have taken greater precedence in recent times. Notwithstanding this, a public health crisis, which threatens not some abstract notion of national or regional security but the bare life of every single South Asian, can serve as a solid unifier. It can compel member states to overlook narrow geopolitical and geostrategic exigencies to redirect focus on collaboration, at least in the short term. The joint response to COVID-19 fits well within this understanding. But some critical lapses remain within the current framework.
As on 1 April, Pakistan topped the COVID-19 caseload tally in the SAARC region with a total of 2042 cases and 26 deaths. India, with a total of 1730 cases and 55 deaths, trails close by. But the margin between the second and the third spots is massive – Afghanistan, which comes after India, has reported only 196 cases and 4 deaths so far. Nepal (5 cases, 0 deaths) and Bhutan (4 cases, 0 deaths) sit at the bottom of the tally. Clearly, Pakistan and India are the two key COVID-19 hotspots in South Asia at the moment.
This essentially implies two things: one, not all member states can afford to invest equally in a regional response, given the varying degree of the threat within national borders; and two, the bulk of the responsibility to prevent a full-scale region-wide outbreak lies on New Delhi and Islamabad and it is important for both to limit the spread of the virus within their borders. These could severely hinder regional coordination.
Moreover, despite its high caseload, Islamabad hasn’t imposed a nationwide lockdown yet, unlike all the other SAARC countries. This stark divergence in the national response framework could blunt the joint regional mitigation strategy, not least by proliferating cases beyond Pakistan’s national borders. More importantly, Pakistan shares an 800 km-long land border with Iran, which was one of the initial COVID-19 hotspots and still soars high up in the tally, with 44,605 total cases and 2,898 deaths. Thus, synchronisation of national strategies between member states must form a key component of the joint regional response. This also includes developing a uniform surveillance, testing and quarantine infrastructure so as to avoid siloised mitigation pathways and prevent negation of each other’s efforts.
Need to Develop Better Border Protocols
Further, the regional response must go beyond mere financial assistance, information sharing, or capacity-building. It has to take into the account the peculiarity of South Asian border regimes. While most land border crossings in the region are currently shut for passenger traffic, the movement of goods continues unabated. While shutting commercial cross-border operations would severely hinder the already fragile South Asian regional economy, SAARC member states need to develop two things immediately: robust border screening procedures for commercial exchanges, and emergency norms for safe and dignified transfer of migrant workers.
For instance, thousands of Nepalese migrant workers in India made an attempt to enter their country after Kathmandu sealed its border with India on 22 March and India announced a nationwide lockdown the next day, leading to chaos and confusion at the border. Kathmandu later claimed that the problem was resolved through coordination with Indian authorities. This, however, proves that SAARC needs to develop rights and protection-based border protocols for vulnerable migrant workers within the ambit of the proposed Pandemic Protocols.
Moreover, the lack of uniform emergency-specific border protocols within SAARC leaves chinks in mitigation measures. For example, the Indian media recently reported that despite the sealing of the Nepal-India border, unofficial cross-border movement of people along the state of Bihar continues unabated. The same report quotes Nepalese journalists claiming that out of 5,000 people crossing the border daily, only 1000-1500 are being medically screened. This is a major cause for concern, as it could trigger fresh transmissions along both sides of the border.
Beyond SAARC
As pointed out by some analysts, India chose to fall back on SAARC and not BIMSTEC because two of the former’s member states, Pakistan and Afghanistan, share land borders with badly-hit Iran. This is a legitimate reason, beyond the endemic fact of the region’s high population density and porous borders. However, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, should not limit themselves to SAARC, and must develop parallel synergies within BIMSTEC. This is primarily because the two additional member states in the Bay of Bengal grouping – Myanmar and Thailand – too are hit by COVID-19.
While Myanmar has a relatively lower caseload than other countries in the region (15 cases, 1 death), Thailand is far worse hit, with 1771 confirmed cases and 120 deaths so far. What more, Myanmar is on high alert after more than 20,000 migrant workers from Thailand returned to the country over the last few days through the Myawaddy-Mae Sot border crossing. Naypyitaw expects a dramatic rise in cases in the coming days. Although the otherwise porous India-Myanmar border is sealed for now, it is possible that some informal movements happen in the days to come. Hence, a coordinated response within BIMSTEC is of utmost importance. This is even more so given that Thailand leads the ‘Public Health’ cluster within the group, and has been praised by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Johns Hopkins University for its COVID-19 response strategy. Bangkok’s invaluable experience could be used by its BIMSTEC partners in this time of crisis.
Lastly, India must pay close attention to its posturing within SAARC’s COVID-19 response strategy. It should not repeat old mistakes of overplaying its structural dominance or curtailing the agency of its fellow South Asian partners in setting the mitigation agenda. Sure, it did come up with the joint framework, but now must ensure that all member states have equal standing in setting the terms of the response, regardless of how much they are contributing. Otherwise, SAARC is bound to relapse into hibernation.
