Street Politics and Digital Revolts: what France and Nepal Tell us About Democracy

Street Politics and Digital Revolts: what France and Nepal Tell us About Democracy

Street Politics and Digital Revolts: what France and Nepal Tell us About Democracy

11 September 2025, NIICE Commentary 11696
Lilian Pineau

On Monday, 8 September, former French Prime Minister François Bayrou and his government lost a vote of confidence in Parliament., two days before a nationwide protest by unions over 44 billion euros in cuts to reduce the country’s debt. Meanwhile, on the same day in Nepal, a significant protest for corruption, nepotism and inefficiency of public policies began, culminating in several deaths and the resignation of Prime Minister Oli the next day. Whilst there were very different contexts, protests, and consequences it is significant that both examples show similar issues for democracies across the world, including governance, inequalities and institutional distrust all of which are increasingly led by youth and social media.

Context

French anger has various origins. With the Yellow Vest movement in 2018 showing a portion of the population, those "forgotten," who were living in poverty and facing economic inequalities, which remained unresolved and had reached their worst level in 30 years in France. Further, in 2023, the massive protests that brought millions of French citizens together against pension reform, that a strong majority of French citizens opposed. But despite mobilisations of citizens, the law was passed by force by the former French Prime Minister Borne, ignoring the will of the people as expressed through their representatives.

In response to these mobilisations, the state has demonstrated due impermeability, violent police interventions acting as social counterpower. Whatever the nature or motivation of the protests, they are systematically criminalized and repressed, which consolidates the verticalisation of power further and deepens the antagonism between the state and the people. Conventional democratic structures seemed shaken when Macron arbitrarily dissolved the National Assembly in June 2024 and, since then, when he has appointed prime ministers who do not arise from the then parliamentary majority, leading to a governmental instability.

But the trigger was the Bayrou budget, which contained proposals to eliminate public holidays, decrease medicine reimbursement and get tough on sick leave. The cumulative grievances persuaded many that a dislocation of power relations had to be taken out of conventional processes, which contributed specifically to fuelled resentment towards political representation. The French demonstrators were even inspired by videos from Nepal. The state employed exceptional police measures with 80,000 police officers deployed, fearing the demonstration would get out of control.

In Nepal, two of the main drivers in the emergence of such a movement were deep social inequalities and pervasive distrust of political elites. Public anger is especially directed at government corruption and nepotism, in which the children of political elites flaunt luxury consumerism in a country where the per capita income is $1,400 a year. There is also a history of political instability, like in France, with 13 successive governments since 2008. The mobilisation was primarily triggered by a government decision seen to undermine civil liberties. In early September of 2025, KP Oli's government ordered the ban of 26 different social media sites (including Facebook, X, and YouTube) under the pretext of a lack of registration. This action seemed to be a tool of censorship, which coincided with a very active online movement denouncing the corruption and nepotism of political leaders and their families. There are many reports of police violence, which only led to more mobilisation and anger. Therefore, there is a resurgence of the logic of the state's inability to respond to public demand. 72 people were killed and more than 1,300 were injured this week.

More than the cancellation of the controversial decree, the Gen-Z movement was instilling the question of institutional reform, the redistribution of power, even sidestepping the constitution, by appointing a prime minister through a Discord poll run by Hami Nepal among the protesters, at a time when constitutional and traditional avenues of popular expression, as seen in France, appeared restricted.

Crisis of democratic legitimacy and breach of the social pact

This demonstrates "a deep democratic malaise" and a lack of institutional legitimacy. A January 2025 poll by Sciences Po Paris indicated that French trust in institutions had receded to 26 percent when the Yellow Vests first emerged. As such, the democratic contract between the rulers and the ruled is fledgling, as citizens perceive that no dialogue is possible. France's "crisis of representative democracy" is manifest in the decline of traditional modes of engagement with an increase in abstention.

Parliamentary democracy is also fragile in Nepal. In the last fifteen years (since 2008), no government elected by the people has finished its term. Nepal has had fourteen governments and ten prime ministers. This perennial instability has been further exacerbated by accusations of corruption at all levels. These young people want political parties to be disbanded and the Constitution to be amended in the original spirit of the people. In both countries, the people no longer see themselves as genuinely part of popular sovereignty.

At the institutional level, these crises have laid bare authoritarian practices. In France, under President Macron, there has been a rapid succession of imposed decisions and reliance on “extraordinary” instruments; the most glaring example has been the use of Article 49.3 of the Constitution to enact the March 2023 pension reform without a vote. Some unions had described this as a “democratic flaw” as it ignored debate by parliament and undermined the legislature. Even more radical was an announcement in June 2024 that he would dissolve the National Assembly after the European elections; this move offended even Macron’s own side. This dissolution carried the constitutional risk of a parliamentary vacuum and the power away from classically aligned formations (including the National Rally). Together, they demonstrate an increasing reliance on exceptional instruments of government and a dismantling of ordinary processes of democratic government.

In Nepal, similar executive overreach has contributed to the breakdown of democracy. Prime Minister KP Oli gained notoriety for dissolving Parliament twice (in December 2020 and May 2021) to avoid a vote of no confidence or the formation of a new coalition, both of which were later ruled by the Supreme Court as “unconstitutional acts.” In July 2021, the Constitutional Court reinstated Parliament and ordered Deuba, who is a rival of Oli, to be the Prime Minister instead. The arbitrary dissolutions led to a series of constitutional crises. On September 4, the Oli government ordered a de facto state of emergency by shutting down access to 26 social media platforms, an extraordinary measure intended to silence digital dissent. It attracted national condemnation as the spark of the revolt, and after only a few days of popular dissent and outrage, Oli was forced to lift it. By the end of the demonstrations, Oli had stepped down, leaving institutions stunned. There was no immediate successor appointed; there was such a void of power that a sense of an absence of authority permeated the country.

Democracy under Strain

In conclusion, the cases of France and Nepal illustrate how citizens take actions outside a parliamentary system when formal processes appear ineffective. Thus, governments tend to respond by tightening authority and further diminishing trust among the public. The imagery of repression and the entrenchment of elites correspond with a ‘backsliding’ pattern of executives evading legislatures. Democracy then has a double burden of both executive overreach and popular distrust.

Lilian Pineau

Lilian Pineau

Lilian Pineau is a Research Intern at the Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE). He is a third-year Political Science student at Sciences Po Aix and will spend a semester at Shenzhen University in China. His research focuses on public action, social mobilization, and international cooperation. He is currently preparing his Master’s thesis on France as a balancing power in the Indo-Pacific and previously completed his undergraduate thesis on environmental activism in France.

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