5 July 2025, NIICE Commentaries 11418
Rinto Sebastian Charles
Since 2022, Russia has shifted its approach in the South Caucasus from near-exclusive security dominance to a more flexible strategy. This change reflects Moscow's adaptation to regional dynamics, including the rise of external powers and the impact of the Ukraine war. The new policy focuses on rebalancing bilateral relations, using a broader range of influence beyond military means, and accommodating regional actors while resisting Western encroachment. This article examines the evolution of Russia's strategy in the South Caucasus and its impact on regional dynamics and security.
The Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
From Dominance to Adaptation
For decades following the Soviet collapse, Russia maintained predominant influence in the South Caucasus through military presence, conflict management, and economic leverage. Moscow leveraged the region's protracted conflicts to secure a central geopolitical role, creating what analysts have called a “Gordian knot” of interwoven obstacles and interests that hindered Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. However, Russia's position has been increasingly challenged by both external actors and the growing assertiveness of regional states. The war in Ukraine has accelerated this trend, creating what some observers call the end of Russia's "unipolar moment" in the South Caucasus. With Moscow focused on Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have gained more freedom in their foreign policies. This shift has pressured Russia to adjust its regional strategy, prioritising influence in a multipolar environment over exclusive dominance.
The Rise of Multipolarity
The South Caucasus is increasingly affected by multipolar international politics, with Turkey, Iran, and China expanding their engagement in the region. These powers are strengthening links between the South Caucasus and Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, supplementing the region's established ties to Russia, the US, and Europe. This has created new opportunities for regional states to diversify their partnerships and reduce dependence on any single external actor. The emergence of multipolarity has been particularly evident in the changing dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan's military victories in 2020 and 2023, supported by Turkey, have changed the regional balance of power. Iran is increasingly uneasy about its potential marginalisation in transportation corridors and the strengthening ties between Azerbaijan and Israel.
Russia's New Strategic Approach
Rebalancing Bilateral Relations
Russia's rebalancing strategy involves recalibrating its relationships with each South Caucasus state according to new realities. With Armenia, Moscow has had to navigate a deteriorating relationship as Yerevan has grown increasingly dissatisfied with Russian security guarantees, especially following Azerbaijan's military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh. In February 2024, Armenia suspended its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), citing Russia's failure to fulfil its security obligations in 2021 and 2022.
With Azerbaijan, Russia has maintained a pragmatic relationship despite growing tensions. Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Russia deployed peacekeepers to the region, which helped solidify its influence. However, Azerbaijan has increasingly asserted its independence, reducing reliance on Moscow as a mediator and taking steps to limit Russian influence within its borders. Georgia continues to resist Russian influence, maintaining its pro-Western orientation despite the ruling Georgian Dream party's more accommodating stance toward Moscow. According to recent reports, 69 per cent of Georgians view Russia as an enemy, highlighting the challenges Moscow faces in improving relations with Tbilisi.
Russia has been promoting the North-South Transport Corridor to connect itself with Iran and South Asia via the South Caucasus. This initiative has gained importance due to Western sanctions, as Russia seeks alternative trade routes. Additionally, Russia employs hybrid tactics, including propaganda, economic coercion, cyber operations, and support for pro-Russian political forces, to undermine pro-Western sentiment and influence democratic processes without military intervention.
The "3+3" Regional Format
A key component of Russia’s rebalancing strategy in the South Caucasus is its support for the “3+3” regional cooperation platform, which brings together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia with Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Originally proposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and quickly endorsed by Russia and Iran, the “3+3” format aims to establish a regional mechanism for dialogue, economic integration, and security management independent of Western influence. This initiative reflects Moscow’s broader goal of countering Euro-Atlantic encroachment by promoting regional ownership over local affairs. While the “3+3” format offers opportunities for dialogue and economic cooperation, such as developing new transport corridors and managing regional crises, it also institutionalises existing power asymmetries. However, the platform’s effectiveness and inclusivity remain constrained by several critical factors. Armenia has expressed reservations, fearing the format could legitimise Azerbaijan’s territorial gains and undermine its security, while Georgia has outright refused participation due to Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its pro-Western orientation. Consequently, the forum functions more as a “3+2” arrangement, limiting its reach, especially in terms of connectivity and transit issues where Georgia plays a pivotal role.
Russia, Turkey, and Iran risk using the platform to entrench their spheres of influence, potentially at the expense of smaller states’ sovereignty and democratic development. By excluding the US and EU, the format alienates pro-Western actors and undermines its legitimacy as a comprehensive regional mechanism. Persistent mistrust among participants and unresolved conflicts further hinder cooperation, raising the risk that the platform will serve as an arena for great power rivalry rather than effective conflict resolution. For Russia, the “3+3” initiative is essential to maintain relevance and counter Western influence amid diminishing control. Its success depends on overcoming challenges to become an inclusive and effective framework for peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus.
Effects and Implications
Erosion of the Russian Monopoly
Russia's rebalancing strategy has coincided with a significant erosion of its monopoly on regional security and influence. Armenia's suspension of CSTO participation and diversification of foreign ties represent a major blow to Russia's position. Azerbaijan has demonstrated its ability to act independently, achieving the early withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh and taking steps to curb Russian influence within its borders. Georgia, despite the Georgian Dream government's more accommodating stance, continues to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration.
Increased Regional Agency and Multipolarity
The South Caucasus states have exploited Russia's policy shift to pursue multi-vector foreign policies, engaging with a wider array of partners. This has led to increased local agency in relation to external partnerships, reinforced by a turn to illiberal domestic politics in some cases. The "3+3" format, while excluding Western powers, gives regional actors more say in security matters but also risks entrenching spheres of influence.
Persistent Instability Risks
Russia's historical pattern of using instability as leverage persists, with its policies often contributing to unresolved conflicts and regional volatility. The nature of peace that Russia has introduced in the region has been described as "geopolitical peace", highly unstable and probably short-lived. Moscow is not genuinely interested in the final resolution of conflicts because such a resolution would limit its projection of power.
Conclusion
Russia's rebalancing strategy in the South Caucasus aims to adapt to a regional environment where its dominance is diminishing. While still a key player, Russia's influence is challenged by other powers and the assertiveness of South Caucasus states. The region is shifting toward multipolarity, with Russia relying on partners like Iran and Turkey. Moving through 2025, the South Caucasus will likely remain contested, and Russia’s success will depend on embracing constructive regional cooperation rather than military means, while the risk of instability could rise from confrontational policies.
Rinto Sebastian Charles is a Research Intern at NIICE and is currently pursuing his Master's in International Studies at Christ University, Bangalore, India.
