27 August 2024, NIICE Commentary 11633
Mohit Singh Mehra
The 24th round of the Special Representative Dialogue on the boundary question between India and China, held in New Delhi on August 19, 2025, chaired by India’s NSA Ajit Doval and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi , was expected to focus primarily on easing tensions and strengthening mechanisms for managing the Line of Actual Control (LAC). One key decision made during the dialogue was to reopen trade through three routes including Lipulekh and other two are Shipki La and Nathu La. Trade through Lipulekh has once again stirred controversy. While India and China hailed the move as a step toward normalizing ties and boosting cross-border economic activity, Nepal reacted sharply, reiterating its long standing claim over Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura. This development is not new in South Asian geopolitics, but it reopens unresolved disputes around borders, identity, and sovereignty.
The Lipulekh Pass, located at the trijunction of India, Nepal, and China (Tibet Autonomous Region), has long served as a traditional trade and pilgrimage route. Historically, it was a crucial pathway for traders, pilgrims, and local communities moving between the Indian state of Uttarakhand and Tibet. The route gained prominence as part of the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage, where Hindu pilgrims journey across the Himalayas to the sacred sites in Tibet.
Nepal traces its claim to the Treaty of Sugauli (1816), signed between the British East India Company and the Kingdom of Nepal after the Anglo-Nepalese War. According to Nepal, the Kali River was fixed as the western boundary, and territories east of it belonged to Nepal. Kathmandu argues that Limpiyadhura, the source of the Kali River, lies northwest of Kalapani, and therefore, Lipulekh and Kalapani fall east of the river, placing them within Nepalese territory.
India, however, identifies the Kali River’s origin at a different point, further downstream near Kalapani, thereby considering these regions as part of Pithoragarh district in Uttarakhand. This divergence in defining the river’s source lies at the heart of the dispute.
Lipulekh has periodically come under focus whenever India has sought to revive or expand trade and pilgrimage through the route. In 2015, India and China signed an agreement to open Lipulekh for trade and the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, bypassing Nepal. Kathmandu protested strongly, seeing the bilateral arrangement as a violation of its sovereignty. Similarly, in 2020, when India inaugurated a new road to Lipulekh to facilitate easier access for pilgrims and traders, Nepal objected by issuing a revised political map incorporating Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura as its territory.
This time, the announcement after the recent Special Representative talks triggered renewed protests in Nepal. Leaders and civil society groups accused India and China of sidelining Nepal’s concerns, arguing that decisions over the trijunction should involve all three stakeholders. For Nepal, this is not only a cartographic dispute but also a question of national pride and sovereignty.
In the days following Nepal’s protests, India rejected Kathmandu’s objections outright. The Ministry of External Affairs described Nepal’s position as “unjustified and untenable,” pointing out that border trade with China through Lipulekh has been in place since 1954 and has continued under formal agreements signed in the early 1990s. India also emphasized that its activities in the region are entirely within its own territory, urging Nepal to resolve boundary differences through dialogue rather than unilateral claims.
While the dispute is framed in terms of state sovereignty, it deeply affects the local communities inhabiting these regions. The Bhotiya community in Uttarakhand, an indigenous group with trans-Himalayan ties, historically depended on cross-border trade through Lipulekh. The exchange of salt, wool, and other goods sustained livelihoods and cultural connections with Tibet. The closure of borders following the 1962 Sino-Indian War disrupted these networks, leading to economic decline and cultural dislocation for the Bhotiyas.
Reopening trade through Lipulekh thus holds economic and cultural significance for these border communities. It promises opportunities for commerce, tourism, and the revival of age-old connections, though the benefits remain fragile amid the larger political contestations. For Nepal’s communities in the western districts, the unresolved status of these territories fuels uncertainty, as claims over sovereignty directly affect resource access, mobility, and identity.
The Way Forward for India
India’s immediate challenge is to manage Nepal’s sensitivities while at the same time safeguarding its own strategic and economic interests. New Delhi cannot afford to overlook Kathmandu, particularly at a time when Nepal’s internal politics remain fragile and Chinese influence is steadily expanding in Nepal. The Lipulekh controversy, if mishandled, risks deepening anti-India sentiment in Nepal, a development that Beijing could easily leverage to its advantage.
To avoid this, India must adopt a more constructive and inclusive approach. First, India should speed up the dialogue with Nepal to resolve its border issues with Nepal, including the Lipulekh. In the meantime, it should proactively engage Nepal with dialogue and transparency, making clear that its trade arrangements with China are not designed to undermine Nepalese sovereignty. Reviving the long-stalled Joint Technical Boundary Committee, which last met in the 2000s, could provide a platform to reopen discussions on boundary demarcation. At the same time, India and China should recognize that Lipulekh lies at a trijunction and avoid making unilateral decisions without Kathmandu’s involvement. Even an informal trilateral consultative mechanism would help prevent controversies from flaring up repeatedly.
Equally important is the need to prioritize the welfare of local communities living in the border areas, such as the Bhotiyas of Uttarakhand, who historically depended on cross-border trade. Better infrastructure, tourism initiatives, and cultural preservation programs can ensure that these communities see tangible benefits from the reopening of trade, thereby reducing the chances of the issue being politicized. Finally, India should invest in confidence-building measures with Nepal by offering joint cultural projects, pilgrim facilitation, and shared economic benefits. Such gestures, both symbolic and material, would help reassure Kathmandu that India seeks partnership rather than exclusion in managing the future of this sensitive Himalayan frontier.
Lipulekh is more than a strategic pass; it embodies the complex interplay of history, geography, and national aspirations in the Himalayas. The recent decision to reopen trade routes with China has catalyzed renewed controversy with Nepal, reminding us that diplomacy, not domination, must guide border management. India’s challenge now is to preserve strategic and economic gains without sidelining its neighbour.
Mohit Singh Mehra is currently pursuing his Masters at the Department of International Relations, South Asian University, India.
