2 Sept 2025, NIICE Commentary 11664
Mohit Singh Mehra
Relations between India and China have gone through big ups and downs in recent years. After the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020 ties reached their lowest point in decades. Things began to change at the Kazan BRICS summit in October 2024, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met and significantly, they endorsed an agreement on patrolling and troop disengagement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, easing tensions from the Galwan clashes of 2020.The leaders pledged to enhance strategic communication, mutual trust, and a long-term, stable bilateral relationship.
Since the Kazan BRICS Summit in October 2024, India and China have cautiously moved towards rapprochement through a series of steps. The process began with the resumption of the Special Representatives’ dialogue in Beijing on December 18, 2024. This was followed by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit in January 2025, which produced agreements on direct flights, the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, journalist exchanges, and revival of the Expert-Level Mechanism on rivers. In June 2025, Chinese Vice FM Sun Weidong visited Delhi, and NSA Doval met FM Wang Yi in Beijing, keeping momentum in dialogue (MEA). The most visible progress came in August 2025, when Wang Yi’s Delhi visit for the 24th SR talks led to the reopening of border trade routes, emergency hydrological data-sharing, confirming the resumption of passenger flights with China soon.
When President Trump imposed an additional 25% tariff on Indian imports raising duties to 50% as punishment for New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian oil, China came out openly in support of India. The Chinese embassy in New Delhi stressed that India’s sovereignty is non-negotiable and that every country has the right to decide where it buys its energy from. Echoing this, Chinese Ambassador Xu Feihong sharply criticized Washington’s coercive tactics, remarking that “silence only emboldens the bully” and warning that giving in to pressure would only strengthen such behavior. This rare public backing underscored Beijing’s alignment with New Delhi in defending sovereign choices against unilateral U.S. sanctions.
At the SCO Summit held in Tianjin from 31 August to 1 September 2025, India and China emphasized cooperation over rivalry, with both Modi and Xi calling their nations “partners, not competitors” and stressing the need to maintain peace along the border. They pledged to expand trade and investment while addressing imbalances, and supported building a multipolar order resilient to U.S. tariff shocks. Xi proposed the Global Governance Initiative at the SCO summit as advocated for practicing multilateralism for equitable global governance and also pressed his vision for a new global security and economic order that prioritises the global south. Both India and China emphasized their commitment to multilateralism, a multipolar world order, and prioritizing the concerns of the Global South. If their current rapprochement holds over the long term, it could play a decisive role in shaping not only the regional balance in Asia but also the future of the global order.
While the China-U.S. rivalry is often portrayed as the defining contest of the 21st century, India-China relationship may prove even more consequential in the long run. Together, the two countries account for nearly 40 per cent of the world’s population and rank among the largest global economies. If their rapprochement holds, it could stabilize Asia by reducing the risk of renewed border clashes and create space for cooperation in trade, supply chains, and regional security frameworks. It also opens opportunities for deeper coordination within multilateral forums such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the G20, where both countries have consistently pushed for reforms that reflect the aspirations of the Global South. At the global level, rapprochement could strengthen efforts to build a more equitable distribution of power in international institutions, thereby challenging Western dominance in global governance. For the West, especially the United States this poses a strategic dilemma, as India cannot be relied upon as a simple counterweight to China. New Delhi’s deep rooted commitment to strategic autonomy means it will resist becoming part of an overt anti-China alliance, instead opting to balance its ties across multiple poles of power. More broadly, sustained cooperation between India and China would accelerate the emergence of a multipolar world order, reshaping both Asian geopolitics and the global balance of power.
However, rapprochement between India and China will remain fragile and limited. The October 2024 border agreement may have restored some patrol rights and opened diplomatic channels, but it did not resolve the larger territorial disputes like China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh (which it calls South Tibet) and its control over Aksai Chin. These unresolved issues mean that the risk of future stand-offs and skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control remains high, especially as both sides continue to maintain thousands of troops and expand border infrastructure. Beyond territory, deeper fault lines of sovereignty and status persist: Tibet for China and Kashmir for India where CPEC projects are built by China remain highly sensitive, and the question of the Dalai Lama’s succession could ignite fresh tensions. One of the major imbalances in the India-China relationship is in trade. India runs a trade deficit of over 100 billion dollars with China, making it one of the largest deficits India has with any country and in the long run it is going to hurt India’s interest. Equally, Beijing has shown little willingness to recognize India as an equal, often dismissing it as a pawn in the larger China-U.S rivalry, which fuels mistrust in New Delhi. Domestically too, nationalism places constraints on leaders. Modi's government faces political pressure not to appear weak on China, while Xi cannot be seen as compromising on sovereignty claims. Taken together, these realities suggest that rapprochement will remain a delicate balancing act, shaped by a mix of selective cooperation and deep-seated rivalry rather than a genuine long-term partnership.
India-China relations to sustain for a long term, the two sides will eventually need to strike a “grand bargain.” This would mean making meaningful concessions on both sides, including a final settlement of the border dispute alongside compromises on broader geopolitical and economic concerns. Without such a bargain, the relationship is likely to remain a mix of limited cooperation and recurring rivalry. Lasting peace will require both countries to respect each other’s red lines, for China, this means India avoiding overt support for Tibetan separatism, Taiwan, or South China Sea claimants; for India, it means Beijing refraining from deeper military or strategic support to Pakistan in conflicts over Kashmir. Other analysts echo this view, arguing that partial deals like the 2024 border agreement cannot erase structural mistrust rooted in sovereignty and status competition. Unresolved issues such as water-sharing on the Brahmaputra and competing visions of Asian leadership also require structured compromises, not ad-hoc fixes. Only long-term institutional cooperation can prevent small disputes from escalating. In this light, the “way forward” is not simply about de-escalating crises but about crafting a comprehensive settlement that links border demilitarization, economic interdependence, and mutual recognition of status. Until such a bargain is struck, rapprochement will remain provisional, more of a strategic pause than a genuine reset.
Mohit Singh Mehra is currently pursuing his Master's degree at the Department of International Relations, South Asian University, India.
The views presented here ar the author's personal views.
