11 November 2025, NIICE Commentary 11920
Kishore Yadav
One of the most significant changes in India's economic and geopolitical thinking in recent years is the country's push for ‘resource nationalism’ around rare earth elements (REEs). The minerals of the twenty-first century are rare earths, which are utilized in semiconductors, wind turbines, electric cars, and defense systems. India is currently working to transform from a marginal player to an independent producer and potentially a worldwide supplier thanks to its vast but underutilized deposits. In a world where geopolitical influence is increasingly determined by access to vital minerals, this endeavor represents both economic ambition and the desire for strategic autonomy.
The Resource Nationalism of India and Its Strategic Logic
India is thought to have one of the largest reserves of rare earth oxide in the world, with an estimated 6.9 million tonnes. These are mostly found in beach sands that are rich in monazite along the beaches of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Odisha. Nevertheless, India produces less than 1% of the world's rare earths, despite this abundance. Because many deposits contain the radioactive element thorium, the bottleneck is caused by low-grade ores, limited processing capacity, and strict regulatory oversight.
In light of this, resource nationalism has become both necessary and an opportunity. India's vulnerability has been made clear by China's worldwide dominance, which accounts for more than 90% of rare earth processing and magnet manufacture. When Beijing imposed export restrictions on certain REE products in 2024, it sent shockwaves across industries worldwide, including in India’s growing electric-vehicle and defence sectors. New Delhi’s response has been to reframe its resource policy from passive export management to active strategic control, seeking to integrate mining, processing, and manufacturing within national boundaries.
At the heart of this strategy is the government's National Critical Minerals Mission (NCMM). It seeks to develop integrated value chains for rare earths and other key minerals, increase exploration, and draw in private investment. In a similar vein, the purpose of the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) programs for electronics, electric vehicles, and renewable energy components is to generate demand for domestic processing of rare earth elements. These initiatives show a change in perspective from considering minerals as export commodities to considering them as tools of national security and industrial policy.
At the same time, the state has restricted the export of unprocessed monazite and directed public-sector undertakings like Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) to focus on domestic supply. This is classic resource nationalism, using natural endowment to build internal capability and reduce external dependence. But what distinguishes India’s approach today is its recognition that self-sufficiency does not mean isolation; it requires diversification of partnerships and integration into global supply networks on favourable terms.
Expanding Reliance: India's International Rare Earth Collaborations
The outward turn of India's present REE strategy is a notable aspect. India is deliberately diversifying its supply sources and technology alliances to lessen its excessive reliance on China, even though self-sufficiency is still the long-term objective. There are various forms and geographical areas of this diversification.
To gain access to vital mineral resources, India has recently established bilateral agreements with nations including Australia, Argentina, Peru, Zambia, Mozambique, and Côte d'Ivoire. The Ministry of Mines has made it clear that these relationships go beyond mining rights and include cooperation in downstream processing, knowledge exchange, and cooperative exploration. India's intention to establish long-term supply security from geologically varied partners is demonstrated, for instance, by New Delhi's talks with Chile and Peru, two Latin American nations rich in lithium and rare earth elements. This collaboration is moving beyond raw resources into industrial ecosystems, as evidenced by the Peruvian envoy's recent declaration in Bengaluru that "Peru's rare minerals can assist in enhancing India's electric-vehicle sector."
Australia has become India's most trusted partner in the Indo-Pacific region. Canberra's robust mining base, open regulations, and alignment with India through the Quad framework have made room for joint ventures. The two nations are already working together on critical mineral research and supply-chain diversification through the India-Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership. In addition to bilateral efforts, India is putting itself in international coalitions such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which also focuses on resilient critical-mineral networks, and the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), which is a grouping led by the United States and allies to secure non-Chinese mineral supply chains. These initiatives highlight a pragmatic resource nationalism that uses cooperation as a means of autonomy.
This "multi-vector diversification" approach reflects a fundamental shift in Indian thought. India wants to build a network of sourcing, refining, and technology partnerships that spread risk and provide leverage rather than relying on China as a replacement. This method views minerals as tools for industrial competitiveness and international policy, rather than just as commodities.
Opportunities, Constraints, and the Road Ahead
India's journey toward rare-earth self-reliance is far from straightforward, despite apparent advancements. Positively, diversification allows India to negotiate better terms with international partners and survive supply interruptions, giving it strategic space. Since many of India's new relationships entail cooperative R&D or co-investment in processing facilities, it also aids in the creation of avenues for technology transfer. Over time, this might lower the price and difficulty of manufacturing magnets and refining in India.
There are still a few limitations, though. The first is the continued underdevelopment of domestic capacity. Large-scale separation plants and facilities for producing high-purity oxides are lacking in India. New international connections might only alleviate dependence to a certain extent in the absence of this midstream infrastructure. Second, domestic expansion is complicated by environmental and social issues related to REE extraction, such as radioactive byproducts, dangers to coastal ecosystems, and community hostility. A crucial test will be striking a balance between industrial urgency and sustainability.
Third, there are still technological and financial obstacles. Precision engineering and reliable supply chains are necessary for the capital-intensive and technologically complicated production of rare earth elements. India must guarantee policy stability, expedited clearances, and long-term offtake contracts in order to draw in private investment. The private sector's current little role will be crucial to the expansion of the recycling and magnet manufacturing sectors.
Finally, additional dependencies are brought about by diversity. Even if India might become less dependent on China, an over-reliance on a small number of new allies could lead to the resurgence of comparable vulnerabilities. In the upcoming ten years, the legitimacy of India's resource nationalism will be determined by how well this balance between openness and control is managed.
The trajectory is encouraging, though. India has shifted from reactive resource policy to strategic resource planning, as seen by its proactive diplomacy with Latin America and Africa, its entrance into the global discourse on critical-mineral governance, and its internal institutional innovations. Rare earths won't be a standalone problem; rather, they will be a component of a larger developmental and geopolitical agenda, as evidenced by the growing convergence of India's mining industry, industrial aspirations, and climate-energy goals.
Conclusion
A developing strategic philosophy that acknowledges that real autonomy is attained by controlling the entire value chain and diversifying risks, rather than by hoarding resources, is shown in India's nationalism around rare-earth resources. India is working to acquire the raw materials that will support its industrial expansion, defense modernization, and clean energy transition through its domestic policy reforms and multi-country alliances.
However, ambition needs to be balanced with skill. India's ability to translate its enormous reserves, diplomatic efforts, and industrial plans into observable outcomes—measured in refined output, technological proficiency, and worldwide influence—will be put to the test in the upcoming years. If it is successful, India may transform from a resource-rich but reliant country into a key actor in the geopolitics of vital minerals. Otherwise, its resource nationalism might continue to be more rhetorical than revolutionary. In any case, India's push for diversification is a significant step in redefining its economic sovereignty in a world where the politics of minerals are becoming more and more dominant.
Kishore Yadav is a Postgraduate in Applied Sociology from Christ (Deemed to be University), Bangalore, India.
