18 May 2025, NIICE Commentary 10943
Rinto Sebatian Charles
The Indo-Pacific is undergoing a profound reshaping of its security and diplomatic order. For decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been boasting of its central role, serving as the region's preeminent convener and normative anchor. Recently, however, the unexpected rise of minilateral clusters like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the trilateral security alliance of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) has posed new and serious challenges to ASEAN's traditional centrality. These new developments have evoked debate not only about the future viability of ASEAN centrality but also about the health of its consensus norms and the capacity of the organisation to evolve with the times.
The Rise of Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific
Minilateralism has become a leading feature of the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. Unlike multilateralism, which seeks to be all-encompassing and inclusive in nature, minilateralism is pragmatic, has specific agendas, and is selective in membership. Good illustrations of this are the QUAD, comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, and AUKUS, which includes Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These are not of a closed alliance nature but are cooperative forums for like-minded countries to deal with specific issues such as maritime security and cyber policy.
The attraction of minilateralism is its operational efficiency and adaptability. While the consensus method employed by ASEAN is good at ensuring participation and debate, it has tended to result in stalemate, particularly on controversial issues such as the South China Sea and the Myanmar crisis. Minilateral mechanisms, however, have the capability to avoid stalemate and deliver concrete results, which is why they are appealing to both outsiders and individual ASEAN members. The QUAD, for example, has been able to coordinate on priority technologies, maritime domain awareness, and vaccine diplomacy with a speed and precision that ASEAN-led platforms have been unable to match.
Minilateralism as a Challenge to ASEAN Centrality
Minilateral groups are becoming a significant challenge to ASEAN's position in regional affairs. As there is growing competition between great powers, great powers are resorting to minilateral groups to pursue their interests. Minilateral groups such as the QUAD and AUKUS are negotiating and tackling matters that would traditionally be their domain, sometimes without seeking ASEAN's participation or consultation.
This development may sideline ASEAN, potentially diminishing its role as the primary setting for regional cooperation. If influential decisions regarding security, technology, or infrastructure occur outside ASEAN meetings, the influence of the organisation over regional affairs will likely decrease. Additionally, with numerous small initiatives that sometimes coincide, the regional structure may be dismantled, fragmenting into competing areas of influence and diluting the solidarity that ASEAN has attempted to maintain. The test is not purely hypothetical. The AUKUS agreement, for example, has introduced cutting-edge military technology and nuclear-powered submarines into the region, a turn towards hard security collaboration that ASEAN is not well-positioned to handle. In the same vein, the QUAD has promoted its own agenda for maritime security and infrastructure without always taking ASEAN into account, fueling concerns about the rise of parallel and potentially rival regional orders.
Minilateralism is increasingly favoured by both external powers and ASEAN members for several compelling reasons. First, it allows for swift decision-making and action, bypassing the complexities of requiring consensus among all ten diverse member countries, which is crucial in a dynamic security environment. Second, minilateral arrangements enable focused responses to specific issues, such as maritime security or cyber threats, where cooperation is more feasible among a smaller group of states. Finally, minilateralism helps bridge capability gaps, as demonstrated by initiatives like the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Patrol among ASEAN states, and by introducing external resources and capabilities that ASEAN may lack independently.
Multilateralism and the Question of Normative Erosion
Minilateralism raises concerns about eroding ASEAN’s foundational norms of consensus, non-interference, and inclusivity. However, its relationship with ASEAN norms is more complex. Successful examples, like the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Patrol among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, show that minilateral arrangements can function within ASEAN’s framework, enhancing rather than undermining core values.
The risk of normative erosion arises if ASEAN remains passive towards minilateralism. By proactively formalisingg consultations with minilateral groups, aligning initiatives with its priorities, and adopting flexible decision-making models like ‘ASEAN Minus X,’ ASEAN can mitigate the risk of being sidelined. Thus, minilateralism does not inherently erode ASEAN’s norms but requires the organisation to adapt and engage strategically for its future centrality.
ASEAN’s Fractured Response: Internal Divisions and Strategic Hedging
ASEAN's minilateralism counterpoint has been plagued by splits in its member countries, whose different strategic priorities and threat assessments lead them down differently oriented pathways. The Philippines and Vietnam have become more positively attuned to near ties with third-party minilaterals as part of countervailing the forceful minilateralsims and assertive attitude of China on the South China Sea, however. Cambodia and Laos respond negatively toward groupings, which instead have Beijing's pull of ASEAN-minister-led approaches.
Such diversity of opinion makes it difficult for ASEAN to adopt a collective stance against minilateralism, effectively undermining its collective agency. The rule of consensus, which in keeping its multilateral members united is effective, also tends to lead to paralysis where disagreement exists. The broken reaction is seen in the manner in which some ASEAN members engage actively with or endorse minilateral moves, while others are wary or even critical. This divide enables outside powers to use divergence within ASEAN to further disempower the bloc to speak with one voice on critical regional issues.
The Double-Edged Sword: Risks and Opportunities for ASEAN
Minilateralism presents both dangers and opportunities for ASEAN. One risk is the potential erosion of ASEAN's cohesion and centrality, as states prioritise their interests within minilateral frameworks, which could weaken ASEAN's role as a regional convenor and agenda-setter. Additionally, increased minilateral forums may foster factionalism, pushing countries to align with either the US or China. Another concern is marginalisation; if great powers favour multilateral agreements over ASEAN-led initiatives, the organisation may lose influence in shaping regional rules and norms. The presence of various, often competing, minilateral initiatives has the potential to splinter the regional architecture into overlapping spheres of influence, dissipating the cohesion that ASEAN has long sought to promote.
But minilateralism also has its opportunities. Internally generated minilaterals can fill ASEAN's collective weak spots, enabling progress on matters for which a consensus is hard to obtain. Furthermore, the co-existence of numerous minilateral activities might stimulate a competitive dynamic to provide public goods, ultimately driving more optimal results for the region. By involving both internally generated and externally generated minilaterals, ASEAN can continue to remain relevant and influential in the regional system.
Conclusion
The minilateral challenge is within ASEAN's competencies, harnessing its convening power and normative reach. Through strategic institutional reforms, such as the enhancement of the ASEAN Secretariat's function and subgroup decision-making on individual issues, ASEAN can become more responsive without betraying its original principles. Direct participation strategically within minilateral arrangements through instruments like observer status, collaborative projects, or agenda-setting can lend substance to ASEAN's role in shaping regional outcomes. The organisation's role as a neutral convenor allows ASEAN to harness the increasing competition among the great powers effectively. By adopting a pragmatic strategy that embraces minilateralism but remains true to its established norms, ASEAN can maintain its central role in the rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific region. The new minilateral trend in the Indo-Pacific is an unprecedented test to ASEAN's centrality, threatening the organisation's position in the most important areas of regional governance. However, the minilateralism argument of necessarily undermining ASEAN's normative foundations is exaggerated. ASEAN's future potential as the central player in the region will rely less on the direct counterbalancing of minilateralism and more on the organisation's ability to adapt, engage, and innovate.
Rinto Sebastian Charles is Research Intern at NIICE and is currently pursuing his Master's in International Studies at Christ University, Bangalore, India.
